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incorporation via that Clause may have been a minimum compromise view
accepted by all the Justices in Slaughter-House. The article builds in part on
prior scholarly work suggesting and developing this reading of the opinions
themselves, and supports that reading by analyzing sources previously untapped
in this regard These sources include briefs and arguments presented to the
Supreme Court and, most dramatically, debates in Congress during 1873-74.
The latter debates reveal that the decision was read in an incorporationist light
by lawyer-politicians across the political spectrum, including (indeed, especially)
by the most conservative, anti-Reconstruction Southern Democrats. Indeed, the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment at least applies all textual Bill of Rights
guarantees to the states, and that even the Slaughter-House majority embraced
such a view, appears to have briefly emerged as a baseline consensus during the
early 1870s. In a series of cases in the mid-to-late 1870s, however-most notably
Edwards v. Elliott (1874), Walker v. Sauvinet (1876), and United States v.
Crulkshank (1876)-the Supreme Court undermined and seemed to abandon the
incorporation theory. Professor Wildenthal explores the previously unrecognized
degree of discontinuity, poor or nonexistent reasoning, and outright procedural
impropriety in the latter cases. He also speculates about what might have caused
the incorporation "compromise" to become lost. The article concludes by
suggesting that this historical evidence should place the incorporation theory on
a stronger foundation in the modern Court, which recently signalled, in Saenz v.
Roe (1999), a willingness to re-examine and give new life to the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause. In a sequel to this article,
forthcoming in the next issue of the Ohio State Law Journal, Professor
Wildenthal pursues the treatment of the incorporation theory on the Supreme
Court after 1880, culminating in Twining v. New Jersey (1908).
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The question may be asked, fils [the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause] not dangerous to the States? My answer is, no;
that it involves no danger to the States or to State rights. For what does
it amount to... ? Simply this: that rights which the citizen of the United
States enjoys under the Federal Constitution, and which the Federal
Government cannot deprive him of shall not be abridged by the State
In other words it is an extension of the guarantees of liberty and of the
Bill of Rights ... preventing the States themselves from depriving their
citizens of those guarantees.... If [that] is not the true reading of that
amendment, then [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] either means
nothing, or it means much more than the people of the United States
ever intended .... I
I. INTRODUCTION: PICKING UP THE THREADS OF AN OLD DEBATE
This article revisits the most durable and ceaselessly provocative controversy
in American constitutional law: the Great Debate over "incorporation," or
whether and to what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states the
guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights.2 That debate has turned in part on the
proper scope of the Privileges and Imnunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 In particular, this article revisits the debates and decisions bearing
12 CONG. REC. app. 244 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874) (Sen. Thomas M. Norwood, D-Ga.).
2 See U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-VIII, XIV. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments do not enter
into the discussion for the most part, since they do not refer to any particular individual rights.
See U.S. CONST. amends. IX-X. On the other hand, the Constitution does contain additional
references to individual rights outside the first ten amendments. See infra note 94.
3 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, with which this article is concerned, reads in
full:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereot
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause consists of the words:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States .... Id. Aside from the substantive debates over the Clause's
meaning, there seems to be a parallel semantic debate over how to refer to it. The commonly
seen shorthand 'Privileges or Immunities Clause' strikes me as awkward, suggesting
uncertainty as to whether it is the "Privileges Clause" or the "Immunities Clause." The Clause
itself uses "or" merely because of a happenstance of phrasing, since it provides that "[n]o State
shall" violate either the "privileges" or the "inmunities" of United States citizens. Because the
Clause therefore protects both "privileges" and "inmunities" the more sensible shorthand,
conveying its substantive meaning, is the 'Privileges and Immunities Clause." This also has the
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on incorporation between 1868 and 1880, in the Supreme Court and Congress. 4
This article proposes a fundamental reassessment of that misunderstood history,
with potentially far-reaching implications for the Court's future constitutional
case law.
A. The Need For Reassessment: Saenz v. Roe, Slaughter-House, and the
Future of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause
The incorporation debate, at a superficial level, seems settled today as a
matter of black-letter law. Not since 1969 has the Court either included or
excluded from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment any provision of the Bill
of Rights.5 But the modem Court has failed to articulate a coherent rationale for
its approach. It has come to rest by uneasy compromise on the awkward and
textually untenable theory of "selective incorporation' via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
virtue of consistency with the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause (from which the
Fourteenth Amendment Clause was derived), which refers to "Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). There is, of course, a need to
distinguish between the two Clauses, which have quite different meanings, see infra Part II.B,
but simply substituting "or" for "and" would hardly serve that purpose adequately.
4 A sequel to this article revisits the incorporation debate in the Supreme Court from 1880
to 1908. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of
the Bill of Rights, 61 OIO ST. L. (forthcoming Nov. 2000) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Road to
Twining] (manuscript available from author upon request).
5 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... "); see also, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 147-50 &n.14 (1968) (discussing selective incorporation approaches). Incorporation
via the Due Process Clause of substantive liberties set forth in the Bill of Rights, such as
freedom of speech under the First Amendment, makes little more sense than "Lochner-style'
incorporation of substantive economic liberties. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEW 14-21 (1980)
(criticizing "substantive" interpretations of Due Process Clause); id. at 25 (noting of Privileges
and Immunities Clause that "no other clause could plausibly serve as the vehicle for
incorporating the entire Bill of Rights"); id at 194 n.52 (noting that 'Due Process Clause can
be seen as an apt vehicle for incorporating those provisions of the Bill of Rights that relate to
'process"). It may be less troublesome as an exercise of judicial power, since the liberties are
drawn from established constitutional text rather than out of thin air by ajudge's personal view
of what is "fundamental," but it seems no less oxymoronic--"sort of like 'green pastel
redness,"' in Dean Ely's apt phrase. ELY, supra, at 18; see also I LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITrTONAL LAW § 7-5, at 1317-20 (3d ed. 2000) [vol. 1 hereinafter cited as
TRIBE 2000; vol. 2 is not yet published] (discussing problematical character of incorporating
Bill of Rights guarantees via substantive due process); Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth
105520001
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Furthermore, one can never be entirely sure that the incorporation debate on
the Court is, in fact, settled. The application of a number of federal constitutional
rights to the states remains in doubt 7 Though the danger perceived by some in
the 1980s that the Court might roll back existing pro-incorporation precedents8
seems to have receded,9 the Court will eventually be confronted by the issues that
remain open. The uneasy rationale underlying the current precedents will then
undergo uncomfortable scrutiny. After all, the majority in Twining v. New
Jersey o presumably believed that it had settled the issue for all time-and
indeed, it took fifty-six years for Twining to be overruled. 11 The need to reassess
the historical and constitutional foundations of incorporation doctrine is thus ever
more apparent.
A careful reexamination of the Court's historical case law is critical to that
enterprise. Every constitutional provision develops meaning through
interpretation over time in the Court's accumulated decisions. How courts
steeped in the common law tradition should carry on that process is a difficult and
controversial issue.12 But that it happens and is important is undeniable. By
analyzing the Court's early efforts to interpret and apply the Fourteenth
Amendment, and in particular its Privileges and Immunities Clause, insight may
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140,
162-70 (1949) (same). But see, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "'Jot
for Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998) (defending a
robustly substantive view of "due process," in an article criticizing the possible narrowing
effect on that doctrine of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
7 See infra Part I.B; Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part V.
8 See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Conceived in Liberty: The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill ofRights, 65 N.C. L. REV. 889 (1987) (remarks at Symposium: "To Endurefor Ages to
Come ". A Bicentennial View of the Constitution).
9 Even Judge Robert Bork, it seems, has mellowed. In a televised panel discussion on the
occasion of the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, responding to Professor Arthur Miller's query
whether he was "bothered" by existing precedents applying most of the Bill of Rights to the
states, Bork soothingly replied, 'Those battles are long over. It doesn't bother me a bit" That
Delicate Balance IL Our Bill of Rights-The First Amendment and Hate Speech (PBS-TV
1992) (videotaped Dec. 14,1991).
10 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Twining held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to the states and marked the nadir of the incorporation theory on the
Court. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Twining, 211 U.S. at 93-114; id. at 114-27 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part IV.
I1 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
12 See generally, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution andLaws, and Comments
by Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION].
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be gained into what the Amendment means today and what it should mean in the
future.
The Court recently showed dramatic new interest in the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause, the most textually and historically
plausible basis for applying all Bill of Rights guarantees to the states. Long
regarded as a "dead letter,"13 the Clause, with only a single shortlived
exception, 14 had never in more than one hundred thirty years been the basis for
any Supreme Court decision strildnig down any state law, until the Court decided
Saenz v. Roe.15 Saenz did not involve the incorporation issue, but rather upheld a
"privilege or imrunity" rooted in the explicit language of the Citizenship Clause
immediately preceding the Privileges and Immunities Clause: the right of
"citizens of the United States" to become and to be treated as equal citizens "of
the State wherein they reside."'16
Most intriguingly, Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, while disagreeing with the Saenz majority's particular application of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, criticized the Court's 1873 decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases17 for "all but read[ing] the ... Clause out of the
Constitution."'1 8 Declaring that "the demise of the. . . Clause has contributed in
no small part to the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence," they announced themselves "open to reevaluating its meaning in
an appropriate case."19 And in a comment that can only tantalize all sides of the
incorporation debate, they continued: "Before invoking the Clause, however, we
should endeavor to understand what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
thought that it meant. We should also consider whether the Clause should
displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and substantive
due process jurisprudence."20 Indeed!
13 Morrison, supra note 6, at 144.
14 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83,93 (1940).
15 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
16 Seeid. at503,510-11.
17 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
18 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed a separate dissent discussing only the equal citizenship issues raised by the
case. Id at 511-21 (Rehnquist C.J.,joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
2 0 Id at 528 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist. C.J., dissenting). For a survey of what
Saenz may or may not foretell about the Court's fiture interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and the Constitution generally, see Laurence H. Tnbe, The Supreme Court,
1998 Term, Comment: Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 182-98
(1999) [hereinafter Tnibe, Saenz].
105720001
OHIO STATE L4 WJOURNAL
The examination provided by this article and its forthcoming sequel21 has not
been adequately done before. The leading scholarly survey of the Court's early
incorporation case law was published more than fifty years ago and leaves much
to be desired. This was the 1949 Stanford Law Review article by Professor
Stanley Morrison of Stanford Law School, a companion piece to the work of his
Stanford colleague, Professor Charles Fairman.22 The two articles responded to
Justice Hugo L. Black's famous 1947 dissent in Adamson v. California.3
Professor Fairman focused on the evidence regarding the original understanding
in 1866-68 and Professor Morrison focused on the treatment of the Amendment
in the Court after ratification.2 4
21 See supra note 4.
22 See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) [hereinafter Fairman]; Morrison, supra
note 6. Professor Michael Kent Curts, in his landmark book on the incorporation debate,
provided a survey of some of this case law that is very useful and considerably more perceptive
than Professor Morrison's. See MiCHAEL KENT CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTs 171-96 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, No
STATE]. The same is true of Irving Brant's immensely readable history of the Bill of Rights. See
IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITs ORIGIN AND MEANiNG 318-63, 378-92 (1965). The
primary focus of Professor Curtis's book, however, is on the evidence regarding the original
understanding; he did not, for example, consider the alternative reading of the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and its influence discussed here. The same is true of
Brant's historical narrative. Professor Akhil Reed Amar briefly discussed some of these cases
in elaborating his theory of "refined incorporation," but he also did not explore the alternative
reading of Slaughter-House and did not discuss many of the cases. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1254-60, 1269-72 (1992)
[hereinafter Amar]. Furthermore, this article and its sequel differ with Amar's analysis in some
ways (although agreeing with him on certain fundamental points regarding incorporation). See,
e.g., infra Part .E (substantially agreeing with Amar's textual analysis); Wildenthal, Road to
Twining, supra note 4, at Parts ll.D and IV (disagreeing in part with Amar's interpretation of
arguments and opinions in certain cases). Professor Robert Palmer provided an insightful
analysis of two decisions discussed here, Slaughter-House and United States v. Cruikhan; 92
U.S. 542 (1876). See Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction:
Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 No. 3 U. ILL. L. REV.
739. Kevin Newsom's recent article also discussed Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, along
with several other cases treated here. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting
Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.
643 (2000). This article differs from and expands upon Palmer's and Newsom's treatments in
ways summarized below in the text and described throughout.
23 332 U.S. 46,68 (1947).
24 The articles were commissioned by the newly founded Stanford Law Review. As the
editors explained:
The division of work was natural. Mr. Fairman undertook to examine in detail the historical
evidence to which Justice Black had appealed .... Mr. Morrison turned to the judicial concept
of the Fourteenth Amendment as formulated since its adoption. He exhaustively analyzed the
1058 [Vol. 61:1051
LOST COMPROMISE
Professor Morrison, like Professor Fairman, strove mightily to debunk
Justice Black's thesis of total incorporation, accusing Black and his dissenting
colleagues25 of "distort[ing] history, as well as the language of the framers, in
Court's treatment of the cases, taking into account the arguments of counsel and views of the
individual Justices.
President's Page, 2 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1949). For a fascinating account of the background
of these articles and the relationship between Fairman and Justice Felix Frankfunter (Justice
Black's great antagonist in the incorporation debate, see, e.g., Adanson, 332 U.S. at 59-68
(Frankfurter, 3., concurring)) and Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 1197 (1995) [hereinafter Aynes, Fairman &
Frankfurter]. Dean Aynes, while strongly critical of both Fairman and Frankfurter, rejected the
suspicion (voiced by Justice Black himself) that Fairman, a former law student of Frankfurter's
at Harvard, was somehow solicited by Frankfinter to write the article. Id. at 1205-08, 1258-59.
Aynes did suggest, however, that Fairman's article "causes considerable pause as to whether he
was then the disinterested scholar or the self-appointed surrogate of Justice Frankfurter in
combatting the views of Justice Black." Id at 1272. Former U.S. Secretary of State Warren M.
Christopher, who was President of Volume 1 of the Stanford Law Review, see 1 STAN. L. REV.
v (1948), recalled that "the idea to write on Adamson may have originated from [Professor]
Morrison, in whose constitutional law class Christopher was enrolled." Aynes, Fairman &
Franlfurter, supra, at 1230 n.204.
2 5 Justice Black was joined without comment by Justice William 0. Douglas. See
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 92 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Frank Murphy
and Wiley B. Rutledge, writing separately, expressed "substantial agreement? with Black, id at
123 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting), adding only the provisos that (1) they
would not limit the procedural scope of due process to other specific procedural guarantees set
forth in the Bill of Rights, see id at 124, and (2) they believed the privilege against self-
incrimination had been violated in the case at bar, see id at 124-25, a point on which Black's
dissent was agnostic, see id at 68-69 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Murphy-Rutledge dissent in Adamson has been commonly, but inaccurately, depicted as
espousing a variation on Black's approach to incorporation. Cf., e.g., GERALD GUNTHER &
KATH.EEN SULLIVAN, CONTT ONAL LAW 438 n.3 (13th ed. 1997) (describing Murphy and
Rutledge as taking "something of a 'having your cake and eating it too' position"'); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON=rrurIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 569 (1978) [hereinafter TRIBE 1978]
(describing Murphy and Rutledge as "argu[ing] that the fourteenth amendment goes beyond the
Bill of Rights" and as foreshadowing protection of unenumerated substantive rights, see id
§ 11-3, at 569-72); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTuTIONAL LAW § § 11-2 to 11-3, at
774-77 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE 1988] (same). In fact, Murphy and Rutledge, as noted
above, were merely concerned about the procedural scope of the Due Process Clause itself
(which is, of course, found in identical terms in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)
and of the Self-Incrimination Clause itself. Confusion may have been created by the fact that
Murphy and Rutledge did state that they were "not prepared to say that [the Fourteenth
Amendment] is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights," Adamson, 332 U.S. at
124 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting), but this comment was simply a preface to
the first proviso noted above, and, in context, clearly referred only to other specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights apart from the Due Process Clause. All four Adamson dissenters thus
agreed that, whatever might be the scope of particular Bill of Rights guarantees (such as the
Due Process Clause itself), the states were subjected by the Fourteenth Amendment to precisely
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order to read into the Constitution provisions which they think ought to be
there.126 He argued that the Court majority in the late nineteenth century
repeatedly and thoughtfully rejected the concept of incorporation from the very
outset, and he dismissed the dissenting nineteenth-century Justices' views as
belated and inconsistent "afterthought[s].' 2 7
The truth is far different. The logic of incorporation was raised early by its
proponents on the Court, and with far more thoughtful and persuasive analysis
than that offered by its opponents. Professor Morrison's article contains important
factual errors and omissions and much of his analysis of the case law is
tendentious and unpersuasive. He erroneously asserted that incorporation "did not
receive the support of any Supreme Court judge until 1892. Between 1868 and
1947, only three judges of the Court favored the doctrine, one of whom shortly
recanted."2 8 Morrison was referring to Justices John Marshall Harlan, Stephen I
the same limitations as the federal government with regard to all such rights. Justice Black's
view that "due process" has no independent content apart from other specific guarantees found
in the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting), was always one of his more idiosyncratic and troubling theories (and in my view
erroneous), but strictly speaking it has nothing at all to do with incorporation, because the due
process guarantee applies equally in terms to both the states and the federal government
26 Morrison, supra note 6, at 162. Morrison's attacks on Justice Black were startlingly
harsh, and quite unwarranted. For example, he accused Black of"present[ing] the evidence of
what was said by a few members of Congress and ignor[ing] the rest of that body," and "not
even consider[ing] the whole of Congressman [John A.] Bingham's remarks" (Bingham,
R-Ohio, being the principal framer of the Amendment), such that "[t]he statements quoted by
Mr. Justice Black... are wholly insufficient to outweigh the preponderance of opinion of
legislators, judges, and others on the other side." Morrison, supra note 6, at 162. The
implication that Justice Black had dishonestly omitted or mischaracterized congressional
statements contrary to his thesis was not only untrue, it was Professor Morrison's own
characterization that was misleading, since, as he must have known, there were no
congressional statements "on the other side." The thrust of Professor Fairman's article, on
which Morrison presumably relied in this regard, was that the well-known statements by
Representative Bingham and Senator Jacob M. Howard (R-Mich.), relied on by Justice Black
and supporting incorporation, were merely (according to Fairman) insufficiently corroborated
by other members of Congress and other evidence. Fairman never claimed that Bingham's and
Howard's views were ever expressly contradicted by their colleagues; indeed, he conceded
they were not, though one has to read his article carefully to notice that. Rather, he argued
essentially that their statements were isolated and outbalanced by ambiguity and silence from
other members on the relevant issue. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 24--68; see also ELY, supra
note 6, at 195 n.56 (observing that "Fairman's own verdict on Black's thesis does not seem to
have been a good deal stronger than 'not proven,"' and that "[t]he claim that he had proved its
contrary is one that has been added by more enthusiastic advocates").
27 Morrison, supra note 6, at 152. See generally id. at 143-57.
28 Id. at 159-60.
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Field, and David J. Brewer.29 But he omitted Justices Joseph P. Bradley and
Noah H. Swayne, who had explicitly endorsed incorporation nineteen years
earlier in Slaughter-House.30 Indeed, Morrison completely overlooked the true
significance of the Court's first foray in Slaughter-House.31 This is troubling in
an article whose burden of argument was that incorporation was an eccentric
theory with few and belated adherents. And it was not an isolated slip. 2
This article challenges in many ways the century-old conventional wisdom
about the incorporation theory and its early treatment in the Supreme Court. The
theory is often viewed as if it sprang full blown in 1947 from the mind of Justice
Black, depicted by Professor Morrison as a "fighting senator" who continued on
the Court "to think as a legislator rather than as a judge."33 That Justice Black
2 9 See id at 150-51; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 359-65 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting); id at 370-71 (Harlan, J., joined by Brewer, J., dissenting). Brewer was the one
who later recanted. See Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part Ill.
3 0 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id at 124
(Swayne, J., dissenting) (joining Bradley's dissent). Bradley, however, and possibly Swayne,
later seemed to abandon the theory. See infra Parts ffl.B-C and IV; Wildenthal, Road to
Twining, supra note 4, at Part H.
3 1 See infra Part II.
32 Morrison had earlier asserted, following a discussion of O'Neil: "Here then, in 1892,
we get the first intimation from any Justice of the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth
Amendment might be considered to incorporate the Bill of Rights .... If any such notion was
abroad, it certainly would have been recognized by some of the Justices prior to 1892."
Morrison, supra note 6, at 151; see also id. at 172 n.63 (asserting that "the only material
support for the incorporation theory to be found in the Supreme Court reports prior to 1947
comes from Justices Field and Harlan"). This not only disregarded Bradley and Swayne in
Slaughter-House (and some very intriguing "intimations" regarding incorporation in the
majority opinion and Field's dissent, see infra Part II.C), it reflected Morrison's earlier
tendentious dismissal of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 538 (1884), which in fact was entirely consistent with, and strongly foreshadowed,
Harlan's explicit embrace of total incorporation in 1892. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 146-
47; Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part JI.B. It is difficult to excuse Morrison's
omission of Bradley and Swayne, because Justice Black not only mentioned their views but
quoted extensively from Bradley's opinion in the very case to which Morrison's article
responded. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 75 n.6, 120-21 (Black, J., dissenting). Morrison also
erroneously stated, in discussing Slaughter-House, that "the question of whether the
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights was not raised," and that "[t]he theory [of
incorporation] does not appear even to have been presented to th[e] Court in the argument of
counsel until 1887." Morrison, supra note 6, at 144, 159. But see infra Part II.D.
33 Morrison, supra note 6, at 140; see also id. at 162-68 (discussing the "peculiar
urgency" with which Black embraced incorporation); see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 134 (1977)
[hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT] (contending that "[i]nvocation of the Bill of Rights against
the states is of fairly recent origin"); id at 136 (describing Black as "[t]he architect of the
'incorporation' theory"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
2000]
OHIO STATE L4 WJOURNAL
was indeed an influential U.S. Senator when appointed to the Court, a hard-
knocks politician whose rise to power in segregationist Alabama was not without
such unsavory aspects as membership in the Ku Klux Klan, 4 may make it easier
for some to dismiss his constitutional ideas. This is not the place for a full-scale
defense of this complex and fascinating Justice, but many scholars find more
telling his thirty-four year record on the Court of ardently defending civil liberties
and racial justice, often standing almost alone-and at the cost, for example, of
effective exile for many years from his beloved home state and the destruction of
his son's political hopes. 35
When the elder Justice Harlan's early and critical role has been
acknowledged, it has often been only to dismiss him as "an eccentric
exception," 36 as if incorporation were the kind of quaint, crackpot theory one
might expect from "the last of the tobacco-spittin' judges."37 In fact, the anti-
incorporationist view of the Fourteenth Amendment was never persuasively
explained, and it prevailed only in the face of persistent and extremely cogent
dissents written or joined during the late nineteenth century by the five Justices
mentioned above.38 Four of those Justices sat together on the Court from 1890 to
1892, briefly and tantalizingly one vote short of a majority,39 eerily
SEDUCrION OF THE LAW 93-94 (1990) (stating that Black is "primarily" responsible for the
view that "the federal Bill of Rights was 'incorporated' in the due process clause and so applied
to state laws and actions").
34 See GERALD T. DuNNE, HuGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 60-74,105-73
(1977); ROGERK. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 89-263 (1994).
35 See DUNNE, supra note 34, at 324-26; NEWMAN, supra note 34, at 430,440-44.
36 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,62 (1947) (Frankfiter, J., concurring).
37 LOREN P. BEMH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JusTICE 174 (1992)
(quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) (internal quotation marks omitted). As any former
law clerk of the late Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. can testify, see supra note *, Justice Harlan
was most assuredly not the "last" of the tobacco-spittin' judges.
38 A sixth Justice, William B. Woods, endorsed incorporation as a circuit judge in 1871,
before being elevated to the Supreme Court in 1881. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at
171-72, 191; infra Part II.A. Justice Woods, however, appeared to abandon incorporation on
the Supreme Court. See Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.C. Yet a seventh
nineteenth-century member of the Court, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, also quite likely
supported incorporation, though he never had occasion to express his views. See infra note 242.
39The four Justices and their tenures were Field (1863-97), Bradley (1870-92), Harlan
(1877-1911), and Brewer (1890-1910). If Justice Swayne (1862-81) had remained on the
Court and lived six years longer to age eighty-five, all five would have briefly overlapped. See
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNID STATES 850, 967-68
(Kermit L. Hall ed. 1992) hereinafter OxFoRD SUPREME COURT]. Five Justices who each, at
least at some point, endorsed incorporation (Field, Bradley, Swayne, Harlan, and Woods, see
supra note 38) did in fact sit together on the Court for less than three weeks, from the time of
Woods's entry on duty on January 5, 1881, to Swayne's retirement on January 24, 1881. If
Woods had survived on the Court just three years past his actual death in 1887 at age sixty-two,
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foreshadowing the 5-4 near miss in Adamson fifty-five years later. Justice
Harlan, in particular, has still not received the full recognition he is due for his
passionate and eloquent vision of total incorporation, expounded over the course
of three decades on the Court 40
Justice Samuel F. Miller's majority opinion in Slaughter-House has been
conventionally viewed as rejecting incorporation via the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,4 1 perhaps because the clearest language on the issue appears
in one of the dissents. 42 In fact, the Bill of Rights and incorporation were not even
relevant to the decision, and the majority's own language was at worst
ambiguous, at best powerfully supportive of total incorporation. 43 Although it
never again gained majority favor on the Court and will probably surprise most
modem lawyers, this incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House was not
unheard-of in the late nineteenth century. On the contrary, this reading was
embraced even by conservative Democrats in Congress in 1873-74, soon after
Slaughter-House was decided, as an alternative to more far-reaching
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment advocated by Republicans. It was
reiterated in 1887 by former Democratic Congressman John Randolph Tucker,
who presented the first fully elaborated argument to the Court in favor of
incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause.44 And this reading of
the number of once or fiture incorporationists on the Court would again have reached five in
1890. See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra, at 938, 967-68. Bradley, however, had apparently
abandoned by then his earlier support of incorporation, as Swayne may also have done prior to
his retirement in 1881. See infra Parts m.B-D; Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at
Part I. Bradley died in office on January 22, 1892, see OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra, at
967, leaving the pro-incorporation side to lose by 5-3 less than three months later in the critical
case of O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). See Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note
4, at Part I.A.
40 See generally Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4.
4 1 See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONsmUcTING RECONSTRUCION: THE SPREME
COURT AND THE PRODUCION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 61, 67-68 (1999); CURTIS, No STATE,
supra note 22, at 175; GUNTHM & SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 421,431; Richard L. Aynes,
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 653-55 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, Miller];
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 71 n.249, 86 (1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting]; John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1415
(1992).
42Seesupra note 30.
43 See infra Part II.
44 The 1873-74 congressional statements are discussed in Part IMIA.1. Tucker's argument
was made in Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). See Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra
note 4, at Part II.D. Together with Justice Field's sardonic dissenting reference to the Bill of
Rights in Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (discussed in Part lI.C), this refutes Dean
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Slaughter-House seems to have provided critical support to the three dissenting
Justices who embraced incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
the 1892 case of O'Neil v. Vermont.45 This article is the first scholarly work to
systematically analyze all of this contemporary evidence for the incorporationist
understanding of Slaughter-House.
Slaughter-House did not, at any rate, resolve the question of incorporation
via the Privileges and Immunities Clause. No majority opinion ever since,
however, with only a single unsatisfactory exception, has made any serious
attempt to answer that question, except by relying without meaningful analysis on
the narrow conventional reading of Slaughter-House or by simply citing
precedents equally devoid of independent analysis.46 Indeed, there have been
only a handful of Supreme Court cases since Slaughter-House that have said
anything meaningful at all about the Clause, in any regard.47
Dean John Hart Ely, in his landmark book Democracy and Distrust, took
note of this fascinating and long-overlooked incorporationist reading of
Slaughter-House, though he devoted only a footnote to it and had the impression
that "the majority's hint was soon forgotten."48 It certainly may seem so from our
vantage point on the threshold of the twenty-first century, but as this article
suggests, this may be only because of the crushing weight of precedent. Professor
William Winslow Crosskey briefly suggested the possibility of such a reading in
a 1953 treatise, though he viewed Justice Miller's opinion as intentionally
"ambiguous" and "evasive" in this regard.49 Professor Robert Palmer's
Aynes's assertion that "there is no evidence that any contemporary source, including Miller,
understood Miller's opinion" to support incorporation. See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at
654. Aynes, it should be noted, shares my agreement with the incorporation theory itself. See
id. at 629-32.
45 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing Slaughter-House); id at 370
(Harlan, J., joined by Brewer, J., dissenting) ("fully concur[ring]" with Field on the relevant
issue); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part III.A.
4 6 See infra Parts III.B-C and IV. See generally Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note
4. The exception was Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), and even there, most of the
majority's relevant discussion consisted of lengthy quotations from Slaughter-House (with
minimal analysis adhering to the narrow conventional reading) and quotations and citations of
later cases devoid of significant independent analysis. See id at 586-601.
47 See infra Parts II.A and lILA (Introduction).
48 ELY, supra note 6, at 196-97 n.59.
4 9 See 2 WILLiAm WiNSLOW CROSsKEY, POLmCS AND THE CoNsrrUioN IN THE
HIsTORY OF THE UNITED STATns 1128-30 (1953) [hereinafter CROSsKEY, PoLmcs]. Newsom,
describing Crosskey as a "conventional commentator" on Slaughter-House, Newsom, supra
note 22, at 657, quoted Crosskey as suggesting that Justice Miller's opinion "does indeed
seem... to 'make [the] Privileges and Immunities Clause completely nugatory and useless,"'
id. (quoting 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS, supra, at 1119). But in the passage quoted by Newsorn,
Crosskey was referring, not to Slaughter-House alone, but generally to what "the Supreme
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pioneering 1984 article was the first extensive scholarly ireatment of the
Crosskey-Ely suggestions, arguing that Justice Miller meant to embrace
incorporation in Slaughter-House but that the Court abandoned the idea three
years later in United States v. Cruikshank50 Palmer did not, however, address the
contemporary evidence for this reading outside the Court's opinions
themselves.51
A recent article by Kevin Newsom also defended the incorporationist reading
of Slaughter-House. Newsom even argued, provocatively, that Cruikshank and
other post-Slaughter-House cases may be viewed in an incorporationist light.52
His article offered important new insights into Justice Miller's views but did not
take account of important evidence both supporting and undermining the thesis.
Court has done to the... Privileges and Immunities Clause," i.e., that "the Court has
consistently refused, throughout the entire eighty-two years the amendment [had then] been in
force, to give to the clause any application at all." 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS, supra, at 1119.
Newsom overlooked the passage cited above, just ten pages later, in which Crosskey became, it
appears, the first modem scholar to note that Miller's opinion may be read in an
incorporationist light. See infra Part IV (discussing Crosskey's views).
50 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
5 1 Professor Palmer, consistent with this article, viewed the Slaughter-House majority
opinion as reflecting a moderate balance between the extremes represented by the dissenters'
views on the one hand and a purely tautological reading of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause on the other. See generally Palmer, supra note 22. Palmer's article, contrary to
Newsom's characterization of it, was most certainly "a sustained defense" of the
incorporationist view of Slaughter-House and did far more than "hint" at that reading. Cf
Newsom, supra note 22, at 649 & n.17 (citing, inter alia, Palmer, supra note 22). Professor
Curtis dismissed Palmer's reading as "novel, but... ultimately unpersuasive.' Curtis,
Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 71 n.249. Professor Amar, in his 1992 article, also briefly
dismissed such a reading of Slaughter-House. See Amar, supra note 22, at 1258. Dean Aynes's
two-page attempt at rebutting Palmer appears to be the most significant criticism of the
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House yet published. See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at
653-55.
52 See generally Newsom, supra note 22. Professor Laurence Tribe also recently endorsed
the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House. See TRIBE 2000, supra note 6, § 7-3, at 1307
(citing ELY, supra note 6, and Palmer, supra note 22); Tribe, Saenz, supra note 20, at 182-84
& nn326, 331 (citing Newsom's then-forthcoming article, supra note 22); see also STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,
1866-1876, at 150 (1998); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept ofIncorporation, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
525, 529 (1999) [hereinafter Maltz, Concept]; infra note 293 (discussing Habrook's and
Maltz's treatment of the issue). Indeed, I understand from a conversation with Professor Tribe
that Newsom developed the thesis of his article while working as a student research assistant on
the relevant chapter in Professor Tribe's recently revised treatise (see TRIBE 2000, supra note
6). Tribe had previously accepted the conventional reading of Slaughter-House, while severely
criticizing the decision so read and urging broader interpretations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. See TRIBE 1978, supra note 25, §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 415-26; TRIBE 1988,
supra note 25, §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 548-59.
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Most notably, Newsom did not address the congressional debates of the 1870s.
Also, his reading of the post-Slaughter-House cases suffers from certain
oversights and, this article concludes, is probably incorrect.53
This article builds in part on the work of Crosskey, Ely, Palmer, and
Newsom, but it has a far broader scope. It is the first scholarly work to analyze in
depth the striking contemporary support for the incorporationist reading of
Slaughter-House to be found in the congressional debates, as noted above. It is
the first to explore the often surprising insights to be gained from careful study of
the Supreme Court briefs in all the relevant cases.54 Moreover, this article and its
sequel55 are the first to treat comprehensively the entire line of relevant case law
from 1868 to 1908 in light of the incorporationist implications of Slaughter-
House.
The foregoing discussion summarizes the descriptive thesis of this article. It
has a normative thesis, too: that the Supreme Court should have embraced, and
should still embrace, the total incorporation theory suggested in Slaughter-House
but abandoned in later cases. Total incorporation, far from being a radical or
unwarranted interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, would have been, and
would still be, an honorable, elegant, and profoundly reasonable compromise.
Such a compromise would accommodate the far-reaching libertarian purpose and
design of the Amendment, while erring (if at all) on the side of conservative
53 This article discusses and responds to Newsom's article primarily in Parts II.E, III.B-C,
and IV.
54 Scholars studying these nineteenth-century cases do not generally seem to have
consulted the full original briefs, as opposed to the often skimpy summaries of argument
published in some of the case reports. Professor Morrison's 1949 article, for example,
overlooked the pro-incorporation arguments in the Slaughter-House briefs, see infra Part 1l.D,
and in one of the defendants' briefs in United States v. Cruikshank; 92 U.S. 542 (1876), see
infra Part fI.C, and the fact that incorporation was not raised before the Court in Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), see infra Part I.B, to cite three of my surprising discoveries in the
briefs, discoveries which significantly affect how we should view the case law. In each case,
the cited feature of the briefs is not discernible from the summary of argument printed in the
case report, but appears only from a full review of the original briefs. Professor Morrison did,
on the other hand, discuss John Randolph Tucker's argument in Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131,
143-55 (1887), which is reproduced in the case report. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 147-48;
Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part HI.D. For three partial exceptions to the
general rule, see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57, 98-99 & n.266 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, Bingham]
(discussing Slaughter-House briefs), Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 632-34 (same), and
Newsom, supra note 22, at 658-62, 695 (same). Aynes's Bingham article, but not his Miller
article, touched on the endorsement of incorporation in the Slaughter-House briefs, but only
very slightly. See infra note 252. Newsom, surprisingly, did not mention this aspect of the
Slaughter-House briefs at all, nor did he discuss the Cruikshank briefs. See generally Newsom,
supra note 22.
55 See supra note 4.
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textualist principles in a way that would not upset, as the Amendment's
opponents feared, the fundamental federal-state balance of power. Most vexingly,
it was a compromise that, however fleetingly, was within the Court's grasp, as
reflected in the arguable consensus of all nine Justices in Slaughter-House.56
This article bucks the conventional wisdom that "everyone agrees"57 the
Court was wrong in Slaughter-House, and that Justice Miller's majority opinion
"ruthlessly eviscerated" the Privileges and Immunities Clause.58 To the contrary,
this article suggests that the majority reached the right result on the facts
presented, and did so on the basis of a reasonable-though certainly debatable-
theory of the Clause. This theory might best be described as "textual
incorporation." But the Court's later refusal to give effect to the Clause's purpose
and design in this regard, or to recognize and grasp the potential compromise
suggested by Slaughter-House, was a failure of tragic and historic proportions.
B. An Overview of the Debate on the Original Understanding
It is useful, at the outset, to review the scholarly debate on the original
understanding regarding incorporation during the framing and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-68. That is not the focus of this article, which is
primarily concerned with the post-ratification understanding, but an overview
helps put the matter in perspective. As noted above, Professors Fairman and
Morrison launched the modem wave of scholarship on the subject in 1949.59
56 Professor Michael McConnell has also described Slaughter-House as a historic
"compromise," though in a sense very different from that used in this article, not involving the
incorporation issue. Professor McConnell described Slaughter-House, consistent with the
narrow conventional view of the decision, as basically negating the substantive scope of
"privileges or immunities" and other rights under the Amendment while observing that "the
Court maintained, in dictum, that 'the one pervading purpose' of the Reconstruction
Amendments [was] 'the freedom of the slave race."' Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten
Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMM. 115, 133-34 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell,
Moment] (quoting Slaughter-House 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71); see also Newsom, supra note
22, at 666 (in heading to Part 1.B of his article, referring to Justice Miller's Slaughter-House
majority opinion as "a 'compromise' view of the Fourteenth Amendment'). The phrase "lost
compromise" in this article's title is taken from a law school paper of that title that I wrote in
1988.
57 Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 8 See Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. L L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989);
see also TRIBE 2000, supra note 6, § 7-6, at 1320-24 & n.17 (advocating overruling Slaughter-
House, or at least its conventional reading, and summarizing scholarly attacks on Slaughter-
House majority's conventionally received reading of Clause).
59 See Fairman, supra note 22; Morrison, supra note 6. Cf John Raebum Green, The Bill
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1948)
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Professor Fairman's article, in particular, has enjoyed great prestige over the
years and has been widely viewed as a definitive refutation of the historical case
for total incorporation.60 This is somewhat remarkable, since Professor Crosskey
published a thorough and devastating critique of Fairman's article only five years
later.61 The debate was taken up a generation later by Professor Raoul Berger on
(supporting Justice Black's incorporation theory but not undertaking any new exploration of
original understanding).
60 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOuRTEETH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8,
141 (1989) [hereinafter BERGER, FOURTEENTH]; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 102 (1962). Cf ELY, supra note 6, at 25 (noting but not endorsing general acclaim of
Fairman's work, and opining that reliance on Fairman was no longer so "voguish"); Aynes,
Bingham, supra note 54, at 58-59 (an article strongly critical of Fairman, noting traditional
views of his work as "classic" and "shap[ing] much of the constitutional field," and noting that
Fairman's 1949 article is "one of the most cited law review articles written since World War
II'); Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 24, at 1229 (describing Fairman's article as
'legendary").
61 See William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legisative History," and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CM. L. REV. 1, 2-119 (1954) [hereinafter
Crosskey]; see also Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 144,
150-56 (1954) [hereinafter Fairman, Reply]. Berger termed Fairman's reply "devastating,"
BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 48, but in fact it did not even attempt to respond to
most of Crosskey's substantive points, consisting mostly of ad hominem attacks on him, and it
misfired on most of the points it did try to make. See, e.g., Fairman, Reply, supra, at 151-52
(quite unfairly accusing Crosskey of deceptively "fudging' by suggesting various possible
corrections in punctuation and grammar in the reported congressional debates). In fact,
Crosskey openly and carefully explained each proposed correction, most of which are perfectly
plausible and help make sense of the debates, but which in any event he left the reader free to
judge on their merits. Furthermore, Crosskey's proffered corrections were in response to the
unreasonable stress that Fairman placed at certain points on an ultra-literal parsing of what
Crosskey noted were, after all, transcripts of oral speeches subject to slips by the speaker and
mistakes by the reporter. See Crosskey, supra, at 37. It appears that Crosskey's views on
incorporation may not have been taken seriously by some because he embraced the unorthodox
view that Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), was wrongly decided and that most
of the Bill of Rights was intended from the beginning to apply directly to the states. See
BERGER, FOURTEENM, supra note 60, at 47-49 (ridiculing Crosskey on this account).
Crosskey's views on the original Bill of Rights formed part of the subject of his 1954 article
and his 1953 treatise, see 2 CROSSKEY, POLMCS, supra note 49, which had received some
blistering reviews, including one by Professor Fairman (whose 1949 article Crosskey had
criticized in the treatise). See Crosskey, supra, at 2; Fairman, Reply, supra, at 144; Charles
Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental
Authority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40 (1953) (reviewing 2 CROssKEY, POLmCs, supra note 49). For
more background on the Fairman-Crosskey debate, see Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra
note 24, at 1243-56. See also BRANDWEIN, supra note 41, at 96-154 (discussing different
frameworks of assumptions Fairman and Crosskey brought to the debate and why Fairman's
argument resonated better with the prevailing views at the time of the legal and academic
establishments). More recent scholarship has suggested that Crosskey's views on the original
Bill of Rights, while probably incorrect, enjoy substantial historical support just as he
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the anti-incorporation side and Professor Michael Kent Curtis for the pro-
incorporation camp. 62 More recently, Professor Akhil Reed Amar has weighed in
contended, and hardly deserve ridicule. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 22, at 1198-1212. Because,
as discussed in text below, Crosskey's unorthodox views in this regard were shared by
Bingham and many other Civil War-Era Republicans, this may well explain why Crosskey,
unlike Fairman, succeeded in making sense out of the debates surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment.
62 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60; BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at
20-51, 134-56, 230-45; CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22; see also Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 863 (1986); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Black, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Incorporation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 231 (1976). Curtis's 1986
and Berger's 1989 books grew out of their earlier debate in the law reviews. See Michael Kent
Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger,
16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980) (responding to BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33);
Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived
Cat, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 435 (1981) [hereinafter Berger, Nine-Lived Cat]; Michael Kent Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 89 (1982) [hereinafter Curtis, Response]; Michael Kent Curtis,
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982); Raoul
Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44
OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1983); Michael Kent Curtis, Still Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A
Rebuttal to Raoul Berger's Reply on Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 62
N.C. L. REV. 517 (1984); see also Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST. Comm. 149
(1991) (reviewing, inter alia, Curtis's 1986 and Berger's 1989 books); Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1 (1991).
Scholars during the 1960s were not entirely silent on the subject either. Compare, e.g., BRANT,
supra note 22, at 318-63, 378-92 (supporting incorporation) and Alfred Avins, Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968)
(same) with Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth Amendment, 53
MINN. L. REV. 711 (1969) (opposing incorporation); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965) (criticizing manner in which Court
has applied Bill of Rights to states); and Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE LJ. 74 (1963) (opposing total incorporation but supporting
selective incorporation to some extent).
Curtis recently returned to the issue in a comprehensive study of the historical
understanding of the "privileges and immunities" of American citizens. See Michael Kent
Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of
Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical
Linguistics]. Berger also revisited the subject in a 1997 revision of his seminal 1977 book, see
BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, which added a number of supplementary notes to the
original chapters. See RAOUL BERGER, Supplementary Note on Incorporation, in GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 174-89
(2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT 1997].
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on the issue, forcefully supporting incorporation on the whole, though with some
important and interesting qualifications and nuances.63
To make a long story short, Crosskey and Curtis demonstrated that Fairman
misunderstood the legal philosophies and premises of the Civil War-Era
Republicans who secured the Fourteenth Amendment's passage, and as a result
fundamentally misconstrued how the debates surrounding the proposal and
ratification of the Amendment bear on the incorporation issue.64 Fairman did not
63 See generally Amar, supra note 22 (elaborating his theory of "refined incorporation").
Amar's article was itself incorporated, in substantially unchanged though doubtless refined
form, in his recent book on the Bill of Rights. See AKHm REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCrION 137-230 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]. The
book expanded on his analysis of individual Bill of Rights guarantees in light of his "refined
incorporation" theory. See id. at 231-83. This article and its sequel, see supra note 4, being
preoccupied with reinterpreting historical case law and related evidence with a view to
challenging traditional anti-incorporation orthodoxies at a broad and systemic level, do not (for
the most part) attempt to engage the nuances of Amar's theory. I look forward to pursuing that
task in future articles. Useful collections of articles reviewing Amar's book have appeared in
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289-600 (1999) and 87 GEO. Li. 2273-2362 (1999). See, e.g., Richard L.
Aynes, Refined Incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289
(1999); Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism,
Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. LJ. 2273 (1999); Mark A. Graber, The
Constitution as a Whole: A Partial Political Science Perspective, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 343
(1999); Maltz, Concept, supra note 52; see also, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Reconstruction or
Reaffirmation?: Review of "The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction," 8 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 167 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Reconstruction or Reaffirmation?]. The year after
Amar's article came out, Dean Richard Aynes published yet another devastating critique of
Professor Fairman's work. See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54. Professor Earl Maltz, an
originalist scholar otherwise generally embracing a narrow view of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has also, nevertheless, found strong historical support for an incorporationist
understanding of the Amendment. See EARL M. MALT_, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUm ON,
AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 113-18 (1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIvIL RIGHTS]. Still
another recent book defending the incorporationist understanding has focused on evidence that
supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment were deeply concerned with protecting the right of
the freed slaves to keep and bear arms. See generally HALBROOK, supra note 52.
64 See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 10-84; CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 26-130;
see also Amar, supra note 22, at 1198-1217, 1233-54. Curtis and Amar dismantled the
extraordinarily narrow reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause urged by Berger. While
Fairman ended up conceding that the Clause probably was, in fact, understood to incorporate at
least those fumdamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (notably including
free speech), see Fairman, supra note 22, at 138-39 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)), Berger read the Clause as merely guaranteeing equal treatment with regard to
a narrow category of "fundamental" (primarily property and contract) rights, thereby excluding
(even from equal protection) most of the guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights. In essence,
Berger read Section 1 ofthe Amendment, in toto, as doing no more than constitutionalizing the
narrowest possible reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra
note 60, at 31-36, 91-127; BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 20-51, 134-56. But see
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seem to grasp the implications of certain unorthodox constitutional theories
embraced by Representative John A. Bingham, Republican of Ohio, the
Amendment's primary framer and leading advocate, and many other Republicans
of the time. These theories included, most notably, the view that the original Bill
of Rights already applied directly to the states, and hence that Barron v.
Baltimore65 was wrongly decided, or at any rate was an undesirable barrier to
protection of individual rights against state abuses that should be overturned by
constitutional amendment 66
Professor Fairman's misunderstanding is best illustrated by his bewilderment
over Bingham's reliance on Barron at a key point in the debates. A Republican
opponent of the Amendment, Representative Robert S. Hale of New York,
objected to an early version that gave Congress power to protect "all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States" and "equal protection in the
rights of life, liberty, and property."'67 In a portion of the debate Fairman omitted,
Hale seemed to argue that the first provision was unnecessary because-as Hale
apparently believed, like Bingham and many other Republicans of the time-the
original Bill of Rights already protected all citizens from contrary assertions of
state power.68 Hale, however, overlooked the Barron decision, which Bingham
viewed as an obstacle to proper enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the
states.69 The very next day on the House floor, in a passage quoted by Fairman,
Bingham responded to Hale by citing Barron and another case relying on it,
explaining that such decisions were "exactly what makes plain the necessity of
adopting this amendment."70
CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 113-30; Amar, supra note 22, at 1243-46. For Berger's
reply to Amar, see Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing
Well, 62 U. CINc. L. REv. 1 (1993). See also Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal
Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74
N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1566-92 (1996). Professor Berger died at the age of ninety-nine as this
article went to press. Douglas Martin, Obituary: Raoul Berger, 99, an Expert on Constitution in
2nd Career, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at C27. The issue whether the Fourteenth
Amendments Privileges and Immunities Clause can be read as merely some sort of equality
guarantee, and how it relates to the original Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, is
discussed further in Part II.B, because that is essential to a full understanding of how the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment Clause beginning in Slaughter-
House.
65 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
6 6 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 58-71, 85-91; Amar, supra note 22, at 1203-
17, 1233-38; Crosskey, supra note 61, at 10-21, 24-44,67-69,72-75.
67 See Fairman, supra note 22, at 24,29-32.
6 8 See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 30-33.
69 See id at 32.
70 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866); CURTIS, No STATE,
supra note 22, at 69-70, 100-02; Amar, supra note 22, at 1234; Crosskey, supra note 61, at 38;
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Professor Fairman, as he did throughout his article, depicted Bingham as lost
in a sea of confusion at this point.71 "How did he extricate himself?" asked
Fairman. "He hailed Barron ... as though it were a vindication of his position,
and plunged on to worse confusion .... "2 Barron was, of course, a vindication
of the point Bingham was making; it was Fairman who was hopelessly
confused.73 As one commentator has succinctly observed, "[a]s a gauge of what
Bingham was trying to do, it is utterly irrelevant whether he thought his
amendment was needed to overcome wrongful or righul decisions of the
Supreme Court The point that counts is that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to overcome those decisions.'74
Fairman, supra note 22, at 34. Bingham had tried to correct Hale by citing Barron when Hale
spoke the day before, but Hale, perhaps exasperated by previous interruptions, refused to yield.
See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 32.
71 See Fairman, supra note 22, at 26 (suggesting Bingham was "befuddled"); id at 31
(suggesting he was "confused" and that his "careless imprecision" shed light on "the obscurity
in the thinking" of many Congressmen); id at 54 (Bingham "show[ed] great confusion"); id at
137 (Bingham, even if "sincere," was "confused"); see also CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22,
at 109 (noting Fairman's descriptions of Bingham, in a later treatise, as a man of "peculiar
conceptions" and "confused discourse," many of whose ideas "cannot be accepted as serious
propositions"). The particular "confusion" alleged by Fairman in this instance was that
Bingham was supposedly misreading Barron and similar cases as "intimat[ing] that [the Bill of
Rights] really extended to the states, but that Congress was without power to make the
requirements effective." Fairman, supra note 22, at 34. Of course, as Professor Crosskey noted,
Bingham never suggested any such reading of Barron. See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 39. It
was Bingham's own view that the Bill of Rights actually applied to the states (and was, in
principle, binding on state officials via their required oath to uphold the Constitution) but that
the federal govemment lacked effective power to enforce it. Quite understandably, he viewed
Barron, whatever rationale Chief Justice Marshall had asserted in the case, as simply an
obstacle to "effective" enforcement. Fairman acknowledged Bingham's view, but quite
obviously neither took it seriously nor grasped its implications, and seemed to make little effort
to try. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 25-26; see also id. at 53 ("Marshall's Court had said [Bill
of Rights guarantees] were not limitations on the states, Bingham somehow believes that they
are-but we need not go over that again.").
72 Fairman, supra note 22, at 35.
73 See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 38-39; see also CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at
96, 100-02. Another commentator has noted:
It is an almost certain tip-off that an historian is not approaching his or her materials with an
accurate frame of reference if important historical actors make no sense at all to the historian.
Important historical actors (and this was true for Bingham, [Sen. Jacob M.] Howard [R-Mich.],
and others involved in the drafting and adoption of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment) make sense
to those around them; that is why they are important actors. The historian's task is to bring out
their sense, not to denounce them as fools.
Zuckert, supra note 62, at 161. See generally BRANDWEIN, supra note 41, at 108-16
(discussing Fairman's misunderstanding with regard to Baron and Bingham).
74 BRANT, supra note 22, at 326-27.
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The implausibility of Fairman's and Berger's rejection of the original
understanding supporting incorporation is perhaps best summed up by their
insistence that Bingham's repeated references to "the bill of rights"75 meant
something other than what Americans have understood for more than two
hundred years to be the Bill of Rights. 6 Professor Crosskey demolished the
argument in 1954,77 and Professor Amar administered the coup de grace in
1992.78
There has never been much the anti-incorporationists could do with the May
1866 speech by Senator Jacob M. Howard, Republican of Michigan, formally
introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate on behalf of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, which was reprinted as front-page news the next
day in the New York 7ymes.79 Senator Howard declared that the privileges and
immunities protected by the Amendment would include
75 See Amar, supra note 22, at 1234-35.
76 Fairman and Berger asserted that Bingham's references to "the bill of rights" meant not
the first eight or ten amendments to the Constitution, but rather a combination of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, which they read as much narrower
than the entire Bill of Rights. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 26,33-34, 134; see also BERGER,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 141; Berger, Nine-Lived Cat, supra note 62, at 463 & n.214.
But see Fairman, supra note 22, at 34 (on same page where he asserted narrow reading of
Bingham's references to "the bill of rights," quoting speech in which Bingham referred to "the
bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the Constitution"). Because Bingham, like
some contemporary Republicans, apparently believed that the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses together encompassed the entire Bill of
Rights anyway, see CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 47-48, 61, 114-15, 149-51, 166;
Amar, supra note 22, at 1229; Crosskey, supra note 61, at 11-16, this may in the end be simply
another illustration of how Fairman and Berger misunderstood the legal theories under which
Civil War-Era Republicans operated.
77 See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 27-28, 39. As Crosskey asked with understandable
exasperation: "Now, who ever heard of a 'bill of rights' consisting of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the original document, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment?" Id at 27.
78 See Amar, supra note 22, at 1234-35 & n.195; see also MALTz, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 63, at 114-15; Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 66-74. In light of the context of
Bingham's repeated use of the phrase "the articles of amendment' in conjunction with
references to Barron, specific Bill of Rights guarantees from (at least) the First, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments, and statements by congressional colleagues indicating that they also used
(and understood Bingham to use) the phrase in its traditional sense, Amar found it "f'ankly
astonishing that some scholars ... have suggested that ... Bingham... didn't mean what he
said." Amar, supra note 22, at 1235.
79 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 87, 128; Fairman, supra note 22, at 54, 68
(both citing, inter alia, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1). The New York Times also fully
reported Bingham's earlier speeches, unambiguously conveying his understanding that the
Amendment would enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. Bingham's speeches to this
2000] 1073
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
the personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as [he then listed rights contained in the First Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments] .... [I]t is a fact well worthy of attention that
the course of decision of our courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these
immunities, privileges, rights, thus guarantied [sic] by the Constitution or recognized
by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States and as a party in
their courts. They do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition
upon State legislation.... [T]hey stand simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution,
without power on the part of Congress to give them full effect; while at the same time
the States are not restrained from violating... them except by their own local
constitutions, which may be altered from year to year. The great object of the first
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel
them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.80
Howard's views on incorporation were thus consistent with those of Bingham,
the primary framer and leading House backer of the Amendment, and not a single
member of either House of Congress, throughout all the debates, ever
contradicted their plainly expressed understanding.8 1
Scholars continue to debate what light the state ratification debates shed on
the incorporation issue.82 The issue may devolve to a classic lawyer's quibble
over who has the burden of proof. The anti-incorporationists contend that the
effect were also widely distributed in pamphlet form. See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 72
& nn.84-85 (citing, inter alia, JOHN A. BINGHAM, ONE COUNTRY, ONE CONSITUTION, AND
ONE PEOPLE: SPEECH OF HON. JOHN A. BINGHAM, OF OHIO, IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATVES, FEB. 28, 1866, IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ENFORCE
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1866); N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,4866, at 5; id., Mar. 10, 1866, at 1).
80 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (May 23,1866).
81 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 91; Amar, supra note 22, at 1238. Anti-
incorporationists have tried to blunt the impact of Howard's speech by various means. Aside
from denigrating Howard's abilities and clarity of thought (the same tactic used against
Bingham, see supra notes 71 and 73), some have placed undue stress on the fact that he was
filling in for Senator William P. Fessenden, Co-Chairman of the Joint Conuittee, who was ill.
See, e.g., BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 135-37; BERGER, GOVERNMENr, supra note
33, at 147-48; Fairman, supra note 22, at 54-57, 134 n.381. This seems to grasp at straws,
because Howard was a member of the Joint Committee and thus had been privy to its
discussions and was obviously trusted by his colleagues to speak in Fessenden's stead.
Furthermore, his lengthy and detailed speech indicated thorough preparation and command of
the issues. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 126-28.
82 Some scholars have argued that the evidence available from the ratification debates
provides, on the whole, strong support for incorporation. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22,
at 131-53; Amar, supra note 22, at 1246-54; Crosskey, supra note 61, at 100-11. Dean James
Bond, focusing on the ratification debates in the southem states, has argued strenuously to the
contrary. See JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 45, 111, 180-82, 220-21, 235-38, 252-62
(1997).
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evidence (mostly in the form of silence) they find in the ratification debates
outweighs the statements by Bingham and Howard (not to mention the most
persuasive reading of the text83), because applying the Bill of Rights to the states
would supposedly have been shocking and inconceivable to Americans of the
day.84 Curtis and Amar have suggested powerful reasons to doubt that
conclusion. 85 It is worth noting, finally, with regard to individual Bill of Rights
guarantees, that even Professor Fairman conceded that there is substantial
evidence supporting incorporation of First Amendment rights, especially freedom
of speech.86 Indeed, it is difficult to see how any fair-minded analyst could deny
that the evidence is overwhelming on that score. 87
The revolution in legal scholarship on incorporation has been accompanied
and informed by the vast "revisionist" historiography on Reconstruction itself.
This has shed new light on the post-Civil War Republicans and their idealistic
and nationalistic views on federal civil rights enforcement. "Revisionism," of
course, has a pejorative connotation suggesting a rewriting of the past but the
consensus of historians is that the revised view in this case has illuminated far
83 See infra Part II2.
84 See BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 37-42, 82-87; Fairman, supra note 22, at
68-126, 137-38; Fairman, Reply, supra note 61, at 154-55.
85 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 91,217-18; Amar, supra note 22, at 1253-
54.
86 See Fairman, supra note 22, at 75-77,96-97, 116-20, 134-35, 139.
87 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 29-34 (discussing centrality of Republican
concerns over antebellum suppression of free speech by slave states, as reflected in 1856
Republican presidential nominee John C. Fr6mont's campaign slogan, "Free Speech, Free
Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, and Fr monf ); id at 133-53 (discussing
pervasive concerns over free speech in 1866 election campaigns, largely fought over recently
proposed Fourteenth Amendment, as well as in ratification debates); id at 217 (summarizing
evidence); MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 117 (concluding that "the evidence
impressively demonstrates that the basic guarantees of the First Amendment were understood
to be included in the concept of privileges and immunities"); Amar, supra note 22, at 1214-17
(discussing antebellum concerns over free speech); id at 1271-84 (discussing exceptionally
strong historical support for incorporation of First Amendment principles in Fourteenth, except,
in Amar's view, nonestablishment of religion); Avins, supra note 62, at 17-22 (canvassing
evidence from congressional debates); Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 46-47 (noting
deep Republican concerns about "precious American right to free speech"); see also Michael
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech,
Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to
Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 (1995);
Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Eliah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free
Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of.American Citizens, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1109 (1997); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the
Civil War, 7 WM. & MARYBILLRTS. J. 105 (1998).
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more accurately and insightfilly the true facts regarding Reconstruction. 88 As
Professor Amar has suggested, Professor Fairman's 1949 article, written without
benefit of this later scholarship, "was remarkably insensitive to all of this and
indeed, quite anachronistic .... [Justice] Black... proved the more faithful
historian, for he understood-because he shared-the almost mystical attachment
to the Bill of Rights exemplified by John Bingham. ' 89
Despite the many judicial defeats of the incorporation theory and the
scholarly wars spawned by Professors Fairman and Morrison, the theory has
achieved a near-total practical victory in the modem Supreme Court. The "lost
compromise" of Slaughter-House was ultimately resurrected, though belatedly
and imperfectly, by the Warren Court of the 1960s. Of the twenty-four separate
88 For some of the best modem work on the legal and judicial aspects of Reconstruction,
see BRANDWVEIN, supra note 41, HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER LAW: CONSTrrUTIoNAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,
THE PoLmCs OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985) [hereinafter KACZOROWsKi, POLTCs]; and WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
(1988). See also BOND, supra note 82; JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 247-345 (1990); JOSEPH B.
JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) [hereinafter JAMES,
FRAMING]; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984)
[hereinafter JAMES, RATIFICATION]. For general treatments of Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988) (the definitive
modem work); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFrER THE CIvIL WAR (2d ed. 1994);
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965); RICHARD NELSON
CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE CARPETBAGGERS (1988); and TRELEASE, supra note *. For an
interesting legal and political novel of the period by a "carpetbagger" who served as a North
Carolina state judge, see ALBION W. TOURGEE, A FOOL'S ERRAND (John Hope Franklin ed.,
Harvard University Press 1961) (1879). Tourgee later represented Homer Plessy in his
challenge to racial segregation. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896); CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISrORICAL INTERPRETATION 30, 41, 148-52 (1987).
Special mention must go to W.E.B. Du Bois's heroic and pioneering work, the final chapter of
which should be required reading for every American. See W.E.B. Du Bols, The Propaganda
of History in BLACK RECONSTRUCTON IN AMERICA: 1860-1880, at 711-28 (David Levering
Lewis ed., Touchstone 1992) (1935) (assailing biased, and often racist, historiography of
Reconstruction that prevailed up to that time).
89 Amar, supra note 22, at 1241; see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 302-
03 (arguing that Fairman and Berger were both "very much in the grip of this [old] viev [of
Reconstruction]"); BRANDWEIN, supra note 41, at 115-16; Aynes, Fairman & Franlfirter,
supra note 24, at 1204 (suggesting that Fairman and his mentor, Justice Frankfurter, were both
influenced, as were many of their contemporaries, by the traditional 'Jaundiced view of
Reconstruction and of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment" exemplified by early
historians like William A. Dunning, and mostly discredited by the modem "revisionist"
school).
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privileges and immunities that may be parsed from the first eight amendments,90
eighteen have been applied in substance to the states, half of them between 1961
and 1969.91 Three have specifically been found not to be applicable and remain
90 They may be numbered as follows: (1) rule against establishment of religion, (2) free
exercise of religion, (3) freedom of speech, (4) freedom of the press, (5) right of peaceable
assembly, (6) right of petition, see U.S. CONST. amend. I; (7) right to keep and bear arms, see
id amend. II; (8) freedom from quartering of soldiers, see ia amend. 111; (9) search, seizure,
and warrant guarantees, see id amend. IV; (10) right to grand jury indictment (11) immunity
from double jeopardy, (12) privilege against self-incrimination, (13) right to just compensation
for private property taken for public use, see id. amend. V; (14) right to speedy trial, (15) right
to public trial, (16) right to impartial jury trial within state and district where crime was
allegedly committed, (17) right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation, (18) right to
be confronted by adverse witnesses, (19) right of compulsory process to obtain favorable
witnesses, (20) right to counsel, see id. amend. VI; (21) right to common law civil jury trial, see
id. amend. VII; (22) immunity from excessive bail, (23) immunity from excessive fines, and
(24) immunity from cruel and unusual punishments, see id. amend. VIII. The right to due
process of law, see id amend. V, is of course not at issue because the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates that specifically, see id amend. XIV, § 1. Reasonable people may of course differ
on how much to "split' or 'lump" these various rights. The above parsing relies on common
sense, guided by how the Supreme Court has actually dealt with them. For example, one could
reasonably sever the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures
from the warrant rule, or for that matter protection against searches from protection against
seizures, but the Court has in fact dealt with the Fourth Amendment as a "package' with regard
to incorporation (though only later and separately incorporating the remedy of the exclusionary
rule). Likewise, it is difficult to see why one would incorporate one or more but not all First
Amendment rights, but the Court, while eventually incorporating all of them, did so piecemeal.
See infra note 91.
91 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(incorporating right to just compensation for takings of private property); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("assum[ing]" that freedoms of speech and press are incorporated);
Stromberg v. Califomia, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (so holding as to freedom of speech); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (same as to freedom of press); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating rights of peaceable assembly and petition); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940) (same as to free exercise of religion and rule against
establishment ofreligion); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,266-73 (1948) (same as to right to public
trial); id at 273 (same as to defendant's "right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,"
i.e., right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27-28, 33 (1949) (incorporating "security of... privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police... at the core of the Fourth Amendment" but not exclusionary rule for evidence seized
in violation thereof); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-60 (1961) (incorporating right to
exclusion of evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (same as to immunity from cruel and unusual punishments); Gideon
v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (same as to right to counsel, including appointed
counsel for indigent defendants); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1964) (same as to
privilege against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (same as to
right of confrontation); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (same as to
right to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (same as to right to
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unincorporated today.92 The Court has not specifically ruled on the remaining
three.93 An intriguing related issue concerns the six other individual rights
guaranteed by the original Constitution against the federal government but not
expressly against the states.94 Are they also properly incorporated?95 To answer
such questions it is necessary, as the saying goes, to begin at the beginning.
compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50
(1968) (same as to right to criminal jury trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96
(1969) (same as to immunity from double jeopardy). The Court's incorporation of the right to
counsel had its gradual start in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but was not fully
accomplished until Gideon. The Court in Robinson appeared to rely on Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), as having already incorporated immunity from cruel
and unusual punishments. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666; see also id. at 675 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Reed's plurality opinion in Resweber, however, merely
"assum[ed] ... without so deciding" that this immunity was incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and did not speak for the Court in any event. See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462
(Reed, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., and Black and Jackson, JJ.). Furthermore, the majority denied
relief to the claimant. See id at 465-66 (Reed, J.); ia at 471-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the judgment).
92 See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874) (civil jury trial); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876) (same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553
(1876) (right to bear arms); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1886) (same); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (grand jury indictment); see also infra Parts flI.B and
Im.C; Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.B.
93 These are the Third Amendment freedom from quartering of soldiers and the Eighth
Amendment immunities from excessive bail and excessive fines. See supra note 90. The Court
has noted in dicta, however, that it has generally been assumed that the Excessive Bail Clause
applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365
(1971); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part V.
94 These may be numbered as follows: (1) rule against suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; (2) right to criminal jury trial, id art. I, § 2, cl. 3; (3)
immunity from liability for treason unless guilty of "levying War against [the United States],
or... adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort," id. § 3, cl. 1; (4) immunity
from conviction for treason "unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same Overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court," id; (5) immunity from any "Attainder of
Treason ... work[ing] Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted," id § 3, cl. 2; and (6) immunity from any religious test for federal office, id art. VI,
cl. 3. The original Constitution also guarantees three individual rights against both federal and
state violation: (1) immunity from bills of attainder, (2) immunity from ex post facto laws; and
(3) rule against grants of nobility. Id art. I, § 9, cls. 3, 8; id. § 10, cl. 1. The amendments
provide such dual protection to another eight rights: (1) prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude, id. amend. XIII, § 1; (2) right to United States citizenship by birth within United
States jurisdiction, id. amend. XIV, § 1; (3) right of United States citizens to state citizenship by
residence within any state, idl; (4) right not to be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law," id amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1; (5) right of United States citizens to
vote without regard to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," id amend. XV, § 1; (6)
right of United States citizens to vote without regard to sex, id amend. XIX, § 1; (7) right of
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II. THE ENIGMA OF SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
A. Introduction and 1868-1873 Developments
Anyone reading the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause for the first time, uncluttered by prior notions, would surely experience the
epiphany that she had discovered something quite important. Surely those
sweeping, majestic words-so redolent of the "thou shalt nots" of the Ten
Commandments-played a major role in many great Supreme Court decisions
and inspired many an impassioned debate on the boundaries of liberty and power.
But as we know, such is not the case. The Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses have seen all the action.96 Like a forgotten elder brother of its more
famous siblings, the Privileges and Immunities Clause looms mysteriously as the
silent partner of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment The war over
incorporation itself has been fought mostly on the terrain of the Due Process
Clause.97 Its first battlefield, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, has remained
eerily undisturbed since the Slaughter-House Cases98 were decided in 1873.
The Slaughter-House majority's interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause has long been almost universally viewed as a barren tautology
nullifying whatever real meaning it was intended to have.9 9 To be sure, the Court
recently employed the Clause in Saenz v. Roe l°0 to strike down a California law
United States citizens to vote in federal elections without regard to "failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax," id. amend. XXIV, § 1; and (8) ight of United States citizens aged eighteen and
older to vote without regard to age, ia amend. XXVI, § 1. Finally, the Constitution guarantees
two individual rights against state but not federal violation: (1) immunity from impairment of
contracts, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; and (2) right to "equal protection of the laws," id amend. XIV,
§ 1. But see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that equal protection
guarantee applies in substance to federal government).
95 Some preliminary thoughts on those issues will be offered in the sequel to this article.
See Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part V.
96 See supra note 3 (quoting Section 1 of Amendment); GUNTHER & SULLivAN, supra
note 25, at 453-916 (surveying staggeringly vast case law construing Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses).
97 See supra notes 6 and 91.
98 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9 9 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 460-
61 (Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat, eds., 14th ed. 1978) (1920); ELY, supra note 6, at 22;
GUNTHER & SULLivAN, supra note 25, at 429-30; see also BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note
33, at 45-49 (criticizing, even from his restrictive perspective on the Clause, majority's even
narrower conventionally received construction); Fairman, supra note 22, at 8-9 (stating that in
Slaughter-House, the Clause was "virtually read out of the Constitution"). See generally Aynes,
Miller, supra note 41; Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41.
100 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also supra Part IA.
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disfavoring welfare applicants who recently migrated from out of state.101 Four
Justices made similar use of the Clause in joining the Court's unanimous 1941
decision strildng down California's attempt to close its borders altogether to
indigent migrants.' 0 2 This use of the Clause was forecast explicitly by dicta in
Slaughter-House itself, where the Court observed that one privilege "conferred
by the very article under consideration... is that a citizen of the United States
can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona
fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." 103 As
that very language indicates, however, and as Saenz reflects, this right of free and
equal interstate migration is ultimately and more specifically rooted in the
Citizenship Clause.104 It cannot plausibly be thought to exhaust the scope of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, though one might get that impression from the
sparse case law on the latter.105
Slaughter-House was a most ill-suited occasion to address the incorporation
issue. The decision did not turn on whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated any of the specific privileges or immunities set forth in the Bill of
Rights. The controversy arose from the protest of the butchers of New Orleans
against a city monopoly on slaughtering facilities enacted, purportedly for health
and safety reasons, by the Louisiana legislature.' 0 6 As Professor Kaczorowski has
101 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 497-511.
102 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., joined by Black and
Murphy, JJ., concurring); id. at 181-86 (Jackson, J., concurring).
103 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80.
104 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also Saenz, 526 U.S. 503, 510-11 (quoting and relying on Citizenship
Clause); William Cohen, Discrimination Against New State Citizens: An Update, 11 CONST.
COMM. 73 (1994), quoted with approval in Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507 n.20; William Cohen, Equal
Treatment for Newcomers: The Core Meaning of National and State Citizenship, 1 CONST.
COMM. 9 (1984).
105 The interstate equality aspect of the Clause was also employed in Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935), which struck down a state law taxing out-of-state investment income but
exempting interest earned on certain in-state investments. See id. at 426-33. But see Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90-93 (1940) (overruling Colgate). The incorporation issue did not
arise in either case.
106 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 38-44, 57-60; KACZOROWSKI, POLICS,
supra note 88, at 143-49. The slaughter-house law embodied both the typical virtues and
notorious faults of Southern Reconstructionism. While genuine and progressive concerns over
health and sanitation played a role in the legislation, "the process. . . was riddled with blatant
corruption, bribery, graft and economic self-interest." KACZOROWsKI, POLITICS, supra note 88,
at 143-44; see also Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 71. One of the ironies of the dispute
was that
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noted, the factual setting allowed the Court to decide ideologically explosive
issues in a deceptively mundane business context.10 7 The butchers claimed that
their right to pursue their livelihood, their "right of free labor," in Justice Field's
euphonious phrase,10 8 had been unconstitutionally abridged. Justice Field
described this as "one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man," 109
but it does not appear anywhere in the Bill of Rights.
The Slaughter-House Court did not write on a blank slate. Some lower
federal courts had already held that Bill of Rights guarantees were now, by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states. Most intriguingly, newly
appointed U.S. Circuit Judge William B. Woods of Alabama held in two 1871
cases-ten years before his elevation to the Supreme Court-that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause incorporated the entire Bill of Rights, most notably the
First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.110 Justice Bradley, himself
then recently appointed to the Supreme Court, expressed his support for
incorporation in private correspondence with Judge Woods regarding the first of
those cases,1 11 consistently with views he would later express, as we shall see, in
Slaughter-House itself.112
Democratic Conservatives and others who opposed the... monopoly created by a corrupt
Republican controlled Louisiana legislature embraced the nationalist theory of civil rights
enforcement authority associated with the Republican Party, while Republicans and others who
wanted the slaughterhouse [monopoly] invoked a more states rights oriented theory of civil
rights enforcement authority associated with Democratic Conservatives.
KAcZOROWsKI, POLmcs, supra note 88, at 146.
10 7 See KACZOROWSKI, POLMIICS, supra note 88, at 143. As Kaczorowski observed: "The
litigants were white butchers and a... corporation rather than blacks and Klansmen." Id
10 8 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110 (Field, J., dissenting).
109 Id
110 See United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); United States v.
Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 171-72;
KACZOROWsKI, POLITCS, supra note 88, at 14-17, 23 n.25; Amar, supra note 22, at 1256;
Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 97-98. But see Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4,
at Part II.C (discussing Justice Woods's apparent abandonment of incorporation on Supreme
Court). Judge Woods was joined in Hall by District Judge Richard Busteed. See Hall, 26
F. Cas. at 79; KACZOROWSKI, POLITCS, supra note 88, at 10, 67-68.
111 See KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 14-16. As Kaczorowski noted,
"[Judge Woods's] opinion closely followed the reasoning of Justice Bradley. Indeed, portions
of it were verbatim copies of Justice Bradley's letter." Id. at 16.
112 Slaughter-House was decided on appeal from the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
upheld the monopoly in April 1870. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 44;
KACZORoWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 144-45. In June 1870, before the U.S. Supreme
Court accepted the appeal, the butchers sought an injunction from the U.S. Circuit Court for
Louisiana. Justice Bradley, sitting as Circuit Justice and joined by Judge Woods, wrote an
opinion granting partial relief to the butchers and embracing a broad, nationalistic view of the
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Some judges and prosecutors involved in federal prosecutions of the Ku
Klux Klan between 1868 and 1873 also took a broad view of the Amendment as
incorporating Bill of Rights guarantees. 113 During congressional debates over
civil rights legislation in 1871-72, the incorporationist theory of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was arguably "the prevailing view on the subject,"'114
among both Republicans and Democrats. 115 The Ohio Supreme Court, in an
1872 decision upholding segregated public education, suggested an
incorporationist understanding of the Clause.116 On the other hand, at least one
Fourteenth Amendment (though he did not there address the issue of incorporation). See Live-
Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870); KACZOROWSKI, POLmCs, supra note 88, at 145-46.
113 See CURTIs, No STATE, supra note 22, at 172; HALBROOK, supra note 52, at 135-45;
KACZOROwsKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 20, 122-34; Lou FALKNER WLLIAMS, THE GREAT
SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALs, 1871-1872, at 60-76 (1996). Federal prosecutors
and judges were engaged at the time in enforcing the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140
(1870), and the Enforcement (Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). These laws were
designed to curb Klan terrorism aimed at the freed slaves; of more troubling and pressing
concern than incorporation were the issues they raised regarding federal authority to reach
private abuses not involving state action. See KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 13-
14, 53-54, 117-34, 199-217. One federal prosecutor joining in this enforcement effort was
John A. Minnis, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama. See ia at 118. Minnis
provided critical assistance in battling the Klan to Fayette County Sheriff Marion Francis
Treadaway, for which the sheriff's family was so grateful that his daughter named his grandson
Frank Minnis Johnson in his honor. Johnson in turn named his son Frank Minis Johnson, Jr.
(the extra "n" being accidentally dropped on the birth certificate). The younger Johnson went
on to serve as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama, eighty years after Minnis
held that post, and then as a federal judge, for whom I clerked. See supra note *; BASS, supra
note *, at 5-10, 80-94; SIKORA, supra note *, at 71-77; TRELEASE, supra note *, at 252-53,
267-69,306,410.
114 Crosskey, supra note 61, at 100 (discussing House debate on Enforcement (Ku Klux
Klan) Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)); see also Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at 525-27
(discussing 1872 Senate debate on bill that later became Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335
(1875)).
115 There was deep division over the scope of Congress's enforcement power, see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, especially whether it went beyond state action to reach private
violations of rights, but even those taking a narrow view on that issue appeared to agree with, or
at least not dispute, Representative Bingham's view, which he expressly reiterated in 1871, that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause encompassed the entire Bill of Rights. See Crosskey,
supra note 61, at 88-100; Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at 525-27; see also CURTIS, No
STATE, supra note 22, at 161-66; HALBROOK, supra note 52, at 119-34, 145-49; Avins, supra
note 62, at 24-25.
116 See Ohio ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 209-10 (1872) ("[T]he
clause, ... taken in connection with other provisions of the amendment, and of the constitution
of which it forms a part, affords strong reasons for believing that it includes only such
privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United
States:").
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lower federal court and one state court appeared to reject incorporation during
this time.1 17
Professor Fairman, thinking he had refuted any incorporationist
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in the congressional and ratification
debates, went on to contend that "the contemporary Supreme Court knew nothing
of [the theory] either." 18 Fairman's primary evidence was the Court's 1869
decision in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania,119 which, in cursory reliance on Barron v.
Baltimore120 and its progeny, rejected jurisdiction over a capital defendant's
claim that his state-court indictment violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to be properly informed of a criminal
accusation. 121 The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified less than a year before, was
never raised, and thus, quite properly in accord with canons of judicial restraint,
was not addressed by the Court.122
117 See United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701,704 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871); Rowan v. State,
30 Wis. 129, 148-50 (1872); Fairman, supra note 22, at 110-11. In Crosby, the court stated
that the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures was
"a mere restriction upon the United States itself," which might be read merely to refer to a state-
action problem in the indictment, which alleged a conspiracy by private citizens to violate the
right. 25 F. Cas. at 704. The court did not discuss whether the right might be a "restriction
upon" a state, though it did offer the puzzling non sequitur that because the right pre-dated the
Constitution in the common law, it was therefore not "secured by the constitution." See id But
why could a right not both have "existed... at common law" and be "secured by the
constitution"? Cf. id.; KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 128; WRtnAM5, supra note
113, at 71-73.
118 Fairman, supra note 22, at 132.
119 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869); Fairman, supra note 22, at 132-33; see also BERGER,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 153 & n.84; Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746,749-50 (1965).
120 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
121 See Twitchell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 325-27.
122 See id at 321-27. It is hombook law-and goes to the very essence ofjudicial power
and restraint in the American tradition, including our courts' traditional aversion to advisory
opinions--that a court generally will not, and should not, address an issue abandoned or never
raised before it, see Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 n.4 (1998) (noting that
"it would be improper for us sua sponte to raise and address" questions not raised by parties
before the Court); see also, e.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 527
(1994); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984);
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 754 n.7 (1962); Newsom, supra note 22, at 726-27
nA10, with rare exceptions such as a court's own lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
Louisville & Nashville IKR. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). As the Court stated in
Yalais v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944), "[n]o procedural principle is more
familiar.., than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by
the failure to make timely assertion of the right."
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Professor Fairman argued that had the incorporation issue occurred to the
Court, it "would have suggested the question and heard argument before
disposing of the petition of one sentenced to death."123 But as Professor Amar
has noted, there was no "uncertainty" that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
"due process" in a state trial, and yet the Court refused to consider the due
process claim simply because counsel had invoked, not the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, but that of the Fifth. Thus, Twitchell "proves
too much-and therefore nothing at all."'124
123 Fairman, supra note 22, at 133; see also Dripps, supra note 64, at 1579-82 (likewise
overreading Twitchell's significance); Mendelson, supra note 62, at 721 (same). It appears that
no written briefs were filed, though the Court did hear oral argument by the defendant's
attorney. See Dripps, supra note, at 1579.124 Amar, supra note 22, at 1255. As Amar suggested, all Twitchell proves is that the
Court, when it wants to, can strictly confine itself to properly raised issues. See id. at 1259
n.286. That the Court has not always done so is reflected in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90
(1876) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), discussed in Parts IH.B and llI.C.
It appears doubtful in any event whether the defendant in Twitchell could plausibly have shown
a violation of due process or the right to be properly informed of the accusation, based on the
sparse facts given, which may firther explain the ease with which the Court unanimously
disposed of the case. See Twitchell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 321-22. Professor Dripps, viewing
Twitchell as seriously undercutting the incorporation theory, see Dripps, supra note 64, at
1579-82, criticized Amar for "explain[ing] Twitchell as judicial incompetence, pure and
simple." Id at 1580. The defendant's lawyer may well have slipped up (hardly an earthshaking
proposition), but it was not "incompetent," but rather reflected utmost propriety, for the Court
not to address a claim not raised before it (a rather basic principle of the American adversary
legal system). See supra note 122. In any event, Dripps himself undercut the importance he
claimed for Twitchell by correctly pointing out that the defendant's due process claim was
simply "weak" in any event. See Dripps, supra note 64, at 1581. Dripps asserted that "Twitchell
proves that.., a unanimous Supreme Court thought Barron was good law immediately after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id Barron was, of course, good law in 1869 and
remains so today, in the sense that the Fifih and Sixth Amendments do not, of their own force,
apply to the states. That was the only issue Twitchell addressed. To borrow Dripps's words, it
seems "not a very convincing account," id. at 1580, to treat as an important refutation of
incorporation the Court's mere silence in a case where the Fourteenth Amendment itself was
not even raised and the underlying Bill of Rights claim that might have been raised via the
Fourteenth Amendment lacked substantial merit. Cf Newsom, supra note 22, at 721-23
(discussing Twitchelo. Likewise devoid of significance for the incorporation issue, Professor
Fairman notwithstanding, cf Fairman, supra note 22, at 133-34, is Justices of the Supreme
Court of New York v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870), which held that the Seventh
Amendment, of its own force, prohibits reexamination in any federal court (except in
accordance with common law rules) of any fact tried by a state-court jury. The Court briefly
acknowledged in dicta the established rule that the Seventh Amendment, of its own force, does
not govern state courts, citing Barron and Twitchell, but noted that this had 'no
pertinent.., application to the question at hand," which concemed the powers of a federal
court. Id. at 278. The Fourteenth Amendment was neither raised nor relevant.
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B. Article IV and the Equal-Rights-Only Theory
In Slaughter-House, unlike Twitchell, the Fourteenth Amendment was
invoked. But; as noted, Slaughter-House did not directly implicate the Bill of
Rights, nor did it really involve any claim of absolute abridgment of any
substantive rights, of "free labor" or otherwise. Rather, the decision concerned
only the allegedly unequal treatment of the butchers as compared to the disputed
monopoly. As the majority correctly noted,
it is not true that [the Louisiana law] deprives the butchers of the right to exercise their
trade ....
... On the contrary, the [monopoly] is required... to permit any person who
wishes to do so, to slaughter in [its] houses; and [it is] bound to make ample provision
for the convenience of all the slaughtering for the entire city. The butcher, then, is still
permitted to slaughter, to prepare, and to sell his own meats; but he is required to
slaughter at a specified place and to pay a reasonable compensation for the use of the
accommodations fiunished him at that place.125
This excerpt helps to explain why both the majority opinion and Justice Field's
dissent focused heavily on the issue of equal rights126 and why they focused little,
if at all, on whether the Fourteenth Amendment substantively incorporates the
Bill of Rights. What has been said so far should also be enough to suggest that the
modem Supreme Court, applying current Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,
would surely-and properly so-have little difficulty upholding a law like the
one challenged in Slaughter-House as a classic example of an economic
regulation subject to the most deferential scrutiny.127
125 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 60-61.
126 See id at 62-66 (discussing historical acceptance of special and exclusive business
privileges analogous to challenged law); id. at 81 (rejecting butchers' challenge under equal
protection Clause); id. at 84-89 (Field, J., dissenting) (excoriating unjust inequality of
monopolies); id at 89-94,97-101 (Field, J., dissenting) (relying on Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments and Civil Rights Act of 1866 to assert 'right to pursue a lawful employment in a
lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally affects all persons"); id at 106-09
(Field, J., dissenting) (discussing several cases said to support "recognition of the equality of
right among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life, and... that all grants of
exclusive privileges, in contravention of this equality, are against common right, and void"); id
at 109-11 (Field, 3., dissenting) (concluding with repeated references to "equality of right"
allegedly violated by challenged law).
127 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding special economic
privileges of certain New Orleans pushcart vendors under deferential standard of review); see
also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 474-86, 635-62; Curtis, Resurrecting, supra
note 41, at 105 (in article generally criticizing Slaughter-House majority for unduly narrow
reading of Amendment, concluding that majority nevertheless "was right in seeking an
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The equal rights focus of Slaughter-House, though merely dictated by the
facts, has contributed to an alternative reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause that has garnered some support over the years:
that the Clause merely guarantees equal enjoyment of certain rights, not
substantive protection for any absolute class of rights.12 8 Because of the
importance of this issue to understanding Slaughter-House and the proper bearing
of the Clause on incorporation, it is worth discussing in some detail.
The equal-rights-only view of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause draws
heavily on its roots in the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV of the
original Constitution.12 9 The latter has long been construed as merely a type of
equal rights Clause. The Supreme Court settled on that interpretation by 1869 in a
unanimous opinion by Justice Field, which declared that the Article IV Clause
"place[s] the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are
concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other
States... [and] inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other
States .... 130 Or, as the Court more recently phrased it, the Article IV Clause
guarantees "to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizens of State B enjoy."'131
Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissent discussed how the Fourteenth
Amendment Clause differs from its Article IV predecessor, taldng into account
his own 1869 opinion. That case held that corporations are not "citizens" for
purposes of the Article IV Clause.132 'The whole purport of the [1869] decision
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that did not risk total destruction of state
power" and "was right in not removing subjects from the democratic process because they fall
loosely under the rubric of economic liberty").
128 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 20-51; NELSON, supra note 88, at
115-23, 155-64; Harrison, supra note 41; see also supra note 64. Professor Nelson, while
arguing that "[u]nderstanding section one [of the Amendment] as an instrument for the equal
rather than absolute protection of rights resolves the contradiction in the evidence that has so
puzzled historians," concluded that the historical evidence regarding the original understanding
cannot resolve "whether section one was intended to be simply an equality provision or a
provision protecting absolute rights as well." NELSON, supra note 88, at 118, 123.
12 9
'qilhe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
130 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
131 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); see also, ag., Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper,
470 U.S. 274 (1985); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).132 See Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180-82. This aspect of Paul remains good law today,
even though its logic was soon undermined by the Court's treatment of corporations as
"persons" under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402-07 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (Field,
Cir. J.), aff'd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Professor Julian Eule demonstrated that no basis remains
1086 [Vol. 61:1051
was, that citizens of one State do not carry with them into other States any special
privileges or immunities, conferred by the laws of their own States, of a corporate
or other character. ' 133 But, Field pointed out:
That decision has no pertinency to the questions involved in this case. The common
privileges and immunities which of right belong to all citizens, stand on a very
different footing. These the citizens of each State do carry with them into other States
and are secured by the [Fourteenth Amendment] clause in question, in their
enjoyment upon terms of equality with citizens of the latter States....
What the [Article IV] clause... did for the protection of the citizens of one State
against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the fourteenth
amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against hostile
and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in
the same or in different States. If under the [Article IV Clause] equality of privileges
and immunities is secured between citizens of different States, under the fourteenth
amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the United States.134
It is easy to see how this language contributes to the equal-rights-only reading
some have placed on Field's entire opinion,135 though such a reading must
ultimately be rejected for reasons discussed below.
The equal rights interpretation of the Article IV Clause has been further
limited by the long-established rule that it guarantees equal enjoyment only of
those rights deemed "fundamental." 136 As a limiting gloss on the egalitarian
reading of the Article IV Clause, this "fundamental rights" focus has been
severely criticized by various Justices and scholars.137 Further complicating
matters is that an alternative theory of the Article IV Clause enjoyed some
today for the Court to adhere to this anachronistic limitation with regard to the Article IV
Clause (nor, by extension, I would argue, with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment Clause).
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425, 452 (1982)
(noting that corporations have long been viewed as "citizens" for diversity jurisdiction purposes
under Article m, and that cases applying Equal Protection Clause to discrimination against out-
of-state corporations had "stripped Justice Field's position [in Paul] of every one of its legal
underpinnings'); see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel,
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1568 & n.78
(1989) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Note] (discussing Eule's views and collecting additional
scholarly support for treating corporations as "citizens" for purposes of Article IV Clause).
133 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100 (Field, J, dissenting).
134 Id. at 100-01 (Field, J., dissenting).
135 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 88, at 156-58; Harison, supra note 41, at 1466-68.
136 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Mont. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,388 (1978).
137 See, e.g., id at 395-98 (Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ., dissenting);
David S. Bogen, The Prvileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
794, 844 (1987); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equaity, 48
U. Cm. L. REv. 487,514-15 (1981); Wildenthal, Note, supra note 132, at 1562-64, 1591-93.
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currency among Civil War-Era Republicans, notably Representative Bingham.
This theory was that the Article IV Clause did not merely guarantee interstate
equality but also provided substantive protection for "fundamental" rights,
including but not limited to those set forth in the Bill of Rights. 138
The "fundamental rights" spin on the Article IV Clause appears to be rooted
in Justice Bushrod Washington's famous 1825 circuit court opinion in Corfield v.
Coryell.139 Corfield upheld a New Jersey law prohibiting out-of-state citizens
from gathering oysters in New Jersey waters, 140 on the theory that they were the
common property of New Jersey citizens.141 More widely cited than the holding
have been Washington's dicta listing various "privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental."'1 42 Nothing in Corfield suggests any reason to
conclude that Washington intended any departure from an interstate equality
theory of the Article IV Clause. His holding and express language indicated his
intent was merely to "confin[e]" the scope of the Clause's reach in that regard.143
Rightly or wrongly, however, Corfield has sometimes been read to support the
substantive theory of the Clause.144
Regardless of which view of the Article IV Clause is correct, or which held
sway when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, it is common ground that
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause was adapted from Article
138 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 47-48, 61, 114-15, 149-51; Amar, supra
note 22, at 1229; Crosskey, supra note 61, at 11-16.
139 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (Washington, Cir. J.).
140 See id at 550-53.
141 See id at 552; see also Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 384, 388 (treating elk and other wildlife
as common property of Montana citizens); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1877)
(treating oysters as common property of Virginia citizens).
142 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
143 See id at 551; see also BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 34-36; BERGER,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 31-34. As Berger noted, Washington plainly erred by
including "the elective franchise" in his list of "fundamental rights" protected by the Article IV
Clause, see Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552, because that would lead to the absurd result oftemporary
visitors to other states enjoying the right to vote on an equal basis with resident citizens. See
BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 32; see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162, 174 (1875) (rejecting such a reading of the Clause).
144 See, e.g., Crosskey, supra note 61, at 14-16. I would now retract my youthful
suggestion, see Wildenthal, Note, supra note 132, at 1569, that Justice Washington in Corfield
supported substantive protection of "fundamental" rights via the Article IV Clause; I did not
approve of such a theory then (nor do I now), and I no longer believe that Justice Washington
embraced such a theory. I remain of the view that the Corfield-inspired fundamental-rights
limitation on the Article IV Clause (construed in its proper interstate equality sense) is
misguided. See supra note 137.
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IV.145 There is no reason to suppose that the words "privileges or immunities"
have any broader meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment than in Article IV. They
might, indeed, have a narrower meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment in light
of their modification by the phrase, "of citizens of the United States. ' 146 But in
any event, this does not resolve the proper construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment Clause. Even if the words "privileges or immunities" have the same
meaning in both Clauses, the full text of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause
renders the equal-rights-only interpretation of the latter Clause untenable.
The Fourteenth Amendment Clause, unlike its Article IV counterpart, is
simply not phrased as a relativistic guarantee of equal rights, but rather flatly
declares that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge" a
certain class of rights.147 Furthermore, the equal-rights-only reading of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause would render it utterly redundant to the Equal
Protection Clause. The latter shows the framers of the Amendment knew
perfectly well how to express the concept of an equal rights guarantee.148 The
145 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866) (Rep. Bingham)).
146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also inffra Parts H.C-E. One respect in which
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities might arguably be construed more broadly
than Article IV privileges and immunities is that the former would seem to include the rights of
United States citizens to vote free of various forms of discrimination, as guaranteed by the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, see supra note 94,
whereas the right to vote seems clearly not covered by Article IV, see supra note 143. It's a
moot point, however, since all the cited amendments apply expressly to the states as well as the
federal government in any event. See supra note 94. Thus, no incorporation issue arises.
147 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I (emphases added). Justice Bradley, in his 1870
Slaughter-House circuit court opinion, see supra note 112, noted, "It was very ably
contended... that the... fourteenth amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens
equal capacities before the law. That was at first our view of it. But it does not so read." Live-
Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 654 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Bradley, Cir. J., joined by Woods, J.). "[TJhe
fourteenth amendment... not merely requires equality of privileges; but it demands that the
privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired." Id at
652; see also, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351, 405-06 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Natural
Law]; Smith, Reconstruction orReaffirmation?, supra note 63, at 192-94.
148 As Dean Ely has noted, "the slightest attention to language will indicate that it is the
Equal Protection Clause that follows the... equality strategy, while the Privileges and
Immunities Clause proceeds by purporting to extend to everyone a set of entitlements.' ELY,
supra note 6, at 24; see also CURTis, No STATE, supra note 22, at 119 (noting textual
impossibility of equal-rights-only reading of Privileges and Immunities Clause); Amar, supra
note 22, at 1243-46 (rejecting equal-rights-only reading as implausible and contradicted by
legislative history). Professor Berger conceded in 1989 the 'tautology" created by his equal-
rights-only reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, commenting that "[a]lthough I
have read the.., clauses countless times, I ... have overlooked what now seems to me the
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Privileges and Immunities Clause cannot be so limited without doing violence to
plain language. The force of this conclusion is confirmed by the contemporary
understanding of Representative Bingham, Senator Howard, and many of their
Republican contemporaries that the Amendment would provide an absolute floor
of protection for substantive liberties, 149 most especially freedom of speech.150
It is likewise unpersuasive to view Justice Field in Slaughter-House as
embracing the view that the Fourteenth Amendment Clause is no more than a
guarantee of equal enjoyment of fundamental rights. He certainly believed it
guaranteed at least that much, as the passage from his dissent quoted above
reflects, and he found that sufficient to support his condemnation of the disputed
monopoly. 15' Equal enjoyment of the rights covered by the Clause is certainly
assured, since any unequal abridgment would be no less an abridgment. Again, it
bears repeating, the facts of Slaughter-House drove the incessant emphasis on
equal rights and the allegedly unjust inequality of the Louisiana law. But Field's
argument as to why the monopoly violated the Clause betrayed his underlying
vision, consistent with the plain text discussed above, that it provided substantive
protection for certain absolute rights. "The privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States," he declared, are "secured against abridgment in any form
by any State.... All monopolies.., are an invasion of these privileges,for they
duplication of 'abridged' by 'equal protection.' This ... calls for further exploration.' BERGER,
FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 124. Or, one might respectfully suggest, reconsideration. In
Berger's revision of his 1977 book, however, published eight years after his concession just
noted, he made no mention of this problem, instead simply reiterating his view that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is identical in scope to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See
BERGER, GOVERNMENT 1997, supra note 62, at 44-56; see also supra note 64.
149 See CURTIs, No STATE, supra note 22, at 119-20; Amar, supra note 22, at 1218-54.
But see generally Harrison, supra note 41 (arguing that the Amendment provides equality-
based not substantive protection). Professor Curtis has provided the most thorough and
definitive refutation of the equal-rights-only theory. See Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at
44-65.
150 See Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 47 (noting that "the primary Republican
complaint was not simply about discrimination," but "about the denial of the precious
American right to free speech and press"); see also supra note 87.
151 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 101 (Field, J., dissenting):
It will not be pretended that under the [Article IV Clause] any State could create a
monopoly in any known trade or manufacture in favor of her own citizens... which would
exclude... citizens of other States....
Now, what the [Article IV Clause] does for the protection of citizens of one State against
the creation of monopolies in favor of citizens of other States, the fourteenth amendment does
for the protection of every citizen of the United States against the creation of any monopoly
whatever.
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encroach upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue
happiness .... "152
Professor William Nelson, defending his equal-rights-only view of Justice
Field's dissent, argued that Field's supposedly "moderate reading" of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House "quickly became the basic doctrine
of American constitutional law."153 Nelson pointed to the 1877 decision in Munn
v. Illinois,154 asserting that it thus "took only four years after... Slaughter-
House... for Justice Field to command a majority on the Court in support of his
views. '155 But Field dissented in Munn.156 The majority in Munn, far more
reminiscently of the Slaughter-House majority opinion than of Field's dissent
from that decision, upheld the state's power to enforce a reasonable economic
regulation of the prices charged by certain types of grain elevators.157 Field found
that to be an invasion of the substantive "liberty" he thought protected by the Due
Process Clause, 158 notwithstanding that no monopoly was involved.1 59
Of course, Professor Nelson was quite right in the sense that Justice Field's
views on economic regulations, not those of the Slaughter-House or Munn
majorities, did eventually prevail over the next fifty years or so. As Professor
Morrison observed, Field, "more than any other one member of the Supreme
152 Id. (Field, J., dissenting) (emphases added). That Field was thinking in termis of
substantive liberties is underscored by his open reliance on laissez-faire capitalist economic
philosophy. See id. at 110 n.* ('The property which every man has in his own labor... is the
most sacred and inviolable.... [T]o hinder him from employing [it] ... is a manifest
encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to
employ him.") (quoting ADAM SMITH; AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONs 151 (1776)). The fact that Justice Bradley, who emphatically rejected an
equal-rights-only reading of the Clause in his 1870 Slaughter-House circuit court opinion, see
supra notes 112 and 147, joined unreservedly in Field's 1873 Slaughter-House dissent, see
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 11, still further underscores how implausible it is to
impute such a reading to Field.
153 NELSON, supra note 88, at 164.
154 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
155 NELSON, supra note 88, at 165; see also id at 171-74.
156 On the short end of a 7-2 vote, it might be added. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field,
J., joined by Strong, J., dissenting). Professor Nelson, of course, acknowledged this, but did not
take sufficient account of it See NELSON, supra note 88, at 172-74.
157 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 123-36.
158 The owners protesting the price regulation based their claim primarily on the Due
Process Clause and did not invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause, doubtless because
Slaughter-House indicated the latter would be unavailing. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 119-20.
15 9 See id. at 141-54 (Field, J., dissenting). For Justice Field, the issue was one of pure
economic liberty conceived in absolute terms: "whether it is within the competency of a State
to fix the compensation which an individual may receive for the use of his own property in his
private business, and for his services in connection with it." Id. at 138. He concluded that the
challenged regulation "interfer[ed] with the legitimate profits of that business." Id. at 154.
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Court, was responsible for the establishment of substantive due process. '160 But
few would describe the line of cases that included Lochner v. New York161 and
ultimately plunged the nation into constitutional crisis as involving any fidelity to
a "moderate," equal-rights-only reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.162
In any event, the proposition that the words "privileges or immunities"
encompass at least all Bill of Rights guarantees is not dependent on accepting the
unorthodox, Civil War-Era Republican view of the Article IV Clause. Even the
orthodox interpretation of the Article IV Clause is filly consistent with reading
"privileges or immunities" to encompass, at a minimum, all the rights set forth in
the Bill of Rights.163 To be sure, the Article IV Clause (under the orthodox
reading) does not provide any substantive protection for any such rights, but
merely guarantees interstate travelers equal enjoyment of such rights, on a par
with citizens of any state they may visit, to whatever extent that state may grant
such rights to its own citizens. And it is true that Justice Washington in Corfield
(if one takes guidance from that case) did not list any specific Bill of Rights
guarantees. But he did refer rather sweepingly to rights "enjoyed by the citizens
of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign," and to "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety."'164 He made clear that his list was only a nonexhaustive
sample in any event.165
160 Morrison, supra note 6, at 172 n.63; see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF
JusTIcESHip OF MELViLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 25-26 (1995) (descning Field as a
"prima donna" on the Court who "pioneered a broad reading of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" and was "the most influential justice during the Gilded Age," whose
"property-conscious views gained ascendancy during Fuller's chiefjusticeship").
161 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
162 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (helping resolve
constitutional crisis and departing from Lochner doctrine by upholding minimum wage law);
Curds, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 85-86, 91-93 (discussing connection between
Slaughter-House and Lochner). Cf. NELSON, supra note 88, at 197-200 (discussing Lochner
and Court's subsequent movement away from Lochner-style activism). The origins and
implications of the Lochner doctrine have been the subject of continuing scholarly debate. See,
e.g., HOwARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTON BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (taking revisionist view of Slaughter-
House/Lochner-era Court's treatment of economic regulations, finding it rooted more in
conceptions of limited govemmental police powers than in libertarian conceptions of natural
economic rights). But such issues are beyond the scope of this article.
163 See generally Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 62.
164 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
165 He stated that it would "be more tedious than difficult to enumerate' the covered
rights, and concluded by suggesting there were "many others which might be mentioned" Id
at 551-52.
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Professor Berger minimized Corfield as "hardly... expansive," noting that it
denied access to a state's oyster beds.166 Fair enough, but could a state properly
deny out-of-state citizens the right to criminal or civil trial by jury, while granting
such rights to its own citizens? Could a state allow freedom of speech to its own
residents, yet censor and muzzle the interstate traveler? It hardly seems
imaginable that any guarantee mentioned in the Bill of Rights, even those perhaps
held in lowest esteem today,167 could ever properly have been withheld on such a
discriminatory basis, consistent with the Article IV Clause. "Fundamental rights"
under the Article IV Clause may not include the rights to hunt elk 168 or dredge
oysters, 169 but it would be bizarre if they did not include the privileges and
immunities enshrined in the Bill of Rights.170
Thus, even taking the narrow orthodox reading of the Article IV Clause as a
premise, it clearly follows, from the phrasing and history of the Fourteenth
Amendment Clause derived from it, that the states are now prohibited from
substantively "abridging" this class of "fundamental" rights. That class of rights
must surely include, at a minimum, the guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights,
plus whatever other rights might properly be viewed as "fundamental," except to
166 BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 35-36.
167 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64-65 (1947) (Frankfirter, J.,
concurring) (noting that "more than half the States" had by then abandoned grand jury);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that grand jury indictment is not
required of states by Fourteenth Amendment). But would even Justice Frankfurter have
suggested that a state which still employed the grand jury could dispense with it in charging
out-of-state visitors with crimes?
168 See Baldwin v. Mont. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,388 (1978).
169 See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391,395-96 (1877); Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
170 It has been argued that the Article IV Clause, drafted and proposed in 1787, could not
possi'bly have had reference to the privileges and immunities later embodied in the Bill of
Rights, drafted and proposed in 1789 and not ratified until 1791. See BERGER, FOURTEENTH,
supra note 60, at 92; Fairman, supra note 22, at 62. But the privileges and immunities of the
Bill of Rights were hardly novelties. As is well known, they derived from time-honored
principles of British and colonial American law. See generally, e.g., AMAR, BELL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 63, at 3-133; ThE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFrs, DEBATES, SOURCES,
AND ORIGINs (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). In any event the Article IV Clause, especially under
the orthodox egalitarian reading, is necessarily prospectively open-ended as to what rights are
covered. See Crosskey, supra note 61, at 83 (arguing that Article IV Clause "would of course
become immediately implemented with all after-created privileges, or immunities.., as soon
as any such privileges or immunities were created"); supra note 146 (voting rights created by
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments may be viewed as
retroactive additions to privileges and immunities protected by Fourteenth Amendment). See
generally Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 62 (historical usages support view that
words "privileges" and "immunities" were understood to include, and used interchangeably
with, rights guaranteed by Bill of Rights).
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the extent the modifying phrase, "of citizens of the United States," might be
thought to place a limitation on such privileges and immunities.
C. Justice Field vs. Justice Miller
Justice Field certainly did not think the Bill of Rights demarcated any outer
limit on the privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
Field's grandiloquent dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House, joined by Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley,171 is perhaps the best
place to start in exploring how broadly the majority viewed that Clause. By
understanding what Field hoped to achieve, it becomes clearer what the majority
wished to reject.
What Justice Field aimed at was no less than sweeping federal judicial
protection for a range of natural, unwritten rights, as against state regulatory
power. Though much of his opinion was devoted to expounding the "privileges
or immunities" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he nowhere defined
them by reference to the Bill of Rights, or to any textually specified rights.
Indeed, he scorned the very notion of limiting one's vision to textually guaranteed
liberties, and specifically excoriated the majority for, as he saw it, doing just that.
In a passage that could be the antithesis of Justice Black's positivist credo, Justice
Field declaimed:
If [the Fourteenth Amendment]... only refers, as held by the majority... to such
privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in the
Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it
was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily
excited Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus
designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new
constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of
the Constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any State
legislation of that character. But if the amendment refers to the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, [it] has a profound significance and
consequence.172
The foregoing sounds a lot like a condenmation of any approach-like
Justice Black's in Adamson v. California173 -that would tie the meaning of the
Amendment to all, but only, rights specifically set forth elsewhere in the
171 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
173 332 U.S. 46,68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see also HuGo LAFAYETrEBLACK,
A CoNSTIuTTIoNAL FAITH 18-21, 34-42 (1968) (discussing Black's textualist philosophy of
constitutional interpretation).
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constitutional text. But if rights "specially designated in the Constitution" were so
inadequate, what rights did Justice Field find in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and how did he define them? Well, he described them no fewer than five
separate times as the "common" rights of all American citizens. 174 The Clause,
he said, guarantees to the United States citizen "[t]he fundamental rights,
privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free
citizen." 175
Justice Field finally, it would seem, got down to business by asking: 'What,
then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by
State legislation?"' 76 Well, they are "those which of right belong to the citizens of
all free governments."',77 What privilege was specifically violated by the New
Orleans butchers' monopoly? Said Field: "All monopolies in any known trade or
manufacture are an invasion of these privileges, for they encroach upon the
liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness, and were held void at
common law in the great Case ofMonopolies, decided during the reign of Queen
Elizabeth. '178 The Fourteenth Amendment, he argued, "was intended to give
practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are
the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but only recognizes."'1 79
And so forth.
The key to understanding Justice Field's philosophy is recognizing the frank
natural law assumptions under which he operated. Positivists like Justice Black
tend to seek some textual benchmark by which to define rights, and find the
absence of such definition troubling, if not intolerable. But for Field and his
dissenting colleagues, this was quite evidently part of the natural order of things.
It is very interesting, finally, that Justice Field used the words "bill of rights"
only once, toward the very end of his dissent: "[G]rants of exclusive
privileges ... are opposed to the whole theory of free government, and it requires
no aid from any bill of rights to render them void." 180 This may be read as an
accusation that the majority was relying--unduly restrictively, in Field's view-
174 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 89, 93, 100, 105 (twice) (Field, J.,
dissenting); see also, e.g., Newsom, supra note 22, at 659-63 (discussing common-law
derivation of "common" rights as referenced in plaintiffs' arguments and Field's dissent).
175 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95 (Field, J., dissenting).
17 6 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
17 7 Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
17 8 Id. at 101-02 (Field, J., dissenting).
179 Id at 105 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
180 Id at 11l (Field, J., dissenting). The words appear at one other place in Field's dissent,
but only as part of a quotation of another case, which conveyed the same backhanded
sentiment. See id. at 109 (invalidation of monopoly "'does not require even the aid which may
be derived from [a state] Bill of Rights"') (quoting Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City
Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19,38 (1856)).
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on the Bill of Rights as a referent for the scope of "privileges or immunities." It
displayed the natural law advocate's scorn for the idea that textual guarantees are
the sole legitimate source of judicially enforceable rights. For Field, the legal
vitality of such rights predated and overarched the written Constitution. For him,
Slaughter-House could never have turned on incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
What divided him from the majority was the philosophical schism between his
natural rights approach and what he may have perceived as the textualist
nitpicking of the whole issue of incorporation.
Justice Field's dissent is a revealing mirror in which to view Justice Miller's
opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Nathan Clifford, David Davis, William
Strong, and Ward Hunt. 181 The Court rejected all the constitutional claims against
the monopoly.182 The butchers' central claim, as we have seen, was that they had
been denied equal enjoyment of the fundamental right of "free labor," in violation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This claim could be refuted by
demonstrating either that (1) the monopoly at issue did not, in fact, deny them the
equal right to pursue their trade, or (2) the rightvlaimed did not, in any event, fall
within the scope of "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. 1 83 Miller set out to demonstrate both propositions. The former, highly
factbound issue need not concern us further.184 The latter was where all the
interesting fireworks took place.
Justice Miller's discussion of privileges and immunities was preceded by a
strangely formalistic analysis of the Citizenship Clause. 185 He placed heavy stress
on the distinction between state and national citizenship, 186 and relied on that
181 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57-83.
182 Other than the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim (the only one warranting
discussion here), the Court addressed and rejected claims that the monopoly constituted a form
of involuntary servitude, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, a denial of equal protection of the laws,
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and a deprivation of property without due process of law,
see id See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66, 69, 80-81.
183 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 60-66, 80-81.
185 See supra note 104.
186 Indeed, almost comical stress. Justice Miller asserted:
Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an
important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the
State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in
the United States to be a citizen of the Union.
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74 (emphases added). Such logic has a tail-wagging-
the-dog quality, sort of like arguing that having the car key is more important than buying the
car, after all, one "must" tum the key to start the car, while one need "only" plunk down
$20 thousand or so to buy it in the first place. In fact, of course, an individual has no control
over where she is bom and can obtain naturalization only with difficulty (most assuredly not by
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distinction to define the scope of the "privileges or immunities" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment He descended into metaphysical contortions in the
process. For example, the Amendment's reference to privileges and immunities
"of citizens of the United States" was said to make it "a little remarkable" to think
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "was intended as a protection to the
citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State."'1 87
What Justice Miller was groping to explain was a concept of dual citizenship
under which every American wears two hats. He was trying to argue, as we will
see, that the Clause only limits a state's power with respect to citizens in their
federal capacity, asserting rights under the federal Constitution. But it sounds
bizarre. After all, against what other citizens would a state most likely exercise
authority, than those who happen to reside within its borders, which is precisely
how the Amendment defines state citizens? And the plain language of the Clause,
providing that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law... abridg[ing]" 188
certain rights of such citizens, indicates rather unavoidably that it most certainly
does protect state citizens, in some fashion, against the legislative power of their
own state. The Clause would not serve much purpose otherwise.
The point of Justice Miller's contortions soon became clear. He was terribly
anxious to exclude from the category of Fourteenth Amendment "privileges or
immunities" the vast conglomeration of natural and common-law rights
suggested by such cases as Corfield v. Coryell.189 Did the Amendment extend
federal judicial protection and legislative power to all of this vast range of
ordinary or "natural" rights enjoyed by most people in most states as a matter of
history, custom, and state constitutional protection? "[W]as it intended to bring
within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore
belonging exclusively to the States?" 190 If so, Miller argued, it would "fetter and
right), whereas under the Fourteenth Amendment that individual, once a United States citizen,
is at complete liberty to claim state citizenship whenever and wherever she pleases, by simply
moving and relocating at will. The language of the Citizenship Clause and the overwhelming
evidence of the original understanding indicate that it was designed to remove any doubt
regarding the citizenship of the freed slaves and to render state citizenship an automatic,
derivative appendage of national citizenship. Even scholars as far apart in their views of the
Amendment as Berger and Kaczorowski seem to have agreed on that much. See
KACzoROWSKI, POLITcs, supra note 88, at 17 ("National and state citizenship were considered
to be two dimensions of the same status."); id. at 151-52 (criticizing Miller's heavy stress in
Slaughter-House on distinction between national and state citizenship); BERGER,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 33, at 44-45 (same).
187 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74.
188 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
189 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825); see also Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 75-77 (quoting and discussing Corfield and other cases); Newsom, supra note 22, at
668-74; supra Part II.B.
190 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
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degrade the State governments" and "radically chang[e] the whole theory of the
relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these
governments to the people." 191
Of equal concern to Justice Miller was the lack of a judicially manageable
referent for the scope of the rights claimed. Accepting such a broad and open-
ended reading of the Clause would give the Court "authority to nullify such [state
legislation] as it did not approve as consistent with those rights." 192 This
strikingly foreshadowed Justice Black's rationale for total incorporation.
Allowing the Court to "substitut[e] natural law concepts for the Bill of Rights,"
Black argued in Adamson, would "license this Court in considering regulatory
legislation, to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to
trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as the
Federal Government."1 93 Black noted with satisfaction that the Slaughter-House
majority had "flatly rejected" such "natural law arguments."'194 It was fitting in
this regard that Black's appointment in 1937 was a linchpin of the judicial
revolution that undid the Lochner doctrine spawned, in part; by Justice Field's
Slaughter-House dissent.195
In any event, Justice Miller concluded that the sweeping natural rights
invoked by the butchers and Justice Field were among "those which belong to
citizens of the States as such" and were "not by [the Fourteenth Amendment]
placed under the special care of the Federal government."'1 96 He then proceeded,
"lest it should be said that no such ... are to be found," 197 to his famously narrow
listing of some of the "privileges or immunities" thought to "owe their existence
to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.' 198
Much of the list deserves the condemnation of Field's dissent-and of most
commentators ever since-as a shamelessly redundant catalogue of rights already
fully protected by the Supremacy Clause.199 For example, Miller solemnly
included the right "to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government... when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign
191 1d. at78.
192.1d
193 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 77 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 81 (noting that Lochner substantive due
process doctrine "marked a complete departure from the Slaughter-House philosophy of
judicial tolerance of state regulation of business activities").195 See DUNNE, supra note 34, at 161-73, 191-92.
196 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
197 Id at79.
198 Id.
199 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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government,"200 without explaining how it would even be possible for a state to
intrude on any such privilege. Equally lacking any need for Fourteenth
Amendment protection were "[t]he right to use the navigable waters of the United
States"201 and "all rights secured to [United States] citizens by treaties with
foreign nations."202 Seemingly trying to run up the score, Miller concluded by
tossing in "the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of
amendment, and by the other clause[s] of the fourteenth. €203
As we have already seen, Justice Field got quite exercised over all this, and
not without reason. Before joining Field in throwing up our hands, however, we
must not overlook a sentence buried in the middle of the second paragraph of
Justice Miller's list: "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."204 So they are, and they are rights
which, under the rule of Barron v. Baltimore,205 were not previously applicable
to the states.206 Some scholars have argued that Miller meant such rights only
when exercised in connection with a citizen's relationship with the federal
govemrnment.20 7 It is certainly true, as discussed in Part lI.C, that the Court later
adopted that narrower reading. But it seems doubtful that was what Miller meant
in Slaughter-House, because he had already listed the right
"to come to the seat of [the federal] government to assert any claim... upon that
government, [or] to transact any business he may have with it, [or] to seek its
protection .... He has [a] right [to] free access to... the [federal] sub-treasuries, [the
federal] land offices, [ .. .] and [the federal] courts ofjustice in the several States. '208
200 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (opinion of the Court).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id at 80. The latter reference was to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
"next to be considered." Id
204 Id at 79.
205 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
206 See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging" rights of
peaceable assembly and petition); id art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (in section listing limitations on
congressional but not state power, providing that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it").
2 07 See, eg., KACZOROWSKI, POLrICS, supra note 88, at 152; Aynes, Miller, supra note
41, at 653-55; see also Amar, supra note 22, at 1258 (noting this "conventional reading" of
Miller's opinion).
208 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35,44 (1868)) (bracketing, added here, attempts in part to correct for slight, nonmaterial
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Reading Justice Miller's later sentence on assembly, petition, and habeas
corpus as referring only to claims upon the federal government would thus render
it doubly redundant.2 09 One would also have to explain why Miller, who
explicitly enunciated the governmental relationship limitation on most of the
other rights he listed, did not include any such limiting language in the sentence
under discussion. His reference to "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus"
was drawn verbatim from the original Constitution.2 10 As to assembly and
petition, he paraphrased the First Amendment almost verbatim, and to the minor
extent he departed from it, his paraphrase tends to contradict any notion that he
intended to limit such rights to a citizen's relationship with the federal
government. Miller referred to "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances," whereas the First Amendment refers to "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."2 1' The "Government" is an obvious reference to the federal
government, in accordance with the orthodoxy of Barron. Assuming Miller's
dropping of the word has any significance at all, it might seem to suggest a more
universal applicability of the right under the Fourteenth Amendment, not limited
to the federal government.
Indeed, to conclude that Justice Miller understood all the rights he listed as
tied to a citizen's relationship with the federal government would disregard his
own introduction to the list, which indicated a clear distinction between those
rooted in the "National character" of the federal government and those derived
from "the Federal... Constitution."212 The sentence in which Miller referred to
misquoting of Crandall by Justice Miller, "federal" references are also added here, based on
unambiguous context in Crandall).
209 I.e., redundant both internally and externally, in that (1) Miller's own opinion had
previously set forth the essence of such rights and (2) such rights were already protected by the
Supremacy Clause. As Professor Palmer noted, Miller "would have been quite clear had he
been talking of petition and assembly in a Crandall v. Nevada fashion, as petitioning or
assembling for a national purpose." Palmer, supra note 22, at 750; see also 2 CROSSKEY,
POLITICS, supra note 49, at 1129 (noting that if Miller's reference to assembly and petition were
read in terms of "'seek[ing of the national government's] protection,' it would have been
directly within the language from the Crandall case that Justice Miller quoted" (brackets added
by Crosskey)).
210 See supra note 206.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Dropping "of the people" seems mere
trimming of nonessential verbiage, and only a humorless grammarian would complain about
Miller's creation of a split infinitive. But cf AMAR, BILL OF RiGHTS, supra note 63, at 26-32,
244-46 (suggesting that words "of the people" had important limiting significance to
generation contemporary to adoption of First Amendment, though less so to contemporaries of
Fourteenth Amendment).
212 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; see also Palmer, supra note 22, at 748
(noting that Miller "listed three sources from which one might derive the privileges or
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assembly, petition, and habeas corpus concluded with the observation that these
"are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."213 By contrast,
the preceding sentence, referring to a right typical of the rest of Miller's list,
indicated that that right "depends upon [the citizen's] character as a citizen of the
United States. '214
Justice Miller's reference to assembly and petition looks very much, in fact,
like a straightforward incorporation of the First Amendment more than fifty years
before it was supposed to have happened.2 15 And why should we not take
seriously, at face value, the incorporationist implications of this reference to
"privileges and immunities ... which owe their existence to the
Federal... Constitution"?216 It seems a perfectly sensible way to encompass all
personal rights set forth in the constitutional text. This reading would certainly
give the lie to Justice Field's dissenting protest that the majority's interpretation
was "vain and idle."217
Justice Field's description of the majority's approach was partially accurate
in that Miller did focus on rights "specially designated in the Constitution or
necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States.' 218 But to the
extent such rights included guarantees previously nonbinding on the states, Field
plainly erred in suggesting that the Supremacy Clause "always controlled any
State legislation" in derogation of such rights.2 19 As Dean Ely reminded us,
dissents must be taken with a grain of salt-perhaps a few tablespoons in Field's
case!220 Field was doubtless unimpressed because the majority's view, even on a
total-incorporationist reading, did not produce the result he so ardently felt was
just.
Justice Miller had merely "venture[d] to suggest some ' 221 of the rights
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Having included habeas
corpus and two First Amendment guarantees in such an avowedly nonexhaustive
immunities of United States citizens: the requirements of the national character of the federal
government, the Constitution, and federal law"); Newsom, supra note 22, at 679 n.176 (making
same point).
2 13 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
214 Id.
2 15 See supra note 91.
2 16 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
217 See id at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). Cf ELY, supra note 6, at 197 n.59 ("Including
[such constitutionally designated federal rights] as privileges or immunities protected against
state action... was a far from trivial step.").
2 18 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting); see also ELY, supra
note 6, at 197 n.59 (quoting same).
219 SeeSlaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
220 See ELY, supra note 6, at 197 n.59.
221 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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list, what other federal right "specially designated in the Constitution" could the
majority have intended to exclude?222 The incorporationist reading of the opinion
has the signal virtue of lending sense and meaning to Miller's analysis, rather
than leaving it a puzzling and contemptible exercise in tautology. On that ground
alone it should be preferred.
The foregoing renders hugely ironic the fact that Justice Miller was a judicial
hero of both Justice Felix Frankfunter and Professor Fairman, the two greatest
twentieth-century antagonists of the incorporation theory.2 23 Fairman wrote the
standard biography of Miller, nowhere suggesting that he might ever have
entertained an incorporationist view of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 24 which
lends even greater irony to one scholar's comment that "Fairman's admiration for
Miller was so great that Fairman lost his ability for critical insight where Miller
was concerned. 225
D. Justices Bradley and Swayne and the Briefs
Justice Bradley's dissent, joined unreservedly by Justice Swayne,226 was the
only opinion in Slaughter-House to unequivocally endorse total incorporation.
"[W]e are not bound to resort to implication, or to the constitutional history of
22 2 Freedom of speech, for one, Dean Aynes argued. See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at
654 (citing free speech as an "obvious omission" from Miller's list). Aynes argued that
assembly and petition, unlike speech, are more easily viewed as "structural" rights tied to a
citizen's relationship to the national government See id Even leaving aside that Miller himself
advertised, as just noted in the text, that his list was nonexhaustive (thus undercutting the
significance of any omission), the argument leaves me unpersuaded. Speech might relate to
national issues or be directed to the national government just as easily as acts of assembly or
petition. All three are merely different aspects of free expression. Indeed, as this article suggests
in Part Im.C, it is difficult to imagine any workable or sensible regime in which First
Amendment freedoms could be protected against state power, but only as to '"national" topics.
The overwhelming evidence that First Amendment rights, above all else, were understood to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 87, makes it all the more
understandable why Miller would single out two such rights as examples in his illustrative,
nonexhaustive list. It does, perhaps, make it seem somewhat odd and grudging of Miller not to
highlight freedom of speech as well, but no one ever said Miller was an enthusiastic
incorporationist. It should be kept in mind that this was all dicta, having nothing to do with the
actual dispute in Slaughter-House. See Newsom, supra note 22, at 679-81 (also cautioning
against reading too much into Miller's omission of other Bill of Rights guarantees, and
suggesting that Miller was responding to Justice Bradley's dissent, see infra Part Il.D, which
mentioned assembly and habeas corpus as protected privileges and immunities).
2 23 See Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 24, at 1201.
2 2 4 See CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890
(1939) (discussed in Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 24, at 1206, 1209-12).
22 5 Aynes, Fairman & Frankfurter, supra note 24, at 1212.
2 26 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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England," Bradley declared, "to find an authoritative declaration of some of the
most important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It is in
the Constitution itself."227 As he noted, many of those privileges and immunities
were only secured, in express terms, from invasion by the Federal government; such
as the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious
worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for
the discussion of public measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not being
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. These, and still
others are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amendments of it as
among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or, what is still
stronger for the force of the argument the rights of all persons, whether citizens or
not.2 28
He later reiterated that one of the chief "mischief[s] to be remedied" by the
Fourteenth Amendment was state "intolerance of free speech and free
discussion." 229
It might be viewed as damaging to the incorporationist reading of the
majority opinion that this clearest and most comprehensive exposition of the
theory came in dissent. But such a reaction would be superficial and misguided.
Almost all of Justice Bradley's dissent was devoted to an exposition of natural-
rights views and hostility to monopolies entirely in accord with Justice Field's
dissent 2 30 which, as noted earlier, Bradley and Swayne also joined. It might also
be noted that Bradley was more lucid than Field in conveying that he was
addressing both equality issues and substantive rights.2 31 Bradley's discussion of
the Bill of Rights took up only a bit more than half a page in a thirteen-page
opinion.2 32 There is no reason to view it as central or even relevant to his (or
Field's) disagreement with the majority. Like Justice Miller, Bradley expressly
mentioned habeas corpus and the right of peaceable assembly.
The obvious point of disagreement between Justice Bradley and the majority
on incorporation would appear to be that Bradley refused to limit incorporation to
rights rooted in the constitutional text. While Bradley seemed anxious to lock
227 Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
228 Id at 118-19 (Bradley, j., dissenting).
229 Id at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
230 See idt at 111-18, 119-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
231 See id at 112 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that two essential questions were raised:
first, whether a citizen had a right'to pursue such civil employment as he may choose to adopt
subject to ... reasonable regulations," and second, whether the monopoly at issue was such a
reasonable regulation).
232 Compare id at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting) with id. at 111-18, 119-24 (Bradley,
J., dissenting).
2000] 1103
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
down a textually determinate core of "privileges or immunities," he did not
believe that such rights "owe[d] their existence to the
Federal... Constitution."233 Quite the contrary: Immediately after his digression
supporting textual incorporation, Bradley resumed his Field-like discourse on
natural rights:
But even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens... would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are. It was not
necessary to say in words that the citizens... should have and exercise [inter
alia]... the privilege of engaging in any lawful employment... 234
For Bradley, as for all the other Justices, Slaughter-House revolved around a
butchers' monopoly and not the Bill of Rights.
The incorporationist interpretation of the majority opinion is further
strengthened by a careful reading of Justice Swayne's dissent, to which both
Palmer and Newsom gave short shrifL235 Swayne's opinion, though much shorter
than the other three, was just as emphatic as Field's or Bradley's in advocating a
sweeping scope for the Fourteenth Amendment. Swayne stated that the privileges
and immunities of a citizen of the United States encompassed "the fimdamental
rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which pertain to him by
reason of his membership of the Nation."236 There is no doubt that Swayne
understood this formula to include the Bill of Rights, because he endorsed
Bradley's explicitly incorporationist dissent. The post-Civil War Amendments,
Swayne declared, "mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of the
country. They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect
2 33 Id. at 79 (opinion of the Court).
2 34 Id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting). In light of this language, it is surprising that Dean
Aynes argued that "Justice Bradley offered the manageable standard of using the text of the
Constitution as the basis for identifying privileges and immunities." Aynes, Miller, supra note
41, at 652-53. Aynes conceded in a footnote that "Bradley, of course, also seemed willing to
treat the rights guaranteed at common law and catalogued in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as
[defining] privileges and immunities," and stated that "this, likewise, is a manageable
standard." Id. at 653 n.180. The latter claim is debatable even as stated, and becomes untenable
when one recalls that Bradley, like all the other dissenters, joined Field's rhapsodic
endorsement of "natural ... rights," "rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law
does not confer, but only recognizes." Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96, 105 (Field, J.,
dissenting). To borrow Aynes's words, it was Justice Miller, not the dissenters, who offered a
"manageable" and "textual" standard for interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause.235 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 124-30 (Swayne, J., dissenting). I disagree
with Palmer's view that "Swayne's dissent adds little to the argument." Palmer, supra note 22,
at 762 n.97; see also Newsom, supra note 22, at 657 (discussing Swayne only with regard to
conventional reading of Slaughter-House, and very briefly at that).
236 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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those bodies. They are, in this respect at the opposite pole from the first
eleven. '237 Tellingly, he footnoted this sentence with a citation to Barron and its
progeny2 38
What is most intriguing, however, is that Justice Swayne's dissent also
contained language closely tracking Justice Miller's much-criticized dual-
citizenship analysis.2 39 Swayne agreed with Miller that the Fourteenth
Amendment created
a double citizenship, each having some rights peculiar to itself. It is only over those
which belong to the citizen of the United States that the category here in question [the
Privileges and Immunities Clause] throws the shield of its protection. All those which
belong to the citizen of a State, except as to bills of attainder, ex postfacto laws, and
laws impairing the obligation of contracts [three rights guaranteed against state
violation by Article I, section 10 of the original Constitution, which Swayne footnoted
here], are left to the guardianship of the bills of rights, constitutions, and laws of the
States respectively. Those rights may all be enjoyed in every State by the citizens of
every other State by virtue of clause 2, section 4, article 1, of the Constitution [an
obvious though garbled reference to the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause240] .... This section [the Fourteenth Amendment clause "here in question"]
does not in anywise affect them; such was not its purpose.241
Justice Swayne seemed to be saying that while the Article IV Clause
guarantees out-of-state visitors the right to equal enjoyment of both state and
federal rights, the Fourteenth Amendment Clause does not cloak the rights of
state citizenship with any additional federal protection. His formalistic "double
citizenship" analysis, coupled with the fact that he specifically listed as subject to
federal protection only three rights already guaranteed by the pre-1868
Constitution, could very easily suggest the same cramped redundancy that most
have found in Justice Miller's opinion. We know this impression of Swayne is
misleading because of the other language in his opinion quoted above and
because he joined Justice Bradley's opinion. This article suggests that equally
careful attention to language and context should likewise dissipate the anti-
incorporationist impression so many have gotten from Miller's opinion.
237 Id. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
238 Id at 125 n.* (Swayne, J., dissenting) (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833), and other cases).
2 39 See supra note 186.
240The substance and context of the sentence make it obvious that Swayne meant to cite
Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. Article I, Section 4, Clause 2 of the
Constitution (amended in 1933 by Amendment XX, Section 2 of the Constitution) provided
that "Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day."
241 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 126-27 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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One riddle is what, if anything, Justice Field thought about incorporation in
1873.242 Perhaps nothing, since he seemed focused on the issues of natural and
equal rights. As we have seen, his only reference in Slaughter-House to the Bill
of Rights conveyed, not so much rejection of the incorporation theory, as
dissatisfaction that it did not go nearly far enough. When he ultimately did
expressly embrace total incorporation in 1892, he stated that he did so "after
much reflection' inspired by an argument made to the Court in 1887, and both
that argument and his 1892 analysis embraced, ironically, the textualist approach
of the Slaughter-House majority.243 On the other hand, Field in Slaughter-House
did not expressly exclude Bill of Rights guarantees from his natural-law
conception of the "sacred and imprescriptible rights of man."244 There are,
however, for Field as well as Justices Bradley, Swayne, Woods, and even Harlan,
a number of puzzling cases and votes over the ensuing years which require
discussion. Indeed, it appears, with varying degrees of clarity, that Bradley,
Swayne, and Woods later abandoned the incorporation theory.245
There was relatively little mention of the Bill of Rights in the briefs filed in
Slaughter-House. For the most part, the briefs filed by the attorneys for the
butchers excoriated the evils of monopolies and advocated the same far-reaching
natural rights proclaimed in the dissents.2 46 They did refer, however, to Bill of
242 The same riddle applies to Chief Justice Chase, who joined Field's opinion and no
other, and died less than a month after Slaughter-House was decided. See Slaughter-House, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57; id. at 111 (Field, J., dissenting); OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note
39, at 967. It seems reasonable to suppose that Chase embraced an incorporationist view of the
Fourteenth Amendment, given his alignment with the other Slaughter-House dissenters (all of
whom either then or later expressly endorsed that view), his generally broad reading of the
Amendment, and his strong, consistent, career-long support for civil rights. Cf Richard L.
Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase's Dissent and the "Sphere of Women's
Work" 59 LA. L. REV. 521 (1999) (discussing Chase's beliefs in civil rights and proposing a
hypothetical opinion which Chase might have written in Bradwell had he not been too ill). If
so, he would be the seventh Supreme Court Justice of the nineteenth century (and the only
Chief Justice, in any century) ever to have embraced such a view. See supra Part IA; supra
note 38.
243 See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 143-55 (1887) (argument of John Randolph Tucker); see also
Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Parts II.D and IlIA.
244 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110 (Field, J., dissenting).
245 See infra Parts III.B-C and IV; Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.
246 See generally Brief for Plaintiffs (filed by John A. Campbell), Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) [hereinafter Slaughter-House Plaintiffs' Opening Brief
(Campbell)]; Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs (filed by John A. Campbell and J.QA. Fellows),
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Brief for Plaintiffs on Reargument (filed
by John A. Campbell), Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Brief for
Plaintiffs on Reargument (filed by J.Q.A. Fellows), Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873) [hereinafter Slaughter-House Plaintiffs' Reargument Brief (Fellows)]. The Supreme
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Rights guarantees, and they explicitly asserted that such guarantees were now
protected against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment This article appears to
be the first scholarly work to provide any substantial discussion of this aspect of
the Slaughter-House briefs.247
For example, the plaintiffs' opening brief, referring to rights set forth in the
First% Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, declared:
The constitution before [the Reconstruction Amendments] had recognized rights and
privileges as beyond the legislation of Congress. Religion and speech and publication
could not be subjects of legislation for Congress. Congress could not pass bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws, or violate the rights of person or property by
unreasonable searches or seizures, nor deprive any of [sic] life, liberty or property,
without due process of law. But the [Reconstnuction] amendents... go further and
declare the native population shall be citizens of the United States-that they shall be
free-that their immunities and privileges shall never be abridged by State
laws .... 248
The same brief later reiterated:
Before [the Reconstruction] amendments, the rights of conscience, of speech, of
publication, of labor, of intercourse and liberty, and security, were scarcely protected
by the Constitution of the United States from State legislation. The bill of rights
appended to the constitution was limited to declaring a protection against federal
legislation or aggression. The rights of an American citizen by the [Reconstruction]
amendments have the safeguard of the entire power of the nation. Conscience,
speech, publication, security, occupation, freedom, and whatever else is essential to
the liberty, or is proper as an attribute of citizenship, are now held under the guarantee
of the Constitution of the United States.24 9
The author of this brief, John A. Campbell, was himself a highly respected
former Supreme Court Justice, appointed in 1853. He resigned his seat in 1861
upon the secession of his home state of Alabama, and became the Assistant
Court briefs in Slaughter-House are reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFs AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 473-732 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARKBRIEFS].
24 7 See infra note 252.
248 Slaughter-House Plaintiffs' Opening Brief (Campbell), supra note 246, at 11-12.
24 9 Id. at 37 (emphases added); see also id at 40 (responding to argument that Louisiana
law was within state police power by stating: "What are those clauses of the Constitution that
protect the freedom of speech, of press, of persons and houses from searches and seizures; that
allow bail to criminals, and a fair trial and reasonable punishment for crime, but restraints on
the police power."). The brief refenred, of course, to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments.
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Secretary of War of the Confederacy.250 Southern Democrats and former
Confederates like Campbell had bitterly opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, but
"Campbell now waved it like a battle flag for the butchers."251 Campbell's pro-
incorporation argument in Slaughter-House, though off-point to the precise issue
before the Court, is strikingly consistent with the support for incorporation-and
the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House-by other Southern Democrats
and former Confederates during the early 1870s, as discussed in Part III.A.1.
On reargument, Campbell's co-counsel J.Q.A. Fellows submitted a brief
devoted to a close examination of the legislative history of the Reconstruction
Amendments and contemporary civil rights statutes. Fellows quoted from
Representative Bingham's key speech introducing the first version of what later
became Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which Bingham explained
that it met the necessity of enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states:
"[T]his immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution
and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States. The House knows, the
country knows, the civilized world knows, that the legislative, executive and judicial
officers of eleven States within this Union, within the last five years, have utterly
disregarded the behest ' 252
250 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 116-17; PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 199 (1999); Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 633 & n.33.
251 IRONS, supra note 250, at 199.
252 Slaughter-House Plaintiffs' Reargument Brief (Fellows), supra note 246, at 16
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (Feb. 26, 1866)). Campbell touched
somewhat indirectly on the incorporation issue in his oral argument before the Court. See Oral
Argument of John A. Campbell, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), Feb. 3-
4, 1873, at 29, reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFs, supra note 246, at 733, 762 (arguing that
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, "this Court had the judicial power of enforcement [only, as
to the states] of those clauses of the Constitution which" [listing several rights secured
expressly against state violation by the original Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10],
whereas under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[e]very act of the [state] Legislature
that... abridg[es] the privileges or immunities which [any individual] claims to have as a
citizen ... become[s] subject to the control or revisory power of this Court").
Dean Aynes briefly noted the references in the Slaughter-House Plaintiffs' Reargument
Brief (Fellows), supra note 246, to the congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment,
including Bingham's speech, see Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 98-99 & n.266, but he did
not mention the other support for incorporation in the briefs (it was not relevant to his
discussion of Bingham). Justice Black mentioned and quoted the Fellows briefs quotation of
Bingham's speech. See Adamson v. Califomia, 332 U.S. 46, 76 n.7 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting). But Black apparently overlooked the other support for incorporation in the briefs,
for he stated that he found no "indication that the Court [in Slaughter-House] was presented
with documented argument on the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment made the
Bill of Rights applicable to the States." Id. Newsom, surprisingly given his extensive discussion
of the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House and his citation and discussion of the briefs
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The defendants' briefs, with one minor and dubious exception, did not
specifically dispute or even address the pro-incorporation arguments of the
plaintiffs. 253 It would hardly have behooved them to take such a stance when it
(1) was far more restrictive than necessary to secure victory for their clients,
(2)ran counter to plain text not yet construed by the Supreme Court, (3)
contradicted the legislative history cited by the other side, and (4) posed a risk of
antagonizing those Justices, notably Bradley, who might well have been thought
likely to embrace the theory.254 The failure of the defendants to mount any
significant rebuttal to the plaintiffs' incorporationist arguments may also be
explained by the fact that their attorneys included two Republican politicians,
who would not be expected to advocate an unduly narrow interpretation of the
on certain other points, see supra note 54 (citing Newsom, supra note 22, at 658-62, 695), also
apparently overlooked this aspect of the briefs.
253 See generally Brief for Defendants (filed by Charles Allen), Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) [hereinafter Slaughter-House Defendants' Opening Brief
(Allen)]; Supplemental Brief for Defendants (filed by Thomas J. Durant), Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Brief for Defendants on Reargument (filed by Thomas J.
Durant), Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) [hereinafter Slaughter-House
Defendants' Reargument Brief (Durant)]. But see Brief for Defendant in No. 479 (filed by
Thomas J. Durant), at 5, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) [hereinafter
Slaughter-House Defendant's Brief in No. 479] (asserting that Privileges and Immunities
Clause "plainly refers to political privileges, and shields only such privileges and immunities as
individuals may have in their peculiar character as citizens of the United States, i.e., the
privilege of voting, holding office, &c., or the immunity from certain public charges and duties,
such as jury duty, military service, &c."). The latter bit of shoddy briefing suggests an affinity
with the tautological reading of the majority opinion, if it can be given any coherent meaning.
"Political privileges" like voting are the one thing the Article IV Clause plainly cannot
encompass, though Durant may have relied on Justice Washington's erroneous "elective
franchise!' dictum in Corfield, which was not authoritatively rejected until two years after
Slaughter-House was decided. See supra note 143. Nor could any voting privileges have been
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment Clause at the time of its ratification. Later
amendments, including the Fifteenth (which had been ratified at the time Durant wrote), did
establish some voting-related privileges of United States citizenship, which might be viewed as
after-acquired (though redundant) components of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause. See
supra notes 94, 143, and 146. It was sheer nonsense to include "immunity from... jury duty
[or] military service." Slaughter-House Defendant's Brief in No. 479, supra, at 5. Durant's
brief on reargument argued, more sensibly (and quite consistently with the incorporation
theory), that the Fourteenth Amendment Clause did not protect "a natural right to keep stock-
landings and slaughter-houses .... Natural rights, whatever they may be elsewhere, are, in a
court of law, only such as the law recognizes and protects.' Slaughter-House Defendants'
Reargument Brief(Durant), supra, at 13.
254 Justice Bradley had already publicly embraced a broadly nationalistic theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment in circuit court litigation arising from these very same cases, and his
judicial comrade in that decision had explicitly embraced the theory of total incorporation in
two other cases. See supra notes 110-12.
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Fourteenth Amendment.2 55 Rather, the defendants focused on the broad police
powers of the state, offering at one point a most impressive parade of homrbles
regarding the consequences for the federal-state balance of power if the Court
were to accept the sweeping scope of nationally protected privileges and
immunities for which the butchers contended.256
The defendants also pointed to the undeniably central purpose of the
Reconstruction Amendments to ensure freedom and equal rights for the former
slaves. 257 Justice Miller's language reiterating that central purpose is often cited
and criticized as unduly narrowing their scope,258 but it is just as often
overlooked that his opinion went on to carefully acknowledge that the
Amendments were not limited to that purpose:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in [their] protection. Both the
language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any
question of construction... And so if other rights are assailed by the States which
properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will
apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent 259
The incorporationist arguments of Campbell and Fellows did not directly
advance their clients' cause, and they may have been wary of emphasizing such
textual rights in light of their dependence on natural law arguments. Note how the
second excerpt quoted above carefully interwove references to textual and
2 55 See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 633 (noting that defendants' attorneys included
"Republican Senator Matthew Carpenter" and "Louisiana radical Republican politician
Thomas Jefferson Durant"). Oral argument for the defendants was presented by Carpenter,
Durant, and Jeremiah S. Black, a former U.S. Supreme Court Reporter and Democratic U.S.
Attorney General. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57; Aynes, Miller, supra note 41,
at 633.
25 6 See Slaughter-House Defendants' Opening Brief (Allen), supra note 253, at 12-13
(arguing that plaintiffs' view would bring within national jurisdiction all laws regarding, inter
alia, employment licensing, dangerous trades and articles, manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors, Sunday closing laws, maximum-hour and child-labor laws, and any exclusive
economic privileges). The reference to maximum-hour and child-labor laws accurately
forecasts the Lochner doctrine which grew out of Field's dissent See supra Part ]LB.
257 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Defendants' Opening Brief (Allen), supra note 253, at 16-
17; Slaughter-House Defendants' Reargument Brief (Durant), supra note 253, at 7-8, 15.
25 8 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71-72; KACZOROWSI, POLITICs, supra
note 88, at 150-51; NELSON, supra note 88, at 162-63; Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at
72-73.
259 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72; see also Palmer, supra note 22, at 743 n.22
(noting that this "passage is a clear refutation of the 'black-only' allegation levelled at Miller");
Newsom, supra note 22, at 683-86 (making similar point, and suggesting that Miller's
emphasis on freed slaves was in response to overbroad claims of Field's dissent on behalf of
white butchers).
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nontextual rights. But these arguments do indicate, contrary to Professor
Morrison's suggestion, that incorporation was very much an idea "abroad"
among lawyers of the day,260 and far less controversial then than it later came to
seem. They suggest that incorporation was on the minds of all the Slaughter-
House Justices, and that the majority's incorporationist dicta should be taken at
full face value.
Indeed, Professor Morrison completely missed the boat with regard to
Slaughter-House. That he overlooked the incorporationist implications of Justice
Miller's opinion is perhaps understandable, for the narrow conventional reading
was by then embedded in precedential concrete. But Morrison also failed even to
mention Justice Bradley's and Justice Swayne's views, three times omitting them
from his account of the nineteenth-century Justices who ever supported
incorporation, even though Justice Black had discussed and quoted extensively
from Bradley's opinion in the very case to which Morrison's article responded.2 61
And in further disregard of Bradley, and without (apparently) having read the
briefs, Morrison stated that in Slaughter-House, "the question of whether the
[Fourteenth] Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights was not raised,, 262 and
that "[t]he theory [of incorporation] does not appear even to have been presented
to th[e] Court in the argument of counsel until 1887."263
E. The Textual Incorporation Compromise
Is all this enough, in the end, to warrant the conclusion that in Slaughter-
House "all nine [Justices] appear with varying degrees of clarity to have endorsed
[the proposition] that whatever else it did, the Privileges or Immunities Clause at
least applied to the states the constitutionally stated prohibitions that had
previously applied only to the federal government'? 264 One has to wonder why
the majority, given the ferocious criticism it faced from the dissenters, did not
tout more proudly its incorporationist credentials, if that is the correct reading. It
is dubious, however, whether such a reading, even if more vigorously expressed,
would have mollified the dissenters. Given their natural-rights bent they may
truly have been little more reconciled to a textualist theory of total incorporation,
limited to rights "which owe their existence to the Federal... Constitution,' '265
than to the tautological reading traditionally given to Justice Miller's opinion.
260 Cf. Morrison, supra note 6, at 151.
261 See id at 151, 159-60, 172 n.63; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 n.6,
120-21 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
262 Morrison, supra note 6, at 144.
263 Id at 159.
264 ELY, supra note 6, at 197 n.59.
265 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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As various scholars have noted, the primary difficulty with total
incorporation from the standpoint of the original understanding lies not in
supporting it, but in limiting it to the Bill of Rights.266 Justice Bradley's view that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause encompasses not only textual guarantees
such as those found in the Bill of Rights, but also a wide and ill-defined range of
others, is strongly supported by the legislative history. Senator Howard, in his
1866 speech introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate-before
"add[ing]" the Bill of Rights to his catalogue of privileges and immunities267-
observed that such rights "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire
extent and precise nature."268
It is important however, not to lose sight of the straightforward text of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The second Justice John Marshall Harlan-
disputing a theory of which, ironically, his grandfather was one of the greatest
champions 269-- once argued that this text is "an exceedingly peculiar way" to
express the principle of total incorporation.2 70 In fact it is a very concise and
compelling way to express that idea. As a law student in 1988, the author of this
article came up with a simple syllogism capturing the logic of incorporation via
the Clause. It went something like this: (1) The Clause undeniably restricts state
power with regard to a class of rights (hint: read the Clause). (2) It had to
accomplish something; therefore, the rights protected must have been ones the
states were previously free to infiinge as far as the Constitution was concerned
(hint: see Barron). (3) The language, "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," indicates that those rights were already guaranteed in some sense
to United States citizens (hint: see the Bill of Rights). (4) Therefore, the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" that "[n]o State
shall ... abridge" must be those that simultaneously meet criteria (2) and (3).
It should not take Holmesian abilities (either those of Oliver Wendell or
Sherlock) to fill in that blank. Professor Amar demonstrated the textual logic of
266 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 28; MALTZ, CIviL RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 113. Some
scholars have argued that the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is tied to
amorphous concepts of natural ights rather than any strict textual source. See generally, e.g.,
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
47-63, 207-30 (1997); BOND, supra note 82, at 255-57; Trisha Olson, The Natural Law
Foundations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 347 (1995); Smith, NaturalLaw, supra note 147.
267 He had already quoted in full the sweeping language of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23,
1866).
268 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1866).
269 See generally Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4.
270 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 n.9 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 165-67 (Black, J., concurring) (laying out Justice Black's effective rejoinder).
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incorporation in considerably more elaborate detail in his 1992 article.271 It is
worth noting, in particular, that Amar completed the work of Professors Crosskey
and Curtis by destroying once and for all the textual argument that incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, and hence, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
would render the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause redundant.2 72
It seems clear that Justice Miller and his majority colleagues intended to
strike a reverberating blow against what they feared would be the consequences
of an untrammeled nationalist interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments.
They adhered in Slaughter-House to a more traditionally federalist and states'-
rights vision of the Constitution. This obviously disappointed the expectations of
many supporters of the Amendments who believed they had conferred on the
federal government plenary authority over "the natural rights of freemen."273 On
the other hand, Miller was perhaps not as out of touch with the contemporary
271 See Amar, supra note 22, at 1218-26; see also Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at
20-26; Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jefey Rosen's
Paper, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1269, 1271-72 (1998).
272 This argument has a long lineage, see, e.g., BERGER, FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at
91-92; Morrison, supra note 6, at 158-59; Fairman, supra note 22, at 58-59; D.O. McGovney,
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 233 (1918),
and even confounded Dean Ely, see ELY, supra note 6, at 27 (stating that it did "great damage
to the incorporation thesis"). But Amar showed that the references to "citizens" in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and "person' in the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses reflected a distinction that was significant, intentional, and well understood in the
congressional debates, and designed to ensure that, while all citizens would receive the
comprehensive benefit of the former, every "person," whether citizen or alien, would receive
the core essential protections of the latter. See Amar, supra note 22, at 1224-26. But see Smith,
Reconstruction or Reaffirmation?, supra note 63, at 187-88 (arguing that Amar's resolution
still leaves some unanswered questions). On this, as on so many points relating to
incorporation, Amar walked in the footsteps of Crosskey and Curtis. See Amar, supra note 22,
at 1225 n.145 (citing, inter alia, Crosskey and Curtis); see also CURTIS, No STATE, supra note
22, at 107 (similarly refuting supposed redundancy of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Crosskey, supra note 61, at 76-77 (same). The stubbornness of the late Professor
Berger's views on incorporation is reflected in the fact that he repeated this redundancy
objection as late as 1997, without even mentioning these refutations of it by Amar, Curtis, and
Crosskey-five, eleven, and forty-three years before, respectively. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT
1997, supra note 62, at 181; see also supra note 64. Amar also disposed of another textual
objection to incorporation, relating to the fact that Bill of Rights guarantees have been viewed
as protecting both citizens and aliens under American jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 22, at
1222-23; see also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1900); Wildenthal, Road to
Twining, supra note 4, at Part IV. As to why the Fourteenth Amendment did not simply refer to
"the Bill of Rights" or "Amendments I to VIII," Curtis and Amar have pointed out that a
number of privileges and immunities may be found scattered in the original Constitution as
well as in the first eight amendments. See Amar, supra note 22, at 1227-28; Curtis, Response,
supra note 62, at 120.
273 KACZOROWSKI, POLrTCs, supra note 88, at 159.
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understanding of the Amendments as Professor Kaczorowski has argued.274 As
Professors Berger and Brandwein have pointed out many Republicans of the
time, though supporting Reconstruction and the necessary changes wrought by
the Amendments, nevertheless adhered, like the Slaughter-House majority, to a
fundamentally traditional conception of the federal-state balance.275
Clearly, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to sharply limit the power
of the states to abuse the fundamental rights of American citizens. Just as clearly,
it was not meant to obliterate state power or radically alter the federal-state
balance. We should not too hastily conclude that, just because Justice Miller
rejected the broadest nationalistic reading of the Amendment, he actually
intended, as the dissenters angrily alleged, to render it a "vain and idle
enaclment."2 76 It is time to reconsider the closing words of Miller's opinion and
reassess whether the majority honestly embraced a reasoned compromise
approach:
The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the
original instrument was accepted, shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time
from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to
exist ... until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the true
danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in... the State[s] ....
Unquestionably, this has given great force to the argument... of those who
believe in the necessity of a strong National government
But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to
the adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in [them]
any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. ... [O]ur statesmen
have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local
government... was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of
government though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the
States, and to confer additional power on... the Nation.
... [T]his court.., has always held with a steady and an even hand the balance
between State and Federal power, and we hust that such may continue... so long as
it[s] ... duties... demand of it a construction of the Constitution, or of any of its
parts. 277
As discussed in Part IV, an incorporationist reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment limited to textually demonstrable "privileges or immunities of
274 Cf id. at 149-66.
275 See BERGER, FOURTEENT-, supra note 60, at 49-66; BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra
note 33, at 230-45; BRANDWEIN, supra note 41, at 5-7,57-58, 135-36.
276 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, 3., dissenting).
277 Id. at 82 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added).
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citizens of the United States"278 is a reasonable, indeed a conservative,
compromise completely within the spirit of Miller's philosophy as reflected in the
quotation above.
Kevin Newsom's recent article presented important new evidence that this
reading of the Amendment and of Slaughter-House is consistent with Justice
Miller's jurisprudential philosophy.279 Perhaps most intriguingly, Newsom
discussed a speaking tour of the Pacific coast by Bingham, the father of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation theory, undertaken in the summer
of 1871 "only several months after Bingham had expressly reiterated his
incorporationist intentions on the floor of the House (and, incidentally, less than
two years before the decision in Slaughter-House was announced). During the
trip, 'Bingham was almost daily expounding his views of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment's scope and purpose.' '2so Bingham's traveling companion on this
trip was none other than Miller.2 81 Furthermore, as Newsom showed, Miller was
very likely aware of the incorporationist speeches regarding the Amendment by
Bingham and Howard in 1866,282 and Miller took original intent very seriously in
constitutional adjudication.2 83
This article disagrees with Newsom's analysis of post-Slaughter-House
cases, as discussed in Parts llI.B, IH.C, and IV, but not in a way undermining the
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House itself. If it is even possible to so read
Justice Miller, why should we not prefer that reading over one that renders the
Clause tautological and depicts the majority as cynically and dishonestly effecting
its judicial repeal? A very powerful reason to prefer the incorporationist reading
is that members of Congress across the political spectrum embraced precisely
such a reading in the wake of the decision, as discussed in Part IR.A.1.
278 Professor Antieau argued that it was "unfortunate," even a "tragedy," that
Rep. Bingham and his colleagues in the 39th Congress added this critical qualifying language,
and he argued that its apparent limiting effect was not intended. See ANTIEAU, supra note 266,
at 49-50. But see supra note 272 (discussing scholarship concluding that use of "citizens" in
Privileges and Immunities Clause, as opposed to "person" in Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, was intentional and its impact well understood).
279 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 675-77,681,688-733.
280 Id. at 700 (quoting HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CoNsTrToN 134 n.90
(1968)).
281 See id
2 8 2 See id at 700-02.
283 See id at 696, 702-03.
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II. THE POST-SAUGHTER-HOUSEUNDERSTANDING:
THE UNRAVELING CONSENSUS
A. The Understanding in Congress
Soon after Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court rejected two claims under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause that did not involve incorporation of the
Bill of Rights.284 Over the next sixty years, even as the Court made liberal use of
the Due Process Clause to strike down progressive economic regulations,285 the
Privileges and Immunities Clause remained as useless to those attacdng such
legislation as it proved to those seeking protection of individual liberties
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.2 86 Right up to the present day, only one extant
(and very recent) Supreme Court decision has ever upheld a claim under the
Clause, and that did not involve any Bill of Rights guarantee.2 87 And yet, it did
not have to be that way.
1. The Civil Rights Bill Debates of 1873-1874
Congressional debates during the year after Slaughter-House was decided on
April 14, 1873,288 suggest that total incorporation was well understood to be the
compromise that decision had arrived at. This was a logical continuation of the
congressional support for incorporation seen in 1871-72.289 In 1873-74,
Congress continued its lengthy debate over the bill that would later become the
284 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (rejecting woman's claim of
admission to privilege of practicing law); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874)
(rejecting claim of privilege to sell intoxicating liquor). Though incorporation was not even
remotely at issue in Bartemeyer, Justice Miller's opinion for the Court contains dicta perfectly
consistent with the incorporationist reading of his Slaughter-House majority opinion. See
Bartemeyer, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 133 (observing that "the rights of the citizen previously
existing, and dependent wholly on State laws for their recognition, are now placed under the
protection of the Federal government, and are secured by the Federal Constitution").
285 See supra Part H.B (discussing Lochner doctrine).
286 In 1940, the Court overruled its sole decision up to that time striking down a state law
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90-93 &
nn.13-20 (1940) (overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), and collecting cases
since Slaughter-House rejecting claims under the Clause, most not involving incorporation);
see also supra note 105.
287 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring); supra Parts IA
(briefly discussing Saenz) and lA (briefly discussing Saenz and Edwards).
288 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57.
289 See supra Part II.A.
1116 [Vol. 61:1051
LOST COMPROMISE
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which, as proposed, sought to prohibit racial
discrimination in public accommodations, transportation, and schools.290 Even
the most conservative and racist Democratic opponents of the civil rights bill
embraced with no apparent qualms the view that the Fourteenth Amendment
totally incorporated the Bill of Rights. They advanced this reading as a
conservative alternative to the even broader reading urged by Republican
proponents of the bill, who believed that the Amendment authorized Congress to
legislate equal access without regard to race to a wide range of accommodations
and amenities in both the public and private sectors.29 1
Thus, the theory that the Amendment at least incorporates the textual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights appears to have emerged after Slaughter-House
as a conservative, baseline position. It was common ground in the otherwise deep
and bitter disputes that racked Congress over the scope of the Reconstruction
Amendments and Congress's power to enforce them. Indeed, Professor Eric
Foner, the most distinguished historian of Reconstruction, stated in the leading
modem work on this Era that "the doctrine of 'incorporation'-that the states
were now required not to violate the Bill of Rights-had by 1874 become a
virtually noncontroversial minimum Congressional interpretation of the
Amendment's purposes."2 92
Surprisingly, however, scholars have long overlooked the stunningly
important fact that these members of Congress explicitly and repeatedly cited
Justice Miller's majority opinion in Slaughter-House as an authority for this
incorporationist reading of the Amendment!293 For example, Representative
290 See 2 CoNG. REC. 340 (Dec. 19, 1873) (Rep. Benjamin F. Butler, R-Mass.); Michael
W. McConnell, Oniinalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984-86
(1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation]. School desegregation was dropped from the
bill as finally enacted. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; McConnell,
Desegregation, supra, at 1080-86.
291 It was the 1875 Act's reach into the private sector that resulted in its invalidation by
the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But see McConnell, Desegregation,
supra note 290, at 1089-91 (challenging this conventional view and arguing that state action
was not key issue).
292 FONER, supra note 88, at 533.
293 Previous scholars have discussed some of these congressional statements, without
noticing the connection to Slaughter-House, beginning (it appears) with Alfred Avins in 1968.
See Avins, supra note 62, at 8-9. I was first alerted to these statements by Professor Curtis's
1986 book See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 166-68. Professor Foner's brief comment
in his 1988 book, see supra text accompanying note 292, was the extent of his discussion (not
surprisingly in a general one-volume history of the entire Reconstruction Era). Dean Aynes
provided a useful summary in his 1993 article. See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 80 &
nn.135-138; see also HALBROOK, supra note 52, at 150-51; Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at
525-29, 534. Stephen Halbrook and Professor Maltz appear to be the only scholars prior to this
article to have noticed the connection to Slaughter-House. Halbrook's 1998 book briefly
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James B. Beck Democrat of Kentucky,2 94 noting that the Court "very recently
considered these questions in the slaughter-house cases, [and] carefully examined
the bearings of the constitutional amendments on this subject," proceeded to
quote at length from Justice Miller's discussion of the scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.2 95 He then declared that "[t]he first ten amendments to the
Constitution... go far... in asserting what the rights of citizens of the United
States shall be" and proceeded to read verbatim the entire Bill of Rights.2 96 He
concluded that "[t]hese are the rights of a citizen of the United States which the
fourteenth amendment declares no State shall abridge. The Supreme Court
recognizes them, and goes on to enumerate a few others of the same general
character in the case [Slaughter-House] I have quoted from."297
discussed some of these statements in regard to whether the Fourteenth Amendment made an
individual right to bear arms applicable to the states. He briefly noted the connection to the
Slaughter-House majority opinion drawn by Rep. Beck, see infra text accompanying notes
295-97, but, while also briefly discussing statements by Rep. Mills (misidentified as "Robert
Mills") and Sen. Norwood, see infra text accompanying notes 298-303 and 311-16, did not
note the similar connections they drew. See HALEROOK, supra note 52, at 150-51. Maltz's
1999 article briefly noted that Sen. Norwood "explicitly linked [his incorporationist] view[s]
with the Slaughter-House Cases themselves," and that, "[b]y contrast, no one [in these
congressional debates] seems to have suggested that Miller's opinion threatened the theory of
incorporation." Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at 529. Like Halbrook, however, Maltz did not
further explore this fascinating and long-overlooked connection. This article, as far as I know,
is the first to do so.
294 To avoid needless clutter of repeated citations, let it be noted here that the full names,
states, and party affiliations of members of Congress discussed here, to the extent not made
clear in the cited pages of the Congressional Record, are taken from CONGRESSIONAL
QuARTERLY's GuiDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 785-811, 1021-31 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.
ELECTIONS].
295 2 CONG. REC. 342 (Dec. 19, 1873).
29 6 Id. at 342-43.
29 7 Id. at 343. The racist tenor of the opposition to the civil rights bill by Rep. Beck and
others is well illustrated by Beck's sarcastic argument that 'I suppose there are gentlemen on
this floor who would arrest, imprison, and fine a young woman in any State of the South if she
were to refuse to marry a negro man on account of color, race, or previous condition of
servitude ....." Id. This prompted African-American Rep. Joseph H. Rainey (R-S.C.) to
respond:
I am contented to marry one of my own complexion ... because I believe that the race of people
I represent, to the extent of the opportunities which they have had, and considering how recently
they have escaped from the oppression and wrongs committed upon them, are just as virtuous
and hold just as many high characteristics as any class in the country ....
... I am very much surprised at the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Beck] making these
objections .... I had supposed that, having had an opportunity during the past summer to return
to the land that gave him birth, and to breathe the free atmosphere among the hills of Old
Scotland, he would return to the land of his adoption with a generous spirit and open heart,
ready to accord to the negro in this country the rights that belong to him as a citizen. But... he
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Representative Roger Q. Mills, Democrat of Texas, another opponent of the
civil rights bill, described the origins of the Bill of Rights and asserted that
"[t]hese first amendments and some provisions of the Constitution of like import
embrace the 'privileges and immunities' of citizenship as set forth... in the
fourteenth amendment' 298 Later in this speech, he stated that such privileges
included,
among others, the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, property... ; the right of
peaceable assemblage... ; freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion; immunity
of one's person, house, and papers against unlawful seizure and search; trial by jury
when held to answer for crime; to be informed of the accusation, and confronted with
the accusers; immunity from excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishments, and many others, all of which are recognized and guaranteed in the
Constitution.299
Having thus touched upon, in an avowedly nonexhaustive list, rights conferred by
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, Mills concluded that the
states were "impotent... to abridge" the "[c]itizenship under the Constitution"
encompassing such "rights, privileges, and immunities." 300 He did not
specifically cite Slaughter-House, but he did state that "[flrom the authority of
adjudged cases it is clear that the privileges and immunities mentioned in the
fourteenth amendment are only such as are conferred by the Constitution
itself,"301 a close paraphrase of Justice Miller's definition of "privileges and
immunities... which owe their existence to the Federal ... ConstitUtion. 302
That Slaughter-House was one of the "adjudged cases" to which Mills
referred seems almost certain, given its prominent and repeated mention in the
debates. In addition to Representative Beck's lengthy discussion of it a few weeks
earlier, Democratic Representatives John T. Harris of Virginia and Alexander H.
Stephens of Georgia, siding with Beck and Mills in opposition to the civil rights
bill, discussed and quoted Slaughter-House at equally great length earlier on the
comes back with the same deep-rooted prejudice against the race to which I belong, and stands
up here to-day and declares that if we be permitted to enter free schools or the public institutions
in this country it can only be by the power of the bayonet, because it would create insurrection
and rebellion in the Southern States.
Id at 344.298 Id at 384 (Jan. 5, 1874).
299Id. at 384--85.
300 See id at 385; see also id at 415 (Jan. 6, 1874) (Rep. John M. Bright, D-Tenn.,
another civil rights bill opponent) ("What rights are now denied to the colored race? They have
the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the ballot, the freedom of
office, the freedom of the courts, and the rights of property.").
301 Id at 384 (Jan. 5, 1874).
302 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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same day that Mills spoke.303 Harris and Stephens did not specifically address the
incorporation issue, but nowhere in their extensive discussion of Slaughter-House
did they dispute the incorporationist view of that decision advocated by their
fellow Southern Democrats and civil rights bill opponents. The same appears to
be true of the other members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, civil
rights bill opponents and supporters, who discussed Slaughter-House (while not
specifically addressing incorporation) in the course of these debates.30 4
Harris did declare that the Fourteenth Amendment "guarantees to the colored
race, as to all others, the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
States. The majority and minority of the court [in Slaughter-House] both concur
in definition of these terms-that they mean 'the fundamental rights of life,
liberty, and property."' 30 5 Stephens referred in seeming approval (though again
without expressly mentioning incorporation) to the speech "the other day by
Mr. Beck, of Kentucky. '306 Stephens suggested the weight that we might accord
to the statements in these debates when he noted:
303 See 2 CONG. REC. 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (Rep. Harris); id. at 378, 380 (Jan. 5, 1874)
(Rep. Stephens).
304 See id at 405-06 (Jan. 6, 1874) (Rep. Milton J. Durham, D-Ky., civil rights bill
opponent, discussing and quoting at length from Slaughter-House); id at 407-10 (Jan. 6, 1874)
(Rep. Robert B. Elliott, R-S.C., civil rights bill supporter, discussing and quoting at length from
Slaughter-House); id. at 414 (Jan. 6, 1874) (Rep. William Lawrence, R-Ohio, civil rights bill
supporter, referring briefly to Slaughter-House); id. at 415 (Jan. 6, 1874) (Rep. John M. Bright,
D-Tenn., civil rights bill opponent, discussing and quoting at length from Slaughter-House); id
at 416-17 (Jan. 6, 1874) (Rep. Josiah T. Walls, R-Fla., civil rights bill supporter, briefly
discussing Slaughter-House); id. at 742 (Jan. 17, 1874) (Rep. Robert Hamilton, D-NJ., civil
rights bill opponent, quoting at length from Slaughter-House); id. at 4085-88 (May 20, 1874)
(Sen. Allen G. Thurman, D-Ohio, civil rights bill opponent, discussing and quoting at length
from Slaughter-House). As Professor Maltz has noted, Sen. Thurman had embraced an
incorporationist view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause before Slaughter-House was
decided, in an earlier debate on the civil rights bill. See Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at 526
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app 25-26 (1872)).
305 2 CONG. REC. 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (emphasis added). It was obviously an overstatement
for Harris to suggest that the Slaughter-House majority and dissenters fully concurred in
defining such privileges and immunities, but his comment suggests a common understanding
that they did at least concur with regard to some important set of rights, most likely those set
forth in the Bill of Rights. Incidentally, the racial tensions crackling through these debates
surfaced again when Harris, in the heat of argument, asserted that "there is not one gentleman
upon this floor who can honestly say he really believes that the colored man is created his
equal." Rep. Alonzo J. Ransier (R-S.C.) interjected, "I can," to which an obviously flustered
and angry Harris retorted, "Of course you can; but I am speaking to the white men of the
House; and, Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to be interrupted again by him." Id
306 Id. at 378 (Jan. 5, 1874).
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I feel the necessity of the greatest possible care in duly considering and properly
weighing every word that may be uttered by me in the discharge of the high duty now
resting upon me, that there may be no misunderstanding of what I may say, and no
grounds for any erroneous report or misrepresentation .... 307
Representative William S. Hemdon, another Texas Democrat and opponent
of the civil rights bill, joined Beck and Mills in embracing an incorporationist
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he did so on the basis of an extensive
analysis of Slaughter-House.30 8 IIemdon concluded that the "rights, privileges,
and immunities... that appertain to the citizen of the United States... may be
found in the Constitution, amendments, and treaties with foreign nations."30 9 He
"mention[ed] a few of them," including "[t]he right of habeas corpus, trial by
jury, free exercise of religious worship, free speech, free press, to assemble and
discuss public measures, to petition for redress, security against unreasonable
searches and seizures, [and]... to have counsel."3 10
Senator Thomas M. Norwood, Democrat of Georgia, yet another civil rights
bill opponent, set forth the most thorough argument in favor of total
incorporation. He devoted most of five pages of double-column, small-print text
in the Congressional Record to an exhaustive discussion of Slaughter-House and
its interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.3 11 Norwood read the
307 Id.
308 See id at 419-20 (Jan. 6, 1874).
309 Id. at 420.
310Id This list thus included rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Sixth
Amendments, as well as by Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, including all three
constitutional rights (habeas corpus, assembly, and petition) mentioned by Justice Miller's
majority opinion in Slaughter-House as within the scope of the Privileges and Immunity
Clause. See supra Part II.C; see also 2 CONG. REC. app. 2 (Jan. 7, 1874) (Rep. Milton I.
Southard, D-Ohio, civil rights bill opponent, citing and relying upon Slaughter-House to
contend that "[ilt is thus made perfectly clear that the privileges and immunities mentioned in
the fourteenth amendment are such only as are derived from the Constitution of the United
States').
311 See 2 CONG. REC. app. 239-44 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874). The depth of Norwood's
racial bigotry was demonstrated earlier in the same speech when he ridiculed African-
American members of Congress who had spoken in favor of the civil rights bill:
[W]henever a democrat in the other wing of this Capitol thrusts his spear in the side of this
hollow horse, the republicans stuff at once and set upon his legs some son of Ham to reply, and
the republican press the following day regale the whole country with full particulars of the
native, cannibalistic act by which the democrat; in the space of five minutes, was tom in pieces,
devoured, and digested by his voracious adversary.
Id. at app. 235. Like Rep. Beck, see supra note 297, Sen. Norwood raised the specter of
interracial marriage, which he assailed as "repugnant," "loathsome," and "unnatural," see 2
CONG. REC. app. 236-37 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874). Most grotesquely, he mocked the sacrifice
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Slaughter-House majority opinion to support including within that Clause's
protection the entire Bill of Rights, and he took care to list almost every single
one of the guarantees mentioned in the first eight amendments, as well as several
set forth in the original Constitution.3 12
Perhaps most strikingly, Senator Norwood carefully criticized and refuted
Justice Field's erroneous dissenting contention that the Slaughter-House
majority's construction of the Clause rendered it "vain and idle" because the
supremacy of federal law supposedly already protected such rights against state
invasion.313 Norwood conceded that it was true, in a sense, that "no new
privileges were conferred" by the Clause; rather, "[i]t has declared, simply, that
of the many African-American soldiers who had died in battle during the Civil War,
sarcastically describing one engagement in which over five hundred soldiers perished,
declaring that their White commander,
so long as his surviving colored companions would vote to make him governor of
Massachusetts or a Representative in Congress, ... would spasmodically devote the idle
moments of the remainder of his political and official life, in a feeble effort to secure to them the
great constitutional right to attend "without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude" every theater, circus, and menagerie in the United States of America and the
Territories thereof.
Id. at app. 235-36. This was a response to the "eloquent account' by Rep. Butler, the
commander in that engagement who later managed the civil rights bill in the House,
of how the wartime conduct of black soldiers had tempered his own racial prejudices .... "As I
looked on their bronzed faces upturned in the shining sun to heaven as if in mute appeal against
the wrong of the country for which they had given their lives... feeling I had wronged them in
the past... I swore to myself a solemn oath ... to defend the rights of these men who have
given their blood for me and my country ......
FONER, supra note 88, at 533 (quoting 2 CONG. REC. 458 (Jan. 7, 1874)); see also 2 CONG.
REC. 340 (Dec. 19, 1873) (Rep. Butler).
3 12 See 2 CONG. REC. app. 241 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874). Of the twenty-four separate
privileges and immunities that may be parsed from the Bill of Rights, see supra note 90,
Norwood listed at least twenty-three, the only arguable omission being the Seventh
Amendment right to civil jury trial. However, he referred generally to "trial by jury" as one
item on his list (separately listing, for example, the right "to trial in the State and district
wherein the alleged crime shall have been committed"), which may indicate that he intended
the general reference to encompass both criminal and civil jury trial. He also listed, for
example, the right of habeas corpus, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and immunity "from
conviction of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court," see id art. 1II, § 3, cl. 1. Norwood cautioned at the end of his list that
"I do not assert that these are all the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States
as distinguished from his rights as a citizen of a State, but I do say that any others, whether few
or many, will be found enumerated in the Constitution of the United States." 2 CONG. REC. app.
241 (Apr. 30 &May4, 1874).
3 13 See id at app. 242 (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J.,
dissenting)); see also supra Part II.C.
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certain existing rights should not be abridged by States."314 But since, as he
noted, it had long been held that the first eight amendments, of their own force,
limited only the federal government, the change worked by the Clause was
dramatically important. "[T]hough new privileges were not thereby conferred,
additional guarantees were."315
In sum, Norwood declared, "the instant the fourteenth amendment became a
part of the Constitution, every State was that moment disabled from making or
enforcing any law which would deprive any citizen of a State of the benefits
enjoyed by citizens of the United States under the first eight amendments to the
Federal Constitution." 316 This was in 1874 from one of the most reactionary
opponents of Reconstruction, in reliance upon a Supreme Court decision
generally viewed as adopting the narrowest possible reading of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Justice Black, the liberal avatar of total incorporation who
saw the theory widely dismissed as implausibly radical in the next century, did
not state it any better.
That Republican supporters of the civil rights bill continued to support (at the
very least) an incorporationist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is also
suggested by these debates. For example, Representative William Lawrence,
Republican of Ohio, recited the legislative history of the Amendment. He quoted
Representative Bingham's 1866 statement that, while '[t]he enforcement of the
bill of rights' had previously been left to "'the reserved powers of the States, to
be enforced by State tribunals and by State officials,"' Congress 'should remedy
that... by amending the Constitution of the United States, expressly prohibiting
the States from any such abuse of power in the future."' 317 Lawrence also quoted
Bingham's statement that a key purpose of the Amendment was "'to arm the
Congress ... with the power to enforce the bill of rights.'318
314 2 CONG. REc. app. 242 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874).
3 15 Id.; see also CURTIS, NO STATE, supra note 22, at 167-68.
316 2 CONG. REC. app. 242 (Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874).
3 17 Id. at 412 (Jan. 6, 1874) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9,
1866) (Rep. Bingham)) (emphasis added by Rep. Lawrence).
318 Id. at 413 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (Feb. 28, 1866)
(Rep. Bingham)) (emphasis added by Rep. Lawrence); see also id at 409 (Jan. 6, 1874)
(Rep. Robert B. Elliott, R-S.C., civil rights bill supporter) (If [a state] abridges the rights of all
her citizens equally, unless those rights are specially guarded by the Constitution of the United
States, she does not violate [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment.") (emphasis added). Cf. Slaughter-
House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for protecting only,
inter alia, "privileges and immunities ... specially designated in the Constitution").
Rep. Lawrence was a lawyer and former Ohio state judge, who received but declined an
appointment as federal district judge in 1863. A member of Congress from 1865 to 1871 and
again from 1873 to 1877, he was Chairman of the Committee on War Claims from 1873 to
1875, and later became Comptroller of the U.S. Treasury from 1880 to 1885. See
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: 1774-1996, at 1373 (1997)
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Who were these intriguing Southern Democrats of 1873-74? How influential
were they? At the time of these debates they were in the minority of a
Republican-controlled Congress.319 But they appear to have been a respected and
accomplished group, some of whom attained positions of leadership. Their
outspoken role in the civil rights bill debate, as just described, provides some
evidence of their prominence. They were all lawyers.320 Representative Stephens
was the former Vice-President of the Confederacy. 321 Representative Beck, who
served in the House from 1867 to 1875, was elected to the Senate in 1876. He
was reelected twice and served until his death in 1890, becoming Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard during 1879-81.322
Representative Mills served in the House from 1873 to 1892, when he also was
elected to the Senate, serving there until 1899. He was Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee in 1887-89, and of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1891-92.323 Representative Harris, who
[hereinafter Bio. DIcr. CONG.]. Rep. Elliott was one of the most distinguished African-
Americans in Congress. Also a lawyer, he served in Congress from 1871 to 1874, when he
resigned to run for the South Carolina State House of Representatives, where he served from
1868 to 1870 and again from 1874 to 1876, eventually becoming Speaker of the State House of
Representatives. He also served as Attorney General of South Carolina from 1876 to 1877. Id.
at 992. Sen. John Sherman (R-Ohio), speaking in favor of the civil rights bill before Slaughter-
House was decided, also endorsed an incorporationist reading of the Amendment. See CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 843-44 (Feb. 6, 1872). Indeed, he indicated that in his view the
early "amendments to the Constitution do not define all of the rights of American citizens.
They define some of them .... What are those rights? Sir, they are as innumerable as the sands
of the sea." Id at 843. Ironically, Berger cited Sherman as one whose views militated against a
broad, incorporationist understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment See BERGER,
FOURTEENTH, supra note 60, at 40-41, 108-09.
3 19 In the 43d Congress of 1873-75, the Republicans held lopsided majorities of 203-88
in the House and 54-19 in the Senate. In the 1874 election, the Democrats swept to an almost
equally lopsided 181-107 majority in the House, though the Republicans held the Senate until
1878. U.S. ELECrIONS, supra note 294, at 1344.
3 20 See BIO. DIcr. CONG., supra note 318, at 638 (Rep. Beck); id at 710 (Rep. Bright); id.
at 973 (Rep. Durham); id. at 1167 (Rep. Harris); id at 1205 (Rep. Hemdon); id at 1528
(Rep. Mills); id. at 1596 (Sen. Norwood); id. at 1877-78 (Rep. Stephens). The Northern
Democrats mentioned in the preceding text and footnotes were also all lawyers. See id at 1150
(Rep. Hamilton); id at 1858 (Rep. Southard); id. at 1947 (Sen. Thurman).
321 Id. at 1877-78; see also FONER, supra note 88, at 533. Reps. Hemdon and Mills both
served in the Confederate Army. See BIO. DICr. CONG., supra note 318, at 1205, 1528.
Rep. Stephens served in the House from 1843 to 1859, and again from 1873 to 1882, when he
resigned to become Governor of Georgia, in which office he died in 1883. He was elected to
the Senate in 1866, but could not take his seat because Georgia was not yet readmitted to
Congress. In the House, he was Chairman of the Committees on Territories (1857-59) and
Coinage, Weights, and Measures (1875-81). See id. at 1877-78.
322 See BIO. DICr. CONG., supra note 318, at 638.
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served in the House from 1859 to 1861 and 1871 to 1881, was Chairman of the
Committee on Elections in 1875-79, and of the Committee on Revision of the
Laws in 187981.324
The incorporationist views of the Fourteenth Amendment and Slaughter-
House cited above were thus not stray remarks by nonentities. These views
appear to have been uncontradicted during these debates, and are entitled to
substantial weight in any assessment of the contemporary understanding of
Slaughter-House.
2. The Blaine Amendment Debates of 1876
In August 1876, just a year after the enactment of the civil rights bill,
Congress debated the so-called "Blaine Amendment," a constitutional
amendment "proposed as a result of concern with the use of public funds for
sectarian schools," which would have "prohibited states from establishing or
interfering with free exercise of religion." 325 An argument pressed by anti-
incorporationist scholars is that if the First Amendment had been understood at
the time as incorporated in the Fourteenth, the Blaine Amendment would have
323 See id at 1528. Sen. Norwood served in the Senate from 1871 to 1877. Defeated for
reelection, he returned to private law practice, hiring on as an advocate for California railroad
magnate Collis Huntington. See id. at 1596; C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACION:
THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCrION 40,251 (1951). He later served
in the House from 1885 to 1889. See BIO. DICT. CONG., supra note 318, at 1596. Rep. Hemdon
served in the House from 1871 to 1875. Defeated for reelection in 1874, he resumed his private
law practice. See id at 1205.
324 See id at 1167. Rep. Bright, see supra note 300, served in the House from 1871 to
1881 and was Chairman of the Committees on Claims (1875-81) and Expenditures in the
Department of the Treasury (1875-77). See BIo. DIC. CONG., supra note 318, at 710.
Rep. Durham, see supra note 304, served in the House from 1873 to 1879 and was Chairman
of the Committee on Revision of the Laws (1875-77). He later served as Comptroller of the
U.S. Treasury (1885-89). See BIO. DIcr. CONG., supra note 318, at 973. Among the Northern
Democrats cited, Rep. Southard, see supra note 310, served in the House from 1873 to 1879
and was Chairman of the Committee on Territories (1875-77). See BIO. DICT. CONG., supra
note 318, at 1858. Sen. Thurman, see supra note 304, served in the House (1845-47), on the
Ohio Supreme Court (Associate Justice, 1851-54, and Chief Justice, 1854-56), and in the
Senate (1869-81). In the Senate he was Chairman of the Committees on the Judiciary (1879-
81) and Private Land Claims (1871-79), and served on the Electoral Commission that resolved
the disputed Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876. He became President Pro Tempore of
the Senate in 1879-81 and was the unsuccessful Democratic nominee for Vice-President on
the ticket with President Grover Cleveland, in 1888. See BIo. DIcr. CONG., supra note 318, at
1947.
32 5 CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 169.
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been seen as redundant and unnecessary.3 26 In fact, as other scholars have
pointed out, the proposal went considerably beyond the language of the First
Amendment 27 This throws considerable doubt on whether the Blaine
Amendment is really the ace-in-the-hole that some anti-incorporationists have
argued. It does, however, pose something of a puzzle.
President Ulysses S. Grant, in his annual message to Congress in December
1875, urged adoption of
a constitutional amendment... making it the duty of each of the several States to
establish and forever maintain free public schools adequate to the education of all the
children in the rudimentary branches within their respective limits, irrespective of sex,
color, birthplace, or religions; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious,
atheistic, or pagan tenets; and prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school
taxes, or any part thereot either by legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the
benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in aid
or for the benefit of any other object of any nature or kind whatever.3 28
A week later, Representative James G. Blaine, Republican of Maine and
Speaker of the House from 1869 to 1875,329 proposed such an amendment in the
House, as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prolibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations. 330
This proposal was not debated in the House until August 1876. 3 1 The House
debate shed no light on the incorporation issue, being concerned mainly with
whether to add a provision (which the House did) stating that "[t]his article shall
not vest, enlarge, or diminish legislative power in Congress." 332
326 See, e.g., Berger, Nine-Lived Cat, supra note 62, at 464; see generally Alfred W.
Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill ofRights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939 (1951).
327 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGm, supra note 63, at 254-55 n.*; Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz.
ST. L. 1085, 1145-50 (1995).
328 4 CONG. REC. 175 (Dec. 7, 1875).
329 See BIO. Dicr. CONG., supra note 318, at 669; supra note 319 (noting Republican loss
of House majority in 1874 election, which of course deprived Blaine of the Speakership).
330 4 CONG. REC. 205 (Dec. 14, 1875).
331 See id at 5189-92 (Aug. 4, 1876).
332 Id. at 5189; see also id. at 5191-92 (House passage of amendment); id. at 5561 (Aug.
14, 1876) (Sen. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, R-N.J.); Meyer, supra note 326, at 942.
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When the Senate took up the Blaine Amendment later that August3 33 the
version passed by the House was criticized by supporters for unduly restricting
congressional power334 and for an apparent loophole that would have allowed
states to fund religion through taxes not formally designated for public
schools.335 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported an amended version that
was itself justly criticized for being even more poorly worded, and almost
laughably prolix:
[Sec. 1.] No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under any State. No public property and no
public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the authority of, the United
States, or any State, Territory, District, or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated
to or made or used for the support of any school, educational or other institution under
the control of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or
wherein the particular creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination shall be taught And no such particular creed or tenets
shall be read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by
such revenue or loan of credit; and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be
made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or to
promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be construed to proibit the
reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it shall not have the effect to
impair rights of property already vested.
Sec. 2. Congress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to provide for the
prevention and punishment of violations of this article.3 36
The primary complaint of the amendment's opponents was that it threatened,
they argued, a federal legislative takeover of traditional state and local authority
33 3 See 4 CONG. REC. 5245-46 (Aug. 7, 1876); id. at 5453-57 (Aug. 11, 1876); id. at
5561-62,5580-95 (Aug. 14, 1876).
334 See, e.g., id. at 5561-62 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Frelinghuysen).
335 See, e.g., id at 5583-84 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Isaac P. Christiancy, R-Mich.); id at
5594 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Oliver H.P.T. Morton, R-Ind.).
336 Id at 5453 (Aug. 11, 1876). Sen. Lewis V. Bogy (D-Mo.) had fin ridiculing how
"ambiguous, and wordy, and full of verbiage" the revised amendment was, with "so many
disjunctive and conjunctive conjunctions and verbs and adverbs and passive cases and
objective cases, all mixed promiscuously together, that.., by the time you have got through
with it the idea that you had at the start has left you, vanished like a dream...." Id at 5590
(Aug. 14, 1876). Engaging in a joking colloquy with Sen. George F. Edmunds (R-Vt.),
chairman of the Judiciary Committee and apparently the author of the revised draft, see id. at
5589-90, Sen. Bogy said "my friend from Vermont put his pen to paper, he admits, [laughter,]
after a good dinner. This is, indeed, very plain; yet it is not in accordance with the old maxim in
vIno veritas ..... Id. at 5590 (brackets in original).
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over education. 337 Accusations were also bandied about that supporters were
seeking to play on anti-Catholic sentiment for partisan advantage in that
presidential election year.3 38 In the end, it fell narrowly short in the Senate of the
two-thirds majority required for passage.339
Although the introductory language of the Blame Amendment tracked the
First Amendment, the wide-ranging scope of the rest of it, and the arguably new
restrictions it expressly imposed on the federal government as well as on the
states, support the conclusion that "as a whole [it] was hardly redundant."340
Scholars have plausibly argued that "Blaine and others were cleverly trying to
bundle their dubious new rules alongside a far more acceptable clause."341 As
Professor Amar has suggested, the redundancy argument is not intrinsically
compelling in any event: "[M]any of the provisions of the original Bill [of Rights]
were seen as 'declaratory' of existing law.., and thus in some sense redundant-
and this declaratory theory was one of the driving forces behind the Fourteenth
Amendment." 342
A dose of realpolitik bolsters this conclusion. Blaine was a perennial
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, starting in 1876.343 It is
only realistic to presume that he intended to gain some political mileage from his
proposed amendment.34 He thus had every incentive to articulate a specific,
catchy_ proposal for concrete congressional action, focusing on an issue
generating public concern at the time. To argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment-as part of a general embrace of the Bill of Rights--already barred
the states from improperly funding religion, and should be so construed by courts,
337 See, e.g., id. at 5580 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Francis Keman, D-N.Y.); id at 5589
(Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. John W. Stevenson, D-Ky.); id. at 5591 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Bogy).
338 See, e.g., id. at 5592-95 (Aug. 14, 1876) (remarks of various senators); see also Lash,
supra note 327, at 1145-50 (arguing that anti-Catholic animus, not any desire to extend
nonestablishment principle, was true motivation behind Blaine Amendment).
339 4 CONG. REC. 5595 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Senate voting 28-16 in favor, i.e., only two votes
short of two thirds, with twenty-seven senators absent or paired).
340 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 255 n.*.
341 Id.; see also Lash, supra note 327, at 1145-50.
342 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 255 n.*.
343 See RICHARD N. CURRENT, T. HARRY WILLIAMS, FRANK FREIDEL & ALAN
BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HiSTORY: A SURvEY 476, 569-74 (6th ed. 1983). Blaine gained the
nomination in 1884, but lost narrowly to Democrat Grover Cleveland, tripped up in part by an
anti-Catholic incident reminiscent of the Blaine Amendment debate, when a Protestant minister
and supporter of Blaine, during a meeting with the candidate, embarrassed him by labeling the
Democrats the party of "rum, Romanism, and rebellion." See id. at 572-74. Ironically, Blaine's
own mother was a Catholic. Id. at 574.
344 See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 5592 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. William W. Eaton, D-Conn.)
('his whole business originated with Hon. James G. Blaine. Did you ever hear of him? It was
one of his dodges to get a nomination... "); see generally Lash, supra note 327, at 1145-50.
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might have been more proper and sensible in a dry, lawyerly way, but would
hardly have served political needs.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there was a curious silence regarding
the Fourteenth Amendment during the Blaine Amendment debates. The charge of
redundancy actually was leveled against the proposal, but only based on the
existence of state constitutional provisions said to adequately guarantee religious
liberty.345 At several points in the debate, both supporters and opponents
indicated, without any reference to the Fourteenth Amendment an understanding
that First Amendment guarantees were not binding on the states.346 It seems
surprising to find such barren Barron orthodoxy just two years after the speeches
of Senator Norwood and Representatives Beck, Mills, Hemdon, and Lawrence
described above, just four years after the 1871-72 debates mentioned in Part II.A,
and just ten years after the famous speeches of Representative Bingham and
Senator Howard.
What had become of those members of Congress who had explicitly
embraced incorporation? Bingham, after two squeaker reelections in 1868 and
1870, was denied renomination in 1872 and appointed minister to Japan in 1873,
rather effectively removing him from the fray.347 Howard died in 1871,348 and
Beck and Hemdon were gone from Congress by 1875. 349 But Lawrence, Mills,
and Norwood were still in Congress in 1876,350 as were Ohio Senators John
Sherman and Allen G. Thurman? 51 Sherman and Thurman, however, were
345 See, e.g., 4 CONG. REc. 5581 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Keman); id at 5591-92 (Aug. 14,
1876) (colloquy between Sens. Morton and Eaton).
346 See, e.g., id at 5245 (Aug. 7, 1876) (Sen. Christiancy, supporter); id at 5454 (Aug. 11,
1876) (Sen. Theodore F. Randolph, D-N.J., supporter of House version, but opponent of Senate
version); id at 5561 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Sen. Frelinghuysen, supporter); id. at 5583 (Aug. 14,
1876) (Sen. William P. Whyte, D-Md., opponent); id. at 5595 (Aug. 14, 1876) (pairing of
senators and Senate roll-call vote); see also id at 5191 (Aug. 4, 1876) (Rep. Nathaniel P.
Banks, D-Mass., supporter) (stating that amendment would "prohibi[t] the States from
exercising the power they now exercise"); id. at 5191-92 (Aug. 4, 1876) (House roll-call vote).
347 See U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 294, at 1019 (reelected by 51-49% in 1868); id at
1022 (same in 1870); 2 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 792-93 (1999) [hereinafter AM.
NAT'LBIO.] (entry by Dean Richard L. Aynes). Bingham was denied renomination "because of
constituents' belief that the seat should be rotated among people from other counties in his
district.' 2 AM. NAT'L BIo., supra, at 792. He served in Japan until 1885 and died in Ohio in
1900. Id. at 793.
348 See U.S. ELECTONS, supra note 294, at 796 (left Senate on Mar. 3, 1871); Fairman,
supra note 22, at 134 n381 (died on Apr. 2, 1871).
349 See BIo. DICr. CONG., supra note 318, at 638, 1205. Beck returned to Congress after
his election to the Senate in 1876, as noted earlier. See id at 638.
350 See id at 1373, 1528, 1596.
351 See supra notes 304 and 318 (noting support of incorporation, prior to Slaughter-
House, of both Thurman and Sherman); BIo. DIC. CONG., supra note 318, at 1815 (Sherman
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absent during the Blaine Amendment debate.352 Norwood, who voted against the
version before the Senate, did not speak.353 Mills, who joined the overwhelming
House majority in voting for the version before that body, was also silent.354
Lawrence, who strongly supported the amendment gave one of the longest
speeches on it of any member of the House during the brief debate in that body,
but said nothing shedding any light on the First or Fourteenth Amendments or
incorporation.3 55
3. Cooley's Views
What could account for the foregoing shift in congressional sentiment on, or
at least attention to, the incorporation issue? Light may be shed by further
research on what contemporary lawyers outside Congress understood regarding
the incorporationist implications of Slaughter-House. This author has not yet had
the opportunity to undertake such research, but a review of contemporary
treatises by Thomas M. Cooley fails to support the incorporationist reading of
Slaughter-House. On the other hand, that may have little significance, since
Cooley said very little at all about Slaughter-House or the incorporation issue.
Cooley, who served as Chief Justice on the Michigan Supreme Court and
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, was perhaps the most prestigious
American legal scholar of the time.356 He was politically a Republican and his
legal philosophy has been described as pragmatic and conservative.3 57 The first
in Senate, 1861-77 and 1881-97, Secretary of the Treasury, 1877-81, and Secretary of State,
1897-98); id. at 1947 (Thurman in Senate, 1869-81). It is interesting that Bingham's home
state of Ohio also elected, as both of its Reconstruction-Era senators, two such politically
distinctive supporters of incorporation as Democrat Thurman, civil rights bill opponent and
Republican Sherman, civil rights bill supporter. Sen. Howard, of course, was from next-door
Michigan. I thus find it satisfying and appropriate, having grown up in Michigan myself, that
this article and its sequel, see supra note 4, are being published in the Ohio State LawJournal.
352 See 4 CoNG. REC. 5456-57 (Aug. 11, 1876) (Sherman and Thurman absent from roll-
call votes); id at 5595 (Aug. 14, 1876) (same). See generally id at 5245-46 (Aug. 7, 1876)
(Senate debate); id. at 5453-57 (Aug. 11, 1876) (same); id. at 5561-62, 5580-95 (Aug. 14,
1876) (same).
353 See id at 5245-46, 5453-57, 5561-62, 5580-95. Every Democratic senator who
voted opposed the amendment. See id. at 5595; Lash, supra note 327, at 1150 n.288; supra note
339.
354 See 4 CONG. REc. 5189-92 (Aug. 4, 1876) (House debate); id. at 5191-92 (House
voting 180-7 in favor, with 98 not voting).
355 See idl at 5190-91.
356 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Law as "The Common Thoughts of Men". The
Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 49 STAN. L. REV. 495 (1997).
357 See id. at 518, 528-31. Cf id at 545 (noting that despite Cooley's party affiliation, he
supported successful Democratic presidential candidate Grover Cleveland in 1884 election,
1130 [Vol. 61:1051
LOST COMPROMISE
edition of Cooley's treatise Constitutional Limitations, published in 1868, did not
discuss the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment 358 The second edition,
published in 1871, appeared to assume that the Bill of Rights remained
nonbinding on the states but did not offer any substantial discussion of the
incorporation issue. Cooley's view seemed to be based on the long-established
Barron doctrine, with little consideration of the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 59
apparently because of concerns over ethics of Republican nominee James G. Blaine, see supra
note 343).
358 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTmTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868)
[hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITLTONAL LIMITATIONS 1868; titles of later editions abbreviated
to "CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS']. This edition appeared in September 1868, following the
Amendment's ratification in July 1868, but bad probably been completed before ratification.
See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 91.
3 59 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrATIONS *19 n.1 (2d ed. 1871)
[hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTInUTIONAL LIMTATIONS 1871] (citing Baron, pre-1868 cases
following Barron, and Twitchell, without mentioning Fourteenth Amendment, and stating that
"though the right of trial by jury is preserved by the Constitution .... the States may,
nevertheless, if they choose, provide for the trial of all offences against the States, as well as the
trial of civil cases in the State courts, without the intervention of a jury"); see also supra Part
HA (discussing Barron and Twitchelo. Dean Aynes argued that this treatise can be read to
support incorporation. Aynes overlooked the passage just quoted, while citing two other
passages. See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 91-92 & nn228-229 (citing COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1871, supra, at *294, *397). In the first of these, Cooley stated
that it was
doubtful whether the... provisions [other than the Citizenship Clause] of the [first] section [of
the Amendment] surround the citizen with any protections additional to those before possessed
under the State constitutions; but as a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a
part of the Constitution of the United States, the effect will be to make the Supreme Court of the
United States the final arbiter of cases in which a violation of this principle by State laws is
complained of....
COOLEY, CONSTITUTONAL LIMITATIONS 1871, supra, at *294. As Aynes noted, "[i]f Cooley
viewed the federal Bill of Rights as protecting the same rights as state constitutions ... ,then
his 1871 Fourteenth Amendment views contradict Fairman's and coincide with those of
Bingham." Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 92. On the other hand, Cooley may simply have
been referring to the fact that most states already guaranteed "due process" and some undefined
set of "privileges and immunities" in their state constitutions; he did not define the "principle of
State constitutional law" to which he referred. The other passage cited by Aynes referred
merely to the interstate equality aspect of both the Article IV and Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clauses, stating that
[a]lthough the precise meaning of 'privileges and immunities' is not very definitely settled as
yet it appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all
other States the right to remove to, and carry on business therein; the right.., to acquire and
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When Slaughter-House was decided in April 1873, Chief Justice Cooley's
revised fourth edition of Justice Joseph Story's famous Commentaries on the
Constitution, in which Cooley authored a new chapter on the Fourteenth
Amendment was just going to press.360 Cooley explained that there was no time
to incorporate any discussion of the decision into the main text, so he just
reprinted much of Justice Miller's opinion in an appendix, introduced by the
comment that his views were "fortunately in harmony with" it.361 His views, as
stated in the main text had reiterated the nonapplicability of the Bill of Rights to
the states.362
In December 1873, just prior to the debates discussed in Part III.A.1, Chief
Justice Cooley completed the third edition of Constitutional Limitations, which
hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law; [and] the right to... the
enforcement of other personal rights ....
COOLEY, CONsTIIUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 1871, supra, at *397. Cf Aynes, Bingham, supra note
54, at 92 (mistakenly reading this passage to imply support for substantive incorporation of
"personal rights").
3 6 0 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
648-85 (4th ed., Thomas M. Cooley, ed., 1873) [hereinafter COOLEY ON STORY 1873]
(ch. XLVII, "The Fourteenth Amendment"); id at 693 (noting the Slaughter-House decision
was handed down "[w]hile the last of the foregoing sheets were passing through the press").
361 Id. at 693; see also id. at 693-703 (quoting at length Miller's opinion, including his
reference to rights of assembly, petition, and habeas corpus as privileges or immunities of
United States citizens).
362 See id § 1947, at 665-66. Cooley stated, in discussing the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, that
earlier amendments to the Constitution provide certain safeguards in criminal cases,... among
other things a presentment by grand jury ... in the case of capital or other infamous crimes. But
those amendments apply only to such offences as may be taken cognizance of and punished by
the federal government, and not at all to those which are offences only against... the several
States. The States... may dispense with the grand jury... ; and they may make all State
offences triable before a single judge, instead of by jury....
Id. In discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he defined the privileges of state
citizenship broadly to include the rights "to be protected in life and liberty by the law" and "to
acquire, possess, and enjoy property." Id. § 1934, at 656. He emphasized that the Clause
protected only the privileges and immunities of United States citizens as such and that "[t]he
difference is in a high degree important." kI § 1937, at 658. He stated that "it is a consideration
of the sphere of the [state and federal] governments respectively which suggests the rights and
privileges as citizens of those entitled to their protection," and proceeded to list several
privileges identical or strikingly similar to the redundant items on Miller's Slaughter-House list
(e.g., "right to demand protection against the wrongful action of foreign authorities" and "to
make use in common with all others of the navigable waters of the United States"). Id at 659.
"It would be useless to attempt a general enumeration, but these few may suffice as
illustrations, and will suggest others." Id.
1132 [Vol. 61:1051
LOST COMPROMISE
appeared in 1874.363 The key passages bearing on incorporation were unchanged
from the 1871 edition, suggesting either inattention or that Cooley did not view
Slaughter-House as affecting the issue364-which, of course, the decision (as
opposed to the dicta) did not. In fact, Cooley made remarkably few references to
Slaughter-House at all, and those few, quite understandably, addressed not
implications in the dicta but rather the specific holding on the disputed
monopoly.3 65
363 See THOMAs M. COOLEY, CONSTmrrONAL LIMITATIONS iv (3d ed. 1874) [hereinafter
COOLEY, CONST=TrONALLIMITATONS 1874] (preface dated Dec. 1873).
364 Compare id. at *19 n.1, *294, *397 with COOLEY, CONSITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
1871, supra note 359, at *19 n.1, *294, *397. See supra note 359. The 1874 edition noted in a
footnote to the second of these passages that "[the Fourteenth Amendment] received a very
careful examination at the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of
[Slaughter-House], not yet reported." COOLEY, CONSTIUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1874, supra
note 363, at *294 n.2.
365 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIrATIONS 1874, supra note 363, at xxxix (index
entry for Slaughter-House, cited as "Live Stock, &c., Association v. Crescent City, &c., Co.");
id at *11 n.1 (noting that Reconstruction Amendments were "construed in the recent
[Slaughter-House] cases," with no further discussion); id. at *294 n.2 (noting that Fourteenth
Amendment "received a very careful examination at the hands of the Supreme Court' in
Slaughter-House, with no further discussion). In a passage dealing with the general police
powers of the states, Cooley stated that "the national govemment... [cannot] assume any
supervision of the police regulations of the States, so long as they do not invade the sphere of
national sovereignty, and obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority which the
constitution has confided to the nation." I d at *574. In a footnote to this sentence, he noted that
a "claim has recently been advanced at New Orleans" that the federal courts had authority, "at
the suit of citizens of a State, to review one of its statutes purporting to establish a police
regulation, and to adjudge it void if in their opinion it wrongfully abridged the right of citizens
to follow a lawful employment; but this claim has not been sustained." Id at *574 n.3 (citing
Slaughter-House); see also id at *584-85 n.2 ("As to the power of the public authorities to
establish a public slaughter-house, or to require all slaughtering of beasts to be done at one
establishment, see... [Slaughter-House].").
Dean Aynes read another 1874 treatise, by a different author, to support incorporation. See
Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 94 n.240 (quoting ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 274 (1874)). Andrews, however, in the quoted
passage, merely noted that because "it has been maintained that the first eight Amendments had
no reference to the State governments, but were restraints upon the general government only,
this Fourteenth Amendment declares explicitly that 'No State shall [etc., quoting remainder of
Section 1]."' ANDREwS, supra, at 274. This merely pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment
was carefully drafted to apply to the states, and did not address the scope of the restrictions
thereby imposed. Because Andrews quoted the entire second sentence of Section 1, including
the Equal Protection Clause (which has no relevance to the incorporation issue), it seems a
stretch to suppose that he intended any comment on that issue (which he did not otherwise
address). He never discussed Slaughter-House; the book generally did not delve into detailed
case analysis.
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It is worth noting that Chief Justice Cooley, more than a decade later, did
express the view that at least the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly were
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, as part of the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause.3 66 But that has no bearing on his view of Slaughter-
House.
4. Conclusion
As suggested above, the 1873-74 congressional consensus on incorporation
may be ascribable, in part; to the implications of Slaughter-House. The prevailing
attitude in August 1876 may likewise be ascribable, in part, to three Supreme
Court decisions between November 1874 and April 1876 which began to unravel
the implicit compromise of Slaughter-House: Edwards v. Elliott,367 Walker v.
Sauvinet,368 and United States v. Cruikshank369 These cases are discussed in
Parts 1.B and II[.C. Professor Curtis suggested this explanation in citing the one
significant comment on the Fourteenth Amendment that did appear throughout
the entire Blaine Amendment debate. This was the argument by Senator Oliver
H.P.T. Morton, Republican of Indiana, as to why the Blaine Amendment,
especially the detailed Senate version, was in his view essential:
The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments which we supposed broad, ample, and
specific, have, I fear, been very much impaired by construction, and one of them in
some respects almost destroyed by construction. Therefore I would leave as little as
possible to construction. I would make [the Blaine Amendment] so specific and so
strong that [it] cannot be construed away and destroyed by courts.370
366 Cooley expressed this view in 1887, in private correspondence with British legal
scholar (later British Ambassador to the United States) Dr. James Bryce, in the course of
commenting upon drafts of Bryce's book The American Commonwealth. See Everett S.
Brown, The Contribution of Thomas M Cooley to Bryce's "American Commonwealth," 31
MIcH. L. REV. 346,352-53 (1933).
367 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
368 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
369 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
370 4 CONG. REc. 5585 (Aug. 14, 1876), quoted in CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at
170. See generally CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 169-70 (explaining shift in
congressional sentiment on basis of Cruikshank and Walker, though not discussing Edwards).
It seems almost certain that Sen. Morton was referring, at least, to Cruikshank and its
companion case, United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (both decided on Mar. 27, 1876),
in light of his linked reference to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Cruikshank
narrowly construed both Amendments, and Reese the Fifteenth. See KACZOROWSKI, PoLITICS,
supra note 88, at 213-17; infra Part lII.C.
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That the Supreme Court was indeed both able and willing to "construe away" and
"destroy" a central part of the Fourteenth Amendment is the lesson of the sorry
but dramatic tale that follows.
B. The Confusion in the Supreme Court, Part 1: Edwards and Walker
In Edwards, decided on November 30, 1874,371 the Court addressed a
challenge to a New Jersey law concerning maritime debt recovery procedures.
Nelson Edwards, a ship owner, argued before the Court, among many other
issues, that the state law violated the right to civil jury trial set forth in the Seventh
Amendment which he argued (very briefly and without analysis) was a privilege
or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.372 George Elliott, a
creditor who had "furnished timber for the vessel,"373 argued that Edwards had
failed to raise this issue in the courts below. 374 Referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment claim as "an afterthought [that] needs no reply,"375 Eliott's attorney
did briefly respond to it, but in a manner indicating that he had confused the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clauses.376
371 See Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532; see also id., 22 L. Ed. at 487 (giving exact date
of decision; for many nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases, the precise date of decision
appears only in the Lawyers' Edition of the U.S. Supreme Court Reports).
372 Edwards also argued that he was deprived of due process of law and equal protection
of the laws. See Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 544 (summary of argument); Brief for Plaintiffs
in Error at 9, 15, Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874) [hereinafter Edwards
Plaintiffs' Brief]; see also Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 534-35.
373 Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 534.
374 See Brief for Defendants in Error at 30, Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532
(1874) [hereinafter Edwards Defendants' Brief].
3 75 1d Elliott understandably complained that Edwards had done little more than vaguely
suggest that the state law was "contrary, in some way not clearly pointed out, to the 14th
amendment" Id
3 76 Id Elliott argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens,
but only to declare that as the States grant them to their own citizens, or as they limit or qualify,
or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of
the rights of citizens of other States within their jurisdiction.
Id (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77). This, of course, merely restated the
orthodox interstate equality reading of the Article IV Clause and had nothing properly to do
with the Fourteenth Amendment Clause. See supra Part ll.B. On the cited page of Slaughter-
House, Justice Miller offered an almost identical description of the purpose of the Article IV
Clause. Elliott also cited Slaughter-House for Miller's general caution against "constitut[ing]
this Court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States," Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 78, and suggested that no one should "attempt a similar application of the limitations
of the national constitution to the laws and proceedings" of any state. See Edwards Defendants'
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The parties' briefs, and the Court's unanimous opinion by Justice Clifford, were
concerned almost entirely with issues of admiralty and maritime law completely
unrelated to jury trial, incorporation, or the Fourteenth Amendment.3 77
In a brief passage at the end of his opinion, Justice Clifford agreed with
Elliott that the jury trial issue had not been properly raised below and was thus
not properly before it. Clifford described Edwards as claiming that the state law
was "in conflict with the provision of the Federal Constitution which secures to
every party, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury,"378 an apparent reference to the Seventh Amendment alone. Clifford
then stated:
Two answers may be made to that objection, either of which is decisive: (1.) That it
does not apply to trials in the State courts. (2.) That no such error was assigned in the
[New Jersey] Court of Errors, and that the question was not presented to, nor was it
decided by, the Court of Errors.
Jurisdiction is not shown unless it appears that some one of the specified
questions did arise in the State court and that the question was decided adversely to
the party assigning error in this court.379
That was it. Clifford supported the critical first point with a footnote citing
Barron, Twitchell, three pre-1868 cases following Barron, and the 1871 edition
of Chief Justice Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations.380
Justice Clifford never even mentioned, let alone analyzed, the Fourteenth
Amendment. That it was raised at all is apparent only from a careful reading of
the briefs and the summary of argument in the case report, 381 which may account
for the fact that Walker, not Edwards, is usually cited as the case establishing that
Brief, supra note 374, at 30; see also Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 548-49 (sunmary of
argument).
377 See generally Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 549-57; Edwards Plaintiffs' Brief,
supra note 372, at 1-10, 16-46; Edwards Defendants' Brief, supra note 374, at 1-29.
378 Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 557.
379 Id. at 557-58 (citation omitted).
380 See id at 557 n.30; see also supra Part IIA (discussing 1869 Twitchell decision, in
which Fourteenth Amendment was not raised, and which itself merely relied on Barron). The
Court cited COOLEY, CONSTrrUTIONALLIMITAnONS 1871, supra note 359, at *19, a passage in
which Cooley himself, as discussed in Part 111A.3, merely relied upon Barron, Twitchell, and
pre-1868 cases following Barron, without mentioning the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra
note 359.
381 See Edwards Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 372, at 9, 15; Edwards Defendants' Brief,
supra note 374, at 30; see also Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 544 (summary of Edwards's
argument); id at 548-49 (summary of Elliott's argument).
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the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the right to civil jury trial.3 82
Clifford's failure to address the Fourteenth Amendment and his reliance on
Barron and other pre-1868 cases strongly suggest that he was not even thinking
of the incorporation issue. If Clifford did, perchance, consciously intend to
scupper the idea of incorporation, we would be entitled to suspect his motives in
thereby "pulling a fast one" on his colleagues and the country. Clifford's possible
hostility to any broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, even a reading
widely supported on the merits, may be inferred from the fact that he was a "pro-
slavery Democrat" whose pre-Civil War appointment to the Court by President
James Buchanan had stirred bitter protest.383
Given the minor significance of the jury trial issue in the overall context of
the case, there is no reason to suppose that the other Justices thought they were
deciding such an important issue as incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Justice
Clifford's alternative reliance on the failure of Edwards to properly preserve the
jury issue rendered the Court's ipse dixit little more than needless dicta, though
strictly speaking it was part of the holding. What makes the implicit denial of
incorporation in Edwards even more fiustratingly gratuitous and inappropriate is
that it had long been established, and remains the general rule today, that the
Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial does not apply in civil admiralty
cases in any event.384
Nevertheless, a year and a half after Edwards, the Court unambiguously
confirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the states to respect the
civil jury trial guarantee of the Seventh Amendment Walker v. Sauvinet,385
decided on April 24, 1876,386 arose, like Slaughter-House, from Louisiana, and
apparently even involved two of the same attomeys.387 The facts were loaded
382 See, e.g., CuRTIs, No STATE, supra note 22, at 170, 179-80 (discussing Walker
without mentioning Edwards); Morrison, supra note 6, at 145 (same).
383 See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 665-66 (quoting PHIL CLIFFORD, NATHAN
CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT 25 (1992)); OxFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 967.
384 See 2 THOMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMRALTY AND MARrrIME LAW § 21-9, at 510
(2d ed. 1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
385 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
386 Id, 23 L. Ed. at 678 (giving exact date of decision).
387 Thomas J. Durant one of the attorneys for the defendants in Slaughter-House, see
supra note 253, was apparently one of the attorneys who represented Walker, the (presumably
White) coffee-house owner who was the defendant at trial and the plaintiff in error (i.e., the
appellant) before the Supreme Court. See Walker, 92 U.S. at 92 (indicating that C.W. Homor
argued Walker's case before the Court); 23 L. Ed. at 678 (indicating '".T Durant" along with
Homor as counsel for Walker); Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 4, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90
(1876) [hereinafter Walker Brief] (indicating "Durant & Homor" as authors of brief). JQ.A.
Fellows, one of the attorneys for the White butchers (plaintiffs) in Slaughter-House, see supra
note 246, represented Sauvinet, the African-American plaintiff at trial and the defendant in
error (i.e., the appellee) before the Supreme Court. See Walker, 92 U.S. at 92 (indicating
2000] 1137
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
with Reconstruction-Era racial overtones. Charles Sauvinet, the African-
American Sheriff of Orleans Parish, sued Joseph Walker, the owner of a New
Orleans coffee-house, for "refusing [Sauvinet] refreshments when called for, on
the ground that [Sauvinet] was a man of color."388 This violated a Louisiana state
civil rights law, and Sauvinet won a judgment from a state judge, in accordance
with Louisiana law, after a hung jury failed to reach a verdict.389
The Court's brief opinion, by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, stated that
"[s]o far as we can discover from the record, the only Federal question" at issue
was whether Walker had been unconstitutionally denied the right to trial by
jury.3 90 The Court then proceeded to resolve whether Louisiana had violated the
Privileges and Immunities or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
in this regard, and concluded that it had not because such a right did not apply to
the states under those Clauses.391 But the Court's reasoning was, at best, a
cursory non sequitur.
Although the Walker Court, unlike Edwards, at least dignified the Fourteenth
Amendment by mentioning it, Chief Justice Waite began by focusing on whether
the Seventh Amendment itself guaranteed civil jury trial in state courts. Of
course, the Court quickly noted, "as has been many times decided, [the Seventh
Amendment] relates only to trials in the courts of the United States," citing
Edwards,392 which, as we have seen, relied on Barron and other pre-1868 cases.
The States, so far as th[e] [Seventh] [A]mendment is concerned, are left to regulate
trials in their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at connnon law
pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to
abridge.393
Fellows argued Sauvinet's case); Brief for Defendant in Error at 5, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90 (1876) [hereinafter Sauvinet Brief] (indicating Fellows wrote the brief).
388 Walker, 92 U.S. at 90. Sauvinet's status as sheriff is not mentioned in the case report
but appears in the brief filed on his behalf. See Sauvinet Brief, supra note 387, at 2. The
dramatic possibilities of the encounter are delicious to contemplate, as reflected in numerous
Hollywood variations on run-ins between African-American lawmen and racist rednecks, in
films running the gamut of drama, see, e.g., In the Heat of the Night (1967), comedy, see, e.g.,
Blazing Saddles (1975), and action, see, e.g., Wild Wild West (1999).
389 See Walker, 92 U.S. at 90-92.
390 See id at 92.
391 See id. at 92-93.
3 9 2 Id. at92.
393 Id
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That was it, as far as the Privileges and Immunities Clause was concerned.394
Because the Seventh Amendment did not impose such a restriction on the states,
"therefore," ipsofacto, the Fourteenth Amendment did not do so either. The latter
was indeed a "vain and idle enactment"! 395 Such "reasoning" rendered the Clause
precisely nugatory, as Slaughter-House has been accused of doing, and with far
more brutal efficiency. To call Waite's analysis unsatisfactory rather seriously
understates the matter, in light of Senator Howard's 1866 speech396 and Senator
Norwood's 1874 articulation of the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-
House.397
But it gets worse. A study of the briefs filed with the Court reveals that
Walker did not even raise before the Court the jury trial incorporation issue the
Court decided. Walker apparently raised two federal constitutional objections in
the state trial court: (1) that the substance of Louisiana's civil rights law violated
his constitutional rights (in some vaguely unspecified way), and (2) that
application of the procedural provisions of Louisiana's law abridged his right to
jury trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment0 98 He apparently raised at
least the latter claim before the Louisiana Supreme Court as wel. 3 99 But he
394 The Court's Due Process Clause analysis was only slightly more extensive. The Court
stated that due process "does not necessarily imply that all trials... must be by jury. This
requirement... is met if the trial is had according to the settled course ofjudicial proceedings.'
ld at 92-93 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 280 (1856)). The Court's citation of Murray's Lessee was ironic, because that
case contains language supporting the idea that "due process" encompasses all other procedural
rights set forth in the Constitution, which would include the Seventh Amendment right to civil
jury trial and all other specific procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights. (Murray's Lessee
involved the Fifth Amendment Clause, but its logic applies equally to that of the Fourteenth.)
See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-77 ('To what principles ... are we to resort to
ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process? ... We must examine the
constitution itselt; to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions.'); id at
276 (specifically referring to Seventh Amendment as an example of such a provision); see also
CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 166; Amar, supra note 22, at 1225-26; Crosskey, supra
note 61, at 6-7.
395 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
396 See supra Part I.B.
397 Seesupra Part IIIA.1.
398 See Sauvinet Brief, supra note 387, at 2-3. Sauvinet's brief, unlike Walker's brief or
the Court's reported opinion, provides a useful and detailed account of the case's procedural
history in the lower courts. See id. at 2-4.
3 99 See id at 3-4. Sauvinet argued that Walker "abandoned [the jury trial point] in the
State Court," id. at 4, apparently referring to the Louisiana Supreme Court, though the basis of
this argument is not clear, since Sauvinet's brief quoted Walker's request for rehearing in that
court and the court's denial of rehearing, both of which addressed the jury issue. See id. at 3-4.
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abandoned the Fourteenth Amendment jury claim before the U.S. Supreme
Court. No mention of it appears in his four-page brief filed in that Court.4 00
The Fourteenth Amendment claim that Walker chose to press before the
Court was that Louisiana's civil rights law, by requiring service of customers
without regard to race, "compel[led] all persons engaged in business to sell their
commodities whenever called upon to do so, and whether willing or not. Such
compulsion is an abridgment of... the [citizen's] natural right to sell or keep his
commodities as best suits his own purpose .... " 40 1 This was, of course, exactly
the kind of natural-law economic liberty argument that Justice Field had pressed
unsuccessfully in Slaughter-House and that the Court later embraced as part of
the ill-fated Lochner doctrine.40 2 Tellingly, though somewhat quixotically, the
two decisions cited by Walker to support this argument were Slaughter-House
400 Walker's brief did argue that "the jury has a right... to decide both law and fact, and
no judge can lawfully compel the conscience of a jury on a constitutional question," Walker
Brief, supra note 387, at 4, but this was part of Walker's third assignment of error, which
expressly dealt only with claimed errors other than "the Federal questions involved," id at 3.
Walker's third assignment of error nowhere mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment, or any
provision of federal law. See id at 3-4. Rather, that part of Walker's brief seemed to raise the
issue whether the state trial judge had improperly charged the jury under state law, suggesting,
contrary to basic principles limiting federal subject-matter jurisdiction, that "in examining a
record from the highest court of a State," the U.S. Supreme Court might properly consider
issues other than whatever federal questions were raised. See id. No record of the oral argument
in Walker seems to have survived. Supreme Court oral arguments were not transcribed in any
cases before 1936, and only in some cases between 1936 and 1965, according to a May 31,
2000, telephone conversation between Thomas Jefferson School of Law reference librarian
Dorothy Hampton and Supreme Court briefs librarian Brian Stiglmeier. The few records of
nineteenth-century arguments that do survive are either found in the summaries sometimes
provided in the case reports, see, e.g., Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 143-59 (1887), or perhaps
in the private papers of the attomeys involved, which may be the source of former Justice
Campbell's Slaughter-House oral argument, quoted supra note 252. The very brief summary of
Homor's argument for Walker provided in the case report also fails to mention the jury trial
issue, stating merely that the Louisiana law "under which the proceedings in this case were had,
abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and is, therefore, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." Walker, 92 U.S. at 92 (summary
of argument by C.W. Homor) (citing Slaughter-House and Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 129 (1874)). The citation of Slaughter-House and Bartemeyer, see supra note 284, both
of which involved claimed economic liberties, reflects the Fourteenth Amendment argument
actually pressed in Walker's brief, which had nothing to do with incorporation or jury trial, as
discussed in text.
401 Walker Brief, supra note 387, at 2-3 (first assignment of error). Walker's second
assignment of error was that Louisiana's law was null and void due to federal pre-emption,
apparently on the theory that the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments
confided exclusive power in Congress to address such civil rights issues. See id at 3. Walker's
third assignment of error did not raise any federal question. See supra note 400.
402 See supra Parts II.B-C.
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itself and Bartemeyer v. Iowa,403 an intervening case having nothing to do with
incorporation, and which involved another unsuccessful economic liberty
claim4 04
The Court in Walker refused to consider the economic liberty argument, or
any questions other than the jury trial issue, on the sound enough ground that they
were not properly raised and preserved in the courts below 405 Why the Court did
not similarly apply the fundamental rule ofjudicial restraint that it should decline
to address an issue not raised before the Court itself is a mystery40 6 The Court
not only wrongly decided the issue it chose to address, it did so without plausible
analysis and in contravention of basic procedural propriety. One can only
speculate why Walker chose (or rather, sought unsuccessfully) to abandon the
jury trial issue before the Court, but a plausible explanation would be that his
attorney took note of the decision in Edwards, which apparently postdated the
lower-court proceedings in Walker.407
403 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874).
40 4 See Walker Brief, supra note 387, at 3; supra note 284.
40 5 See Walker, 92 U.S. at 93. Sauvinet took the same tack, not even bothering to respond
on the merits to Walker's economic liberty argument. Sauvinet's attorney, J.QA. Fellows, did
take some trouble to refute the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial claim Walker had raised in the
lower courts (apparently accurately foreseeing that the Supreme Court might reach it
notwithstanding Walker's abandonment of it there). See Sauvinet Brief, supra note 387, at 4-5.
It is interesting to note that Fellows's duty to represent Sauvinet's interests led him to repudiate
the incorporation theory that he and his then-co-counsel, former Justice Campbell, had
supported in Slaughter-House. See supra Part II.D (quoting and discussing Slaughter-House
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief (Campbell), supra note 246, and Slaughter-House Plaintiffs'
Reargument Brief (Fellows), supra note 246). Fellows finessed the issue rather cleverly, merely
noting: "In the Slaughter-House cases, the question of what constituted the privileges and
immunities of citizens was discussed in extenso. But so far, no case has been found in which a
trial by jury in a State court, was considered one of the rights, privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." Sauvinet Brief, supra note 387, at 5 (citing Slaughter-House and
four pre-1868 cases). This neatly avoided delving into what Slaughter-House had generally
suggested the scope of such privileges and immunities should be (and what Fellows and
Campbell had then argued it should be), while hiding behind the accurate technicality that no
case had yet specifically incorporated any jury trial right.
4 06 See supra note 122.
407 Walker's brief did not cite Edwards. Nor, oddly enough, did Sauvinet's brief, even
though the latter appears to have been filed about a year after Edwards was decided (precise
dates of submission are not indicated on the briefs), and even though Sauvinet responded to
Walker's abandoned jury trial argument and cited other cases in an attempt to refute application
of civil jury trial to the states. See supra note 405; Walker Brief, supra note 387, at 1 (indicating
filing during October 1874 term); Sauvinet Brief, supra note 387, at I (indicating filing during
October 1875 term). The Court's docket was extremely backlogged during this time, which
would account for the long delay between the filing of Walker's brief and the decision. See
KACZOROWVsKI, PoLMcS, supra note 88, at 225 (docket "was two years in arrears" around this
time).
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Justice Field dissented in Walker, though (uncharacteristically) without
opinion.4 8 One might wish to think he was protesting the majority's unexplained
repudiation of incorporation. While that would be consistent with his later
embrace of that theory,40 9 however, it is far more likely that Field's dissent turned
primarily on sympathy for Walker's claimed economic liberty of refusing service
to those whose skin color he disliked. This conclusion is bolstered by Field's
proven hostility to guaranteeing equal rights without regard to race 410 Ironically
enough, the other dissenter, also without opinion, was Justice Clifford,411 the
author of Edwards, which further suggests that the incorporation debate had
nothing to do with the dissents. Justice Clifford's likely hostility to
Reconstruction and racial equality, and his consequent likely motivation for
dissenting in Walker, may be inferred from facts noted earlier. 412
Newsom argued that Edwards and Walker are consistent with the
incorporationist thrust of Slaughter-House, primarily on the theory that the
Seventh Amendment might not have been understood to guarantee any individual
right susceptible to incorporation 4 13 Rather, Newsom argued, relying on
Professor Amar, that the Amendment might have been understood merely as a
structural or "federalist" provision, requiring jury trial in a common-law action
heard in federal court only if a jury would have been provided by the state court
408 See Walker, 92 U.S. at 93 (noting that Field, J., dissented from opinion and judgment
of Court).
409 See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 359-66 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting);
Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.A.
410 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880) (Field, J., joined by
Clifford, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold exclusion of African-Americans from state juries); Ex
pare Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367-70 (1880) (Field, J., joined by Clifford, J., dissenting)
(same).
411 See Walker, 92 U.S. at 93. The U.S. Reports states simply that "Mr. Justice Field and
Mr. Justice Clifford dissented from the opinion and judgment of the court." Id. The Lawyers'
Edition reports an actual brief dissent by Clifford, stating: "I dissent from the opinion and
judgment of the court in this case, and I am requested to say that Mr. Justice Field also dissents
both from the opinion and judgment." 23 L. Ed. at 679.
412 See supra note 383 and accompanying text. Indeed, Justice Clifford joined Justice
Field as the only two dissenters in Strauder and its companion case, which struck down racial
exclusion from jury service. See supra note 410.
4 13 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 727-32. Newsom also unearthed intriguing evidence
that Justice Miller in particular harbored a strong personal hostility to civil jury trial. See id at
730-31. But while that might explain (without justifying) Miller's silent concurrences in
Edwards and Walker, it does not explain the more puzzling concurrences of Justices Bradley
and Swayne, or indeed those of the other Justices who joined Miller's Slaughter-House opinion
(all of whom concurred in Edwards, and all but Clifford in Walker). See infra Part IV.
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that would otherwise have heard the action.4 14 Amar argued that the Amendment
was so understood at the time of its adoption in 1791 415
Professor Stanton Krauss also recently argued that the Amendment was not
originally understood to guarantee any individual right, though he rejected
Amar's theory as well, concluding instead that the Amendment was designed to
allow Congress plenary authority to define when civil jury trial would be
available in federal court 416 Amar and Krauss both also conceded that the
modem Supreme Court has, by contrast, long read the Amendment to guarantee
the right to civil jury trial in federal court to the extent that it "existed under the
English common law when the Amendment was adopted."417 There seems no
compelling reason why the Amendment, as so conceived by the Court, would not
be subject to incorporation against the states.418
Resolving the original understanding of the Seventh Amendment is beyond
the ambition of this article. But while Professor Amar noted that incorporation of
the Seventh Amendment into the Fourteenth "becomes somewhat awkward"419
under his view of the original understanding of the former, his more fundamental
insight was that in resolving any incorporation issue, we should look at how the
provision in question was understood by the Civil War generation. 420 Neither
Amar nor Newsom exhaustively explored (and Krauss not at all) how the
Seventh Amendment was understood during that Era. Yet only by doing so can
we assess whether Edwards and Walker were "sui generis" statements about the
Seventh Amendment alone4 2 1 or posed a more generalized contradiction to the
incorporationist implications of Slaughter-House. A definitive study of how the
Seventh Amendment was understood during the Civil War Era is also beyond the
4 14 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 729 & nn.418-421 (citing AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 63, at 89, 92,276).
4 15 See AMAR, BILLOFRIGHTs, supra note 63, at 89-93.
416 See Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right
to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 407,408-09,445-59,479-83 (1999).
417 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 89; Krauss, supra note 416, at 409.
418 Cf AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 276 (offering what Amar conceded was
"some fancy doctrinal footwork" in an attempt to "explain why the [structural] reading of the
Seventh Amendment makes sense in the incorporation context even though the Supreme Court
does not embrace it in Seventh Amendment doctrine proper"); infra note 573 (noting that stare
decisis would today counsel against overruling Edwards and Walker, even if the Sevefith
Amendment was properly incorporated as a theoretical matter).
419 AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 92.
420 See id at xii-xv, 284-94. As Amar stated, "words inserted into the Constitution in
1791 must be read afresh after 1866." Id. at 283.
421 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 732.
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scope of this article. A preliminary survey, however, severely undercuts
Newsom's view.
Newsom did not consider how the Supreme Court itself dealt with the
Seventh Amendment in the years leading up to Edwards and Walker. The
modem Court's view is that the individual-right conception of the Amendment
has prevailed "[s]ince Justice Story's day, '422 decades before the Civil War. And
indeed, in the 1833 case of Livingston v. Moore,423 immediately after Barron
itself, the Court rejected a claim that Pennsylvania had violated the right to civil
jury trial, not on the basis of any structural theory of the Amendment like those
suggested by Amar, Krauss, or Newsom, but simply because it "[did] not extend
to the states."424 Tn 1856, the Court analogized the Seventh Amendment jury trial
right to that of the Sixth Amendment describing them collectively as "further
special provisions.., for that mode of trial in civil and criminal cases,"425 and
holding that all such constitutional guarantees are encompassed by the concept of
due process of law.426
In 1870, the Court construed the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment42 7 to prohibit retrial, upon removal of a case to federal court, of facts
tried in state court.428 The Fourteenth Amendment was not raised, and the Court
stated, on the basis of Barron, Livingston, and Twitchell, that the Seventh
Amendment itself "could not be invoked in a State court to prohibit it from re-
422 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376; accord Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). But
see Krauss, supra note 416, at 460-78 (disputing this conventional account).
423 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
424 Id. at 552.
425 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,276
(1856).426 See id at 276-77; supra note 394.
427 The Amendment provides in full:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved [the Jury Trial Clause], and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law [the Reexamination Clause].
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This article, consistent with traditional practice in cases and
scholarship dealing with the incorporation issue, treats both Clauses as components of one
unified right to civil jury trial. But this approach may well be too simplistic, because the Court
has long treated the Clauses separately for purposes of Seventh Amendment analysis. See, e.g.,
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (construing Reexamination
Clause); Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (construing Jury Trial Clause); see also Justices of the Sup.
Ct. of N.Y. v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274,277 (1870); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433,447 (1830).428 Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 277-82.
1144 [Vol. 61:1051
examining... facts that had been tried by a jury."429 But the Court found the
incorporation issue irrelevant because "the question in hand... is not
whether... the [Seventh] [A]mendment has any effect as to the powers of an
appellate State court, but what is its effect upon the powers of the Federal
appellate court?"'430 The clear implication was that if Barron were overruled, as it
effectively was by the Fourteenth Amendment under the incorporation theory,
then the Seventh Amendment would apply to state courts.
Newsom also placed unwarranted stress on the fact that civil jury trial was
occasionally omitted from the typically nonexhaustive catalogues of Bill of
Rights guarantees thought to apply to the states, as offered by some contemporary
figures favoring incorporation.431 Newsom conceded one example contrary to his
thesis4 32 and there are others that he did not mention. For example,
Representative Beck cited the Seventh Amendment as applying to the states in
1873. 4 33 Representative Bingham himself, the father of incorporation, endorsed
that view in both 1866 and again in 1871, citing (along with Barron itself) the
Court's refusal in Livingston to enforce the Seventh Amendment against the
states as one of the antebellum decisions that were "exactly what makes plain the
necessity of adopting th[e] [Fourteenth] [A]mendment. 434
429 Id at 278; see also supra note 124.
430 Id.; see also supra note 124.
431 See, e.g., Newsom, supra note 22, at 729 (arguing that Sen. Howard "conspicuously
omitted any reference to the right to a civil jury" in his 1866 speech). But Sen. Howard referred
to "the personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments ... such as
the freedom of speech [etc.]:' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1866)
(emphasis added). While he listed rights found in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments, he omitted (along with the Seventh) the Religion Clauses of the First, all
four rights guaranteed by the Fifth, five of the seven guaranteed by the Sixth, and one of the
three guaranteed by the Eighth. See id.; supra note 90 (cataloguing twenty-four privileges and
immunities in Bill of Rights). Newsom's argument thus proves altogether too much. Cf supra
note 312 (discussing Sen. Norwood's arguable omission of civil jury trial from his list of
incorporated rights, an example not noted by Newsom).
4 32 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 730 n.424 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess.
1245 (1871) (Rep. Lawrence)); see also supra Part IIIA.1 (discussing Lawrence's 1874
incorporationist speech).
433 2 CONG. REc. 343 (Dec. 19, 1873); supra Part IIIA.1. Rep. Hemdon referred
generally to "trial by jury" without specifying criminal or civil, in listing "a few" of the
privileges protected by the Fourteenth Amendment See 2 CONG. REC. 420 (Jan. 6, 1874);
supra Part MA.1.
434 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (Feb. 28, 1866). In 1871, recalling his
incorporationist design in proposing the Amendment, Bingham repeated the linked reference to
Barron and Livingston and recited the Seventh Amendment along with the First through Eighth
Amendments as applying to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871).
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Additional evidence is furnished by Justice Story's Commentaries, originally
published in 1833 and reissued in 1873 under the editorship of Chief Justice
Cooley.435 This treatise declared that the Seventh Amendment
secured the right of a trial by jury in civil cases in the fullest latitude of the common
law.... [1It is a most important and valuable amendment and places upon the high
ground of constitutional right the inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil
cases,---a privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases, which is conceded by all
to be essential to political and civil hberty.436
Newsom argued that "at least a handful of states voting to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment had procedures in place that would not have complied
with an incorporated Seventh Amendment. '437 But of the thirty-seven states in
the Union in 1868, all but one-Louisiana with its Napoleonic civil law
heritage438-guaranteed that procedure as a matter of state constitutional right, in
a manner at least substantially in accord with the Seventh Amendment 439
435 See I COOLEY ON STORY 1873, supra note 360, at v-ix (prefaces); supra Part III.A3.
436 2 COOLEYON STORY 1873, supra note 360, at 526. Another Cooley treatise stated:
The several State constitutions preserve the right of trial byjury, with permission in some for the
parties to waive the right in civil cases. Those cases which before the constitution were not
triable by jury need not be made so now.... But the legislature cannot deprive a party of a
common-law right... and compel him to abide the estimate of commissioners upon his
damages. Where the constitution gives the right it cannot be made by statute to depend upon
any condition.
COOLEY, CONSTrTUTIONAL LfrrATIONS 1874, supra note 363, at *410 n.1 (citations omitted).
4 37 Newsom, supra note 22, at 730 & n.424 (citing Fairman, supra, note 22, at 81-132).
438 Even Louisiana, though not expressly guaranteeing civil jury trial in its constitution,
appeared to provide it in major cases. The Louisiana Constitution of 1868 vested original
jurisdiction over certain cases in which less than five hundred dollars was in dispute in its
parish courts, and stated: "There shall be no trial by jury before the parish courts." See LA.
CONST. of 1868, tit. IV, art. 87, reprinted in 4A SoURcEs AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTrMONs 154 (William F. Swindler ed. 1973-79) [hereinafter ST. CONST.]. The
constitution vested district courts with original jurisdiction over cases involving more than five
hundred dollars, implying by silent contrast that jury trial was available in those courts. See id
art. 85, reprinted in 4A ST. CONST., supra at 154.
439 See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. , § 13, reprinted in I ST. CONST., supra note 438, at
83; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 6, reprinted in I ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 382; CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3, reprinted in I ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 447; CONN. CONST. of
1818, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 2 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 145; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art.
I, § 4, reprinted in 2 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 217; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 4,
reprinted in 2 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 353; GA. CONsT. of 1868, art. V, § 13, reprinted
in 2 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 508; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 6, reprinted in 3 ST.
CONST., supra note 438, at 267; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 20, reprinted in 3 ST. CONST.,
supra note 438, at 379; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 3 ST. CONST., supra note
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For all these reasons, it seems impossible to explain away Edwards and
Walker as Newsom would do, on the theory that the Seventh Amendment was
understood to be uniquely unsusceptible to incorporation. Walker in particular
stands as a puzzling contradiction to any notion that the apparent incorporationist
consensus of Slaughter-House had any staying power.
C. The Confusion in the Supreme Cour, Part 2: Cruikshank
On March 27, 1876, one month before Walker was decided, the Court
rendered its decision in United States v. Cruikshank4 40 in another opinion by
Chief Justice Waite. Waite wrote for a majority of eight, with Justice Clifford
filing a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment. 4 1 The story of
438, at 452; KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 5, reprinted in 4 ST. CONST., supra note
438, at 83; KY. CoNsT. of 1850, art. XIII, § 8, reprinted in 4 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at
182; M. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 20, reprinted in 4 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 316; MD.
CONST. of 1867, Decl. of Rights, art. 5, reprinted in 4 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 448;
MASS. CONST. of 1780, DecI. of Rights, art. XV, reprinted in 5 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at
95; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VI, § 27, reprinted in 5 ST. CoNsT., supra note 438, at 230;
MINN. CONsT. of 1857, art. I, § 4, reprinted in 5 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 303; MIsS.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 12, reprinted in 5 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 377; MO. CONST. of
1865, art. I, § 17, reprinted in 5 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 517; NEB. CONST. of 1867, art.
I, § 5, reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 151; NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 3,
reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 263-64; N.H. CONST. of 1784, Bill of Rights, art.
XX, reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 346; NJ. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 7,
reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 454; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art I, § 2, reprinted in
7 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 192; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 19, reprinted in 7 ST.
CONST., supra note 438, at 415; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5, reprinted in 7 ST. CONST.,
supra note 438, at 558; OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 18, reprinted in 8 ST. CONST., supra note
438, at 206; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 6, reprinted in 8 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 303;
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 15, reprinted in 8 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 388; S.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 8 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 494; TENN. CONST. of 1834,
art. I, § 6, reprinted in 9 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 153; TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 16,
reprinted in 9 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 308; VT. CONsT. of 1796, Deel. of Rights, art.
XII, reprinted in 9 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 508; VA. CONST. of 1851, Bill of Rights, art.
XI, reprinted in 10 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 69; W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II, § 7,
reprinted in 10 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 343; Wis. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 5, reprinted
in 10 ST. CONST., supra note 438, at 418.
440 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see also id, 23 L. Ed. at 589 (giving exact date of decision). The
fact that the case report of Cruikshank is published almost five hundred pages after Walker in
Volume 92 of the U.S. Reports has understandably confised some scholars, including
Professor Morrison, into thinking that Crikshank postdated Walker. See, e.g., Morrison, supra
note 6, at 145. They are published in the correct order in the Lawyer's Edition. See Cruikshank,
23 L. Ed. at 588; Walker v. Sauvinet, 23 L. Ed. 678 (1876).
441 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 559 (Clifford, J., separate opinion). The case report labels
Clifford's opinion as "dissenting" (presumably at his request, and apparently because he
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Cruikshank; yet another case arising from turbulent Reconstruction-Era
Louisiana, has been oft-told. The decision has often been criticized for unduly
narrowing Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment and
for presaging the strict view of state action that the Court later adopted in the Civil
Rights Cases.442 The conventional wisdom has viewed the Court's opinion as
rejecting the incorporation theory, 4 3 and furthermore, as merely confirming what
Slaughter-House had already accomplished. 444
Professor Palmer, the first scholar to explore in depth the incorporationist
reading of Slaughter-House,445  argued by contrast that Cruikshank
"accomplished the nullification of the fourteenth amendment that scholars
traditionally attribute to Slaughter-House."44 6 Newsom, carrying Palmer's
revisionism a step further, argued that even Cruikshank did not reject
incorporation.447 This all requires careful consideration. It may be noted at the
outset however, that if Palmer was right then even he understated the full irony
and illegitimacy of Cruikshank's trashing of incorporation. Neither Palmer nor
Newsom addressed the facts, as discussed below, that the government abandoned
before the Supreme Court the only aspects of the case implicating the
incorporation issue and that one of the defendants' attorneys conceded an
incorporationist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The facts of Cruikshank "involved a level of violence tantamount to a
localized civil war in what was perhaps the bloodiest racial conflict in Louisiana
history."448
The case arose out of the outrages of the Colfax massacre, the "bloodiest single
instance of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era." After the disputed gubernatorial
election of 1872 in Louisiana, blacks in the town of Colfax organized themselves for
disagreed with Waite's reasoning), but the first sentence of his opinion states: "I concur that the
judgment in this case should be arrested, but for reasons quite different from those given by the
court." Id
442 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). For
criticisms directed mainly to the state action aspects of Cruikshank see, e.g., KACZOROWSKI,
PoLITIcs, supra note 88, at 173-229, and Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 86-90. For
criticisms directed mainly to the incorporation aspects of Cruikshank, see, e.g., CURTIS, No
STATE, supra note 22, at 178-79, Aynes, Bingham, supra note 54, at 99-103, and Palmer,
supra note 22, at 762-69.
443 See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 178-79; Aynes, Bingham, supra note
54, at 99-103; Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 41, at 86-90; Palmer, supra note 22, at 762-69.
444 See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 22, at 178 ("By the time Cruikshank was
decided the Court considered the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment settled.').
445 See Palmer, supra note 22, at 741-62.
4 46 Id. at 762.
447 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 712-20.
44 8 KACZOROWSKI, PoLITcS, supra note 88, at 175.
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self-defense against an expected attempt by white Democrats to seize control over the
government On Easter Sunday, 1873, a mob of white citizens armed with rifles and a
small cannon overwhelmed the defenders and engaged in a day of indiscriminate
killing. Two whites and 280 blacks were killed-including fifty black men who had
laid down their arms under a flag of surrender.449
By eerie coincidence, the massacre took place the day before Slaughter-
House was decided. 50 A federal grand jury indicted ninety-seven of the alleged
killers in June 1873451 under the Enforcement Act of 18704 52 Nine were brought
to trial in February 1874 before U.S. Circuit Judge (later Justice) William B.
Woods, resulting in one acquittal and a hung jury on the others 453 Retrial of the
remaining eight defendants began in May 1874, with Justice Bradley himself
joining Judge Woods in presiding. This time five defendants were acquitted, but
three, including William Cruikshank, were found guilty of sixteen counts of
conspiracy to violate various federal constitutional rights.
454
Justice Bradley, however, in a circuit court opinion issued on June 27, 1874,
quashed the indictment 4 55 He relied on a straightforward state-action theory to
limit the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment The criminal prosecutions at issue
exceeded federal power, he held, because they reached private assaults on life and
liberty, whereas the Amendment was "a guaranty of protection against the acts of
the state government itself."45 6 Most scholars, concerned primarily with the state
action issue, have emphasized that Bradley's 1874 decision foreshadowed in that
449 McConnell, Moment, supra note 56, at 134-35 (quoting FONER, supra note 88, at
437).
450 IRONs, supra note 250, at 202.
451 KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 176.
452 Ch. CXIV, 16 Stat. 140.
453 See KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS, supra note 88, at 176-78; see also supra Part IIA
(noting Judge Woods's endorsement of incorporation in 1871). Federal authorities were
overwhelmed by the task of tracking down the hundreds of armed bandits involved. Despite the
pleas of local U.S. Attorney James R. Beckwith for more vigorous enforcement support,
Attorney General George H. Williams ordered Beckwith to select only a handful of ringleaders
for actual prosecution. According to Professor Kazcorowski, this decision by the Grant
Administration "represented cynical tokenism." KACZoRowsKi, POLmCS, supra note 88, at
176.
454 Id at 178.
455 United States v. Cniikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (Bradley, Circuit
Justice), aftd, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see also KACZOROWsKI, POLITIC, supra note 88, at 179.
456 Cruikshan, 25 F. Cas. at 710. The Amendment, he held, was "not intended as a
guaranty against the commission of murder, false imprisonment robbery, or any other crime
committed by individual malefactors, so as to give congress the power to pass laws for the
punishment of such crimes in the several states generally." Id; see also id. at 714-15
(discussing Fourteenth Amendment rights that the indictment alleged the defendants violated).
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regard the full Court's holdings on appeal in Cruikshank, in United States v.
Reese,4 57 and ultimately in the CivilRights Cases of 1883458
What seems to have gone unnoticed until very recently, however, is that
Justice Bradley's 1874 opinion most emphatically did not foreshadow any
abandonment of incorporation. Quite the contrary: Justice Bradley explicitly
reaffinmed the incorporationist consensus implied by Slaughter-House and
echoing in the halls of Congress that very winter and spring of 1874459 Noting
that the first count of the Cruikshank indictment dealt with the right of peaceable
assembly, Bradley observed that this right was guaranteed by the First
Amendment, which did not address private actions but only limited Congress's
own power460 He found this count void, but only under his state action theory:
Has anything since [the First Amendment] occurred to give congress legislative
power over the subject matter? The 14th amendment declares that no state shall by
law abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Grant that
this prohibition now prevents the states from interfering with the right to assemble, as
being one of such privileges and immunities, still, does it give congress power to
legislate over the subject? Power to enforce the amendment is all that is given to
congress. If the amendment is not violated, it has no power over the subject.461
457 92 U.S. 214 (1876). Reese, decided the same day as Cruikshank; involved Congress's
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment (which was also at issue in Cruikshank). See
KACZOROWSKI, POLrrMCS, supra note 88, at 213.
458 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Professor John Braeman, for example, noted that Bradley,
following his broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House see supra
note 112 (discussing Bradley's 1870 circuit court opinion in Slaughter-House); supra Part II])
(discussing Bradley's Supreme Court dissent in Slaughter-House), began "shift[ing] his
ground" in his 1874 Cruikshank decision. See BRAEMAN, supra note 88, at 64; see also id, at
64-67 (discussing Cruikshank; Reese, and Civil Rights Cases); John Anthony Scott, Justice
Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment From the Slaughter-House Cases to
the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552 (1971) (discussing the role of Bradley's
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases in conceptualizing the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Professor Kaczorowskd blamed Justice Bradley's decisions in Cruikshank and in
Texas v. Gaines, 23 F. Cas. 869 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874), for a new explosion of political and
racial violence across the South. KACZOROWSKI, PoLrICs, supra note 88, at 188.
459 See supra Part III.A.1.
460 See Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 714-15.
461 Id. at 714-15 (emphasis added). Referring to the second count, which dealt with the
right to bear arms, Bradley merely noted that it was "open to the same criticism as the first." Id
at 715; see also HALBROOK, supra note 52, at 168 (noting the incorporationist aspect of
Bradley's 1874 opinion); BRANDWEIN, supra note 41, at 71, 80 (same); Newsonm, supra note
22, at 717,720 (same).
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Since Bradley's views on the Fourteenth Amendment were, by this time,
necessarily guided by the majority's holding in Slaughter-House,462 this passage
constitutes still more compelling evidence that incorporation was, by this time,
widely accepted as a minimum consensus view of the Amendment.
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Waite's opinion two years later affirming Justice
Bradley's quashing of the indictment 463-joined silently by Bradley himself-
seemed to offhandly reject incorporation. Waite found all sixteen counts of the
indictment legally invalid. Oddly, he cited Slaughter-House only once, toward
the beginning of his opinion, for the general proposition that the rights of a citizen
of the United States differ from those of a citizen of a state. 6 After elaborating
awhile on the theme of dual citizenship, Waite turned to the first, second, ninth,
and tenth counts of the indictment, which essentially alleged that the defendants
had violated the victims' First Amendment right of peaceable assembly and their
Second Amendment right to bear arms 4 65 Instead of simply relying on the
obvious state-action weakness of those counts, as Bradley had done, Waite
recited the rule that those amendments applied of their own force only to the
federal government, citing Barron and pre-1868 cases4 66 The only post-1868
cases cited were Twitchell and Edwards.467
Chief Justice Waite did not even mention the Fourteenth Amendment or
Slaughter-House in his discussion of the counts dealing with peaceable assembly
and the right to bear arms. The closest he came even to an implicit reference to
the Amendment, or to anything remotely resembling analysis of the incorporation
issue, was to state:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning
Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers
or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as
such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a
government republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was
to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute,
462 See, e.g., KACZOROWSIu, POLIrICS, supra note 88, at 179-83; see also Cruikshan, 25
F. Cas. at 712 (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81).
463 Justice Bradley certified the case to the Supreme Court because he and Judge Woods
were divided on the issue, with Woods favoring upholding the validity of the indictment See
Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 546, 548; Cruilshank, 25 F. Cas. at 708; KACZOROWSKI, POLIrICS,
supra note 88, at 177-78.
464 See Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 549.
465 Id. at 551-53.
466 Id; see also supra Part IIA (discussing Barron).
467 Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 552; see also supra Part IIA (discussing Twitchell); supra Part
3I.B (discussing Edwards).
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and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. Such, however, is not the
case. The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be made out if it be shown that the
object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting for any lawful purpose
whatever.468
Here would seem to be the origin of the narrow conventional reading of
Slaughter-House to recognize only those privileges and immunities deriving from
some relationship with the federal government.
With regard to the right to bear arms, Chief Justice Waite stated simply: 'The
second amendment declares that [this right] shall not be infringed; but this, as has
been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. 469 One
might argue that the Second Amendment, unlike other Bill of Rights guarantees,
is inherently unsusceptible to incorporation because it is not so much an
individual right against governmental power generally, but a right of the states
against the federal government to maintain a "well regulated Militia."470 Modem
scholarship has cast doubt on whether the Second Amendment may be construed
in so limited a manner, but that issue is beyond the scope of this article4 71
The remainder of Chief Justice Waite's Cruikshank opinion emphasized
three general weaknesses of the various counts of the indictment that rendered his
incorporation-related discussion utterly needless. First, echoing Justice Bradley's
circuit court opinion, Waite pointed to the lack of alleged state action arguably
requisite under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.472 Second, he pointed
to the arguable lack of sufficient allegations of racial motivation. 473 Third, he
pointed to the indictment's overall vagueness, generality, and arguable lack of
fair notice.474
The federal government's brief in Cruikshank referred to "the right to
assemble and consult about Federal politics, and to petition Congress for redress
468 Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 552-53.
469 Id. at 553.
470 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
471 See generally HALBROOK, supra note 52 (arguing that historical evidence from 1866-
76 supports incorporation of individual right to bear arms in Fourteenth Amendment); Koren
Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The Second Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards
a Workable Jurisprudence, 50 HASTINGS L.J 177 (1998) (surveying scholarship and also
contending that right is properly incorporated); see also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63,
at 46-63, 257-66 (lending considerable support to individual-right, incorporationist view of
Second Amendment).
472 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553-56.
473 Id. at 554-56.
474 Id. at 557-59.
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of Federal grievances," 475 but the government expressly emphasized that these
were rights that did not originate with the Fourteenth Amendment but rather had
existed, along with the federal power to enforce and protect them, "at any time
since 1789."476 The government argued that even if it were shown that some
rights addressed in the indictment did not fall within federal protection, "we reply
that such conclusion is not material. '477 As long as there were "some such we are
not interested in this connection to say whether they be more or less, or to settle
the debate whether certain rights are upon this or that side of the boundary."478 In
other words, the government seems not to have wanted to address the
incorporation debate.
Indeed, the Court had no need to address the counts dealing with peaceable
assembly and bearing of arms at all because the government had abandoned
them, along with all counts other than the sixth, eighth, fourteenth, and
sixteenth479 The latter counts alleged denial of the right to vote and, generally, of
"'each, every, all and singular [of] the several rights and privileges granted or
secured... by the Constitution and laws of the United States."' 480 Chief Justice
Waite disposed of them without reference to the incorporation issue, on the basis
of the three weaknesses mentioned above.4 81 Thus, the briefs reveal that to
whatever extent incorporation was rejected or undermined in Cruikshank, this
was not only unnecessary and unreasoned, it was also (like the similar holding in
Walker) procedurally improper.
The government as noted, seemed to deliberately avoid the incorporation
issue, despite its natural stake in promoting the theory. Paradoxically, one of the
briefs filed on behalf of the defendants, who had every incentive to oppose
incorporation, actually endorsed the theory. Four briefs were filed on behalf of
the defendants, the dominant theme of all four being the lack of state action. 482
475 Brief for the United States at 6, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)
[hereinafter CruiAshank U.S. Brief] (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79). The
Supreme Court briefs in Cruilshank are reprinted in 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 246, at
285-417.
4 76 Cruikshank U.S. Brief, supra note 475, at 6.
477 Id at 26.
4 7 8 Id at 26-27.
4 7 9 See id at3.
4 80 Id at 4; see also id. at 3--4, 26.
481 See Cruikshankl 92 U.S. at 555-59.
4 82 See Brief for Defendants (filed by David S. Bryon) at 18-26, United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) [hereinafter Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Bryon)]; Brief for
Defendants (filed by RH. Marr) at 7-24, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)
[hereinafter Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Marr)]; Brief for Defendants (filed by John A.
Campbell) at 4-11, 24-28, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) [hereinafter
2000] 1153
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Only two of the defendants' briefs clearly addressed incorporation, and they did
so in cursory fashion. One seemed to argue against incorporation, though in
notably unpersuasive fashion.483 The other, however, conceded that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.4 84 Cruikshank like
Walker, involved yet another of the Slaughter-House attorneys, in this case
former Justice Campbell. Campbell's brief took no clear position on
incorporation, perhaps not surprisingly, given the conflict between his clients'
interests and his own espousal of the theory in Slaughter-House.485
Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Campbell)]; Brief for Defendants (filed by David Dudley Field)
at 4-5, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
483 See Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Bryon), supra note 482, at 10, 14. Bryon simply
misquoted Slaughter-House, stating that it was "decided in [Slaughter-House] that it is one of
the rights of citizens of the United States, resulting not from any particular article of the
Constitution, butfrom the general nature of the government, to peaceably assemble, provided it
be 'to petition the government for a redress of grievances."' Id at 10. In fact, as discussed in
Part II.C, it was exactly the reverse. The sentence in Justice Miller's majority opinion in
Slaughter-House referring to the right of assembly expressly noted that it was rooted in "the
Federal Constitution," in contrast to other rights listed by Miller which he linked to the
"National character" of the federal government. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
And Miller, contrary to Bryon's quotation above, dropped from Slaughter-House's paraphrase
of the right of petition any mention of "the govemment" (presumably meaning the federal
government) as the exclusive target. See id.; supra Part II.C. Bryon later asserted, with no
explanation at all, that "the right to bear arms is not enumerated [he meant, presumably, in
Slaughter-House's avowedly nonexhaustive list] among the rights of a citizen of the United
States." Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Bryon), supra note 482, at 14.
4 84 See Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Marr), supra note 482, at 17 (emphasis added):
Th[e] first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] ... in no manner adds to or changes the
power of the Federal government with respect to the protection, against the acts of individuals,
of the rights charged in the indictment to have been violated. It does, indeed, add to thepower of
the Federal government. It puts the States with respect to the prohibition and limitations
imposed, under the restrainingpower of the Federal Constitution. None of the restrictions ofthe
first ten Amendments were applicable to the State governments. The prohibition and limitations
of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable to the State governments alone.
Marr argued that the Second Amendment did not protect an individual right to keep and bear
arms for any lawful purpose, but rather only secured the right of "maintaining, in the States, a
well regulated militia," against federal interference. Id. at 26; see also infra note 493 (noting
Marn's narrow view of right to assemble).
485 See supra Part ll.D. Campbell seemed to take a narrow view in Cruikshank of the
rights to assemble and bear arms, even as against the federal government.
The first amendment... denies power to the United States, to abridge the right of the people to
assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances. But this prohibition contains
no implication of control, superintendence, allowance or prevention of such assemblies. The
same objections apply to the counts which charge the object of the conspiracy to disturb the
exercise of the right to keep and bear arms. This is not a right derived from or secured in the
Constitution .... The second amendment... denies to the government power to infringe that
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Notably, Justice Clifford's separate opinion resolved the case without
touching on incorporation. Clifford pointed out that the government had
abandoned most counts of the indictment.4 86 Therefore, he correctly admonished,
while "[c]ertain other causes for arresting the judgment are assigned in the
record, ... having come to the conclusion that the indictment is insufficient it is
not necessary to consider th[ose] question[s]. ' 487
It seems "ironic," as Professor Palmer noted, that Chief Justice Waite, "under
the banner of Slaughter-House,"488 could somehow have eliminated from the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment-at least for the next half-century489-one
of the very examples of protected privileges and immunities expressly cited by
Justice Miller in Slaughter-House. Yet Miller joined Waite's opinion in
Cruikshank without protest. Even more paradoxically, so did Justices Bradley
and Swayne. Something is clearly amiss somewhere. Defenders of the
conventional reading of Slaughter-House might argue that the incorporationist
reading of Miller must give way. But that would not explain the Bradley-Swayne
about-face.
Newsom purported to resolve the dilemma, in rather startling fashion, by
asserting that "Cruikshank is not the anti-incorporationist juggernaut it was once
thought to be."490 But how could Cruikshank be consistent with incorporation?
Newsom argued in part that the case turned more properly on the state-action
issue,491 which is certainly true as discussed above, but does not explain Waite's
language bearing on incorporation, and indeed, makes it even more troubling.
Newsom argued, however, that Waite's discussion of the right of assembly
reflected, not a reluctance to incorporate the right as against the states, but rather a
right, and no article in the Constitution... has any relation to that fight, except that which
relates to the organization and equipment of the militia; the privilege of citizens to keep and bear
arms, for a lawful purpose, is not a right or privilege which the United States granted, nor its
government charged to guard and to guarantee....
Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Campbell), supra note 482, at 5-6.
486 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 561 (Clifford, J., separate opinion). Clifford stated that counsel
for the United States had "confined their arguments entirely to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
sixteenth counts." Id. The fourteenth and sixteenth counts essentially duplicated the allegations
of the sixth and eighth counts. See Cruikshank U.S. Brief, supra note 475, at 3. The thirteenth
count largely duplicated the sixteenth, except that the thirteenth specified that the victims were
denied their rights on account of race. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 557.
487 Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 569 (Clifford, J., separate opinion); see also id at 561.
488 Palmer, supra note 22, at 769.
489 It was not until 1925 that the Court began re-incorporating First Amendment freedoms
into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), and not
until 1937 that the rights of assembly and petition were specifically re-incorporated, see
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,364 (1937).
490 Newsom, supra note 22, at 720.
491 See id at 717-20.
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narrow conception of the right even as applied to the federal government. This
conception, which Newsom himself seemed to endorse, is that the First
Amendment guarantees, not a right to assemble for any lawfil purpose, but rather
"the right to assemblefor the purpose ofpetitioning the government."492
Newsom's argument is audaciously defiant of conventional wisdom, and, if
tenable, would have great explanatory power. It would reconcile Cruikshank with
the incorporationist views and implications of all nine Justices in Slaughter-
House and Justice Bradley in the Cruikshank circuit court opinion. If Newsom
had examined the Cruikshank briefs, he would have found some support for his
narrow view of the right of assembly in the defendants' arguments4 93
Unfortunately, however, Newsom's reading of Cruikshank falls apart under
scrutiny.
First of all, Newsom did not explain why Chief Justice Waite refused to
incorporate the right to bear arms. Newsom acknowledged Waite's anti-
incorporationist language on the Second Amendment but did not further discuss
the issue.494 One might try to explain away this aspect of Cruikshank by arguing
that the Second Amendment is uniquely unsusceptible to incorporation, as noted
earlier, but Newsom attempted no such argument.
Second, Newsom's theory does not square with a careful reading of Chfef
Justice Waite's opinion. Newsom overlooked the significance of a critical
paragraph, which stated:
The particular amendment now under consideration [the First Amendment as
the preceding paragraph made clear] assumes the existence of the right of the people
to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress.
The right was not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed,
except as against congressional interference. For their protection in its enjoyment,
therefore [clearly meaning, in context, protection against anything other than federal
power], the people must look to the States. The power for that purpose was originally
placed there, and it has never been surrendered to the United States.4 95
492 Id. at 714; see also id. at 714-16.
493 See Cruikshank Defendants' Brief (Marr), supra note 482, at 25-26 (arguing that right
of assembly, as applied to either federal government or states, protects only assembly for
purpose of petition, not for any lawful purpose); see also Cruikshank Defendants' Brief
(Bryon), supra note 482, at 10 (making similar argument); Cruikshank Defendants' Brief
(Campbell), supra note 482, at 5-6 (same); supra notes 483 and 485.
494 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 713.
495 Cruikyhank 92 U.S. at 552 (emphases added).
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Waite thus stated quite unambiguously that the federal government is obliged to
respect a broad right of assembly "for lawful purposes," but that this right does
not apply to the states 4 96
Newsom's misstep was to focus too narrowly on Chief Justice Waite's
comment (twice cited by Newsom) that "[t]he right... to assemble for lawful
purposes existed long before the adoption of the Constitution,"' 497 and was
therefore (according to Newsom) "not... 'granted or secured' by the
Constitution. '498 Waite made essentially the same point in the paragraph quoted
above, that "[t]he right was not created by" the First Amendment or the original
Constitution. But that was in no way inconsistent with Waite's equally explicit
statement also quoted above, that this right was, nevertheless, "protect[ed]" by
the First Amendment "against encroachment by Congress." Legal thinkers of that
time often drew a distinction between whether a right was created by the
Constitution or merely "declared" and reiterated by it.499 Waite was simply
acknowledging the historical reality that the right of assembly has a pedigree in
Anglo-American law predating 1791. He made clear, in the paragraph quoted
above, his belief that the right was also declared, secured, and protected by the
First Amendment though only against federal infringement
Newsom argued that '"Waite seemed frankly to acknowledge the
'incorporating' character of the Fourteenth Amendment '500 in the paragraph
(quoted earlier above) that began by referring to "[t]he right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the
national government." 501 That paragraph followed immediately after the
paragraph (quoted and discussed just above) dealing with the First Amendment.
To be sure, that "right of assembly was, according to Waite, 'an attribute of
national citizenship."' 502 But while Newsom labeled this a "First Amendment
49 6 See Tribe, Saenz, supra note 20, at 183 n.330.
497 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551, quoted in Newsom, supra note 22, at 713, 714.
49 8 Newsom, supra note 22, at 713 (quoting Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 548). Newsom quoted
Waite's use of the words "granted or secured" out of context. Waite, laying out the issue
presented for decision, was merely quoting the language of the Enforcement Act prohibiting
unlawful hindrance of the 'free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured ... by the constitution or laws of the United States."' Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.
4 99 See, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 254-55 n.* ("As we have seen,
many of the provisions of the original Bill [of Rights] were seen as 'declaratory' of existing
law... and this declaratory theory was one of the driving forces behind the Fourteenth
Amendment.').
50 0 Newsom, supra note 22, at 716.
501 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
502 Newsom, supra note 22, at 716 (quoting Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 552).
2000] 1157
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
right,"50 3 that was not Waite's characterization. Waite had referred to the First
Amendment in the paragraph quoted and discussed just above, as protecting
against federal infringement the right to assemble "for lawful purposes." But in
the paragraph quoted earlier, dealing with assembly for the purpose of petitioning
the federal government, Waite nowhere alluded to the First Amendment. Instead,
he stated that this narrower right of assembly was "implie[d]" by "[t]he very idea
of a government, republican in form."504
As a right to communicate with and seek the protection of the federal
government, this narrower right of assembly was probably already shielded by
the Supremacy Clause of the original Constitution, 05 with no need of assistance
from the Fourteenth Amendment. This analysis is consistent with the
government's own argument in Cruikshank, as quoted earlier, that the federal
power to protect such rights had existed "at any time since 1789."506 The very
way in which Chief Justice Waite chose to characterize the right, as "an attribute
of national citizenship,' 507 tends to align it with those identified by Justice Miller
in Slaughter-House as derived from the "National character" of the federal
government, as opposed to those "ow[ing] their existence to
the ... Constitution."50 8 And it is thus vulnerable to the same charge of
redundancy properly leveled against the former (but not the latter) category of
privileges and immunities listed by Miller.
It is worth noting that this subject-matter limitation on the right of assembly,
as applied to the states by Chief Justice Waite, would be quite unworkable. The
implication is that states would be free to suppress peaceable assemblies as a
general matter, but obligated to keep hands off any assembly at which "national"
issues or appeals to the federal government were discussed or made. Spicing up
any given assembly with a few federal issues or appeals would not seem beyond
the ingenuity of most activists, so such a limitation might be illusory in any event
But even as a theoretical matter it is offensive to the very concept of free
expression pervading the First Amendment, which presupposes that
governments, both state and federal, have no business favoring or disfavoring
particular subjects of (at the very least) political speech.50 9 Newsom's narrow but
503 Id.
50 4 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
505 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50 6 Cruikshank US. Brief, supra note 475, at 6.
507 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
50 8Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; see also supra Part II.C.
509 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (content-based restrictions on
speech generally subject to strictest scrutiny); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that
most content-based restrictions are per se invalid). It appears that the only Supreme Court case
in which any Justice has attempted to apply Waite's limited conception of freedom of assembly
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fully incorporated version of the right of assembly would presumably protect the
right to petition state (and perhaps local) governments as well. But the same basic
objections apply.
This author has always understood the First Amendment right of assembly in
the broad sense suggested by Chief Justice Waite, as applying to all peaceable
assemblies for lawful purposes. Furthermore, this author has always understood
the rights of assembly and petition as distinct First Amendment freedoms.
Although petitioning the government (any government) is one obvious purpose
of the right to assembly protected by the First Amendment, it cannot be so limited
without doing violence to plain text The Amendment declares both "the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances,"510 not merely the right to assemble "in order to," or "for the purpose
of," petition. Justice Miller in Slaughter-House, echoing the Amendment's
language, referred to "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances." 511 Justice Bradley referred in Slaughter-House to "the right
peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures," omitting the right
to petition altogether (along with numerous other Bill of Rights guarantees) from
his avowedly nonexhaustive list.512
The above reading is supported by modem usages. In De Jonge v. Oregon,
the txventieth-century case incorporating assembly and petition into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated that, "consistently with the Federal
Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime."513 In Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court found that the state had
"infinged the... constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly,
and freedom to petition for redress of... grievances." 514 Leading scholarly
works are in accord.515
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See id. at
511-16 (Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.) (relying on Privileges and Immunities Clause to
uphold rights to freely disseminate information concerning, and to peaceably assemble to
discuss, federal labor relations statute); id at 532 (Hughes, CJ., concurring) (agreeing with
Roberts on relevant point).
510 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
511 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (emphasis added).
512 Id at 118 (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne, J., dissenting).
513 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (emphasis added).
514 372 U.S. 229,235 (1963) (emphases added).
515 See, e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 26-30 (discussing Assembly
Clause); id at 30-32 (discussing Petition Clause); id at 234-36, 244-46 (repeatedly referring
disjunctively to rights of speech, press, petition, and assembly); TRIBE 1988, supra note 25,
§ 11-2, at 772 (referring disjunctively to "first amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
petition, free exercise of religion, and non-establishment of religion"). I cannot purport to have
exhaustively researched the understanding of the rights of assembly and petition during the
Civil War Era. It appears that some lawyers of the time may have understood them in the way
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Finally, there is an even more fundamental problem with Newsom's reading
of Cruikshank He did not satisfactorily explain Chief Justice Waite's continued
reliance on the Barron doctrine to deny that the Bill of Rights applied to the
states. Of course, as Newsom emphasized, it was technically correct-even
assuming an incorporationist view of the Fourteenth Amendment-for Waite to
state that the First and Second Amendments did not of their own force 'limit the
powers of the State governments."516 But realistically, why would Waite say
such a thing in a case where the Fourteenth Amendment and a federal statute
based on it were expressly invoked, and the incorporation issue was squarely
presented by the counts of the indictment that Waite chose (however needlessly)
to address? This was quite different from cases like Twitchell where "'rights were
asserted under the first [eight] amendments only and without reference to the
fourteenth."' 517 If an incorporationist understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment still prevailed in 1876, it surely would have been recognized that
such mechanical reliance on Barron no longer made sense.518
Newsom does, as reflected in some of the defendants' arguments in Cruikshank cited above-
though Chief Justice Waite and the Justices joining his Cruikshank opinion, as discussed above,
do not seem to have shared such a view. Justice Story's Commentaries, as edited by Chief
Justice Cooley, treat the rights as one unified clause and emphasize the historical roots of the
right of petition, but otherwise provide little guidance. See 2 COOLEY ON STORY 1873, supra
note 360, §§ 1893-1895, at 619-20; accord COOLEY, CONSTrrmONAL LirrrATIONS 1874,
supra note 363, at *349 (quoting 2 COOLEY ON STORY 1873, supra note 360, § 1894).
516 Cruikshan, 92 U.S. at 552; see also id at 553; Newsom, supra note 22, at 715-16
(discussing Waite's reliance on Barron).
5 17 Newsom, supra note 22, at 722 (quoting Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 25 AM. L. REV. 536, 542 (1891) (alteration by Newsom)); see also
supra Part II.A (discussing Twitchell).
518 Professor Maltz, foreshadowing Newsom to some extent, has also suggested that we
should not read Cruikshank too narrowly. But I must demur from Maltz's surprising statement
that, "[r]ather plainly, Waite viewed rights such as those protected by the First [and Second]
Amendment[s] ... as the kind of fundamental rights that would be protected [by the Fourteenth
Amendment]." Maltz, Concept, supra note 52, at 532. Why, if so, Waite rejected indictments
premised on such rights (entirely apart from the state action issues involved), Professor Maltz
did not explain. He cited Waite's statement that "the Due Process Clause 'furnishes an
additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which
belong to every citizen as a member of society."' Id (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554). But
there is less here than meets the eye. Waite was arguing that the Due Process Clause "adds
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty
against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every
citizen as a member of society." Cruikshank 92 U.S. at 554. In other words, Waite was merely
asserting a state action limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment, without committing himself to
any particular scope for it. Likewise, Maltz quoted a passage in which Waite discussed the
Equal Protection Clause, which obviously did not go to the substantive scope of any rights,
liberties, privileges, or immunities protected by the Amendment. See Maltz, Concept, supra
note 52, at 532. Again, Waite's point was simply that the Clause required "only... that the
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IV. CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE PUZZLE
AND LOOKING AHEAD
How can we explain the conflicting evidence of the understandings in
Congress and the Supreme Court with regard to incorporation of the Bill of
Rights? Comments in two cases decided as the 1870s ended, Davidson v. New
Orleans5 19 and Missouri v. Lewis,520 tend to confirm that, rightly or wrongly,
intended or not, explained or not, Edwards, Walker, and Cruikshank effectively
unraveled-at least on the Court-the incorporationist consensus seemingly
embraced in Slaughter-House. Newsom's suggestion that such a consensus
persisted up until Justice Miller's death in 1890521 is undermined by-in addition
to his unpersuasive treatment of Edwards, Walker, and Cnikshank-the fact that
he ignored Davidson and Lewis, as well as the 1886 decision in Presser v.
llinois.522
It is true that neither Davidson nor Lewis involved any claim under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, nor was the incorporation issue critical to the
decision of either case. But Justice Miller, writing for the Court in Davidson,
rejected a challenge to a city tax assessment under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and commented:
If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it must be
remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the provision on that
subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the [Due Process
Clause] we are conslnaing, was left out, and this [due process] was taken.523
The implication was that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was not
incorporated. Why would Miller have said such a thing if he understood his
Slaughter-House opinion to imply that all privileges and immunities of United
States citizens "ow[ing] their existence to the... Constitution ' '524 were "taken"
States do not deny the right [to equal protection]. This the [Clause] guarantees, but no more."
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555 (emphases added).
519 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
520 101 U.S. 22 (1880).
521 See Newsom, supra note 22, at 708-09, 732-33; OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra
note 39, at 967 (dates of Miller's tenure).
522 116 U.S. 252 (1886); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.C.
Newsom actually quoted Davidson at one point, but still overlooked its anti-incorporationist
language-and this was an opinion by Justice Miller himself' See Newsom, supra note 22, at
693.
523 Davidson, 96 U.S. at 105.
524 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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by the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states? Ironically, the Takings
Clause was found to be incorporated via the Due Process Clause less than twenty
years later, in the very first victory on the Court for the incorporation theory.525
The only Justice who declined to join Miller's opinion in Davidson was,
intriguingly, Bradley, who concurred in a short opinion expressing support for the
view that the Due Process Clause encompassed the right of just compensation. 526
Any hope that Davidson marked a return by Justice Bradley to the
incorporationist fold was dashed, however, by his unanimous opinion for the
Court in Lewis. In that case, a disbarred attorney challenged an odd provision of
Missouri law under which cases arising in St Louis and several other counties, in
contrast to the rest of the state, could not be appealed directly to the Missouri
Supreme Court, but were instead routed to a special court of appeals.527 In
rejecting the claim that this violated the Equal Protection Clause, Bradley
commented:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these
respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of
this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right Each
State prescribes its own modes ofjudicial proceeding.528
To the extent that Justice Bradley in Lewis may have intended to refer only to
civil jury trials, his comment implicitly acknowledged Edwards and Walker. If he
intended to speak of both civil and criminal jury trial, he foreshadowed, of course,
the Court's later express holding that the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury
trial was not incorporated either.529 Neither reading suggests that Bradley and his
colleagues-who still included Justices Swayne and Field, his dissenting
companions in Slaughter-House, and Justices Miller, Clifford, and Strong from
52 5 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897);
Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part III.B.
52 6 Davdson, 96 U.S. at 107 (Bradley, J.). While agreeing with the Court's judgment and
the "general tenor of the opinion," Bradley stated that
it narrows the scope of... due process of law more than it should do.
... If a State, by its laws, should authorize private property to be taken for public use
without compensation [subject to some exceptions], I think it would be depriving a man of his
property without due process of law.
Id.
527 SeeLewis, 101 U.S. at 29-30.
52 8 Id. at31.
52 9 See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1900); Wildenthal, Road to Twining,
supra note 4, at Part IV.
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the Slaughter-House majority--had any attachment to incorporation.5 30 It would
be difficult to argue that they had forgotten the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
for Bradley commented that "[i]t is the right of every State to establish such
courts as it sees fit; ... provided it... does not abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.' 5 31
This passing language in Davidson and Lewis may not provide any firm
guide to the views of Justices who merely joined silently in these evidently
uncontroversial decisions. The newly appointed Justice Harlan joined both
opinions, for example, yet would soon emerge as a powerful champion of total
incorporation.532 Justice Swayne's silent assent to both opinions is more
troubling, following his silent concurrences in both Cruikshank and Walker. He
must be chalked up as having possibly abandoned the incorporation theory to
which he subscribed in Slaughter-House.533 And yet Swayne's consistently
strong support over the years for broadly reading and vigorously enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights statutes provides room for doubt.534
Swayne, whose son was a Civil War hero who later directed the Freedmen's
530 Justice Hunt from the Slaughter-House majority did not participate in Lewis. He
suffered a disabling stroke in December 1878 that prevented him from performing his duties
during the remainder of his tenure. He waited to retire until January 1882 when Congress
passed a special pension bill for him. See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 417;
IRONS, supra note 250, at 198. Bradley's Lewis opinion repeated the point about jury trial,
stating: "Where part of a State is thickly settled, and another part has but few inhabitants, it may
be desirable to have different systems ofjudicature for the two portions,-trial by jury in one,
for example, and not in the other." Lewis, 101 U.S. at 32.
531 Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30.
532 See generally Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4. Davidson was one of the
very first cases in which Harlan participated on the Court. He took his seat on December 10,
1877. OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 968. Davidson was argued on December 11
and 12, 1877. Davidson, 24 L. Ed. at 616.
533 See supra Part ll.D.
534 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (joining Court's opinion striking
down exclusion of African-Americans from juries); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
581, 595-96 (1872) (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's
narrow interpretation of jurisdictional provision of 1866 Civil Rights Act); United States v.
Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (Swayne, Circuit Justice) (upholding
constitutionality of 1866 Civil Rights Act and citizenship of freed slaves under Thirteenth
Amendment, in case involving denial of African-American's right to testify against White
person); see also Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 676 n.359 (noting that Swayne, by then
retired, wrote Justice Harlan to congratulate him on his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 26 (1883), which Swayne characterized as "one of the great-indeed one of the
greatest-opinions of the Court"); Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional
Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1989) (generally discussing importance of Blyew); id at 483-87
(discussing Swayne's role in Rhodes); id at 505-07 (discussing Bradley-Swayne dissent in
Blyew).
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Bureau in Reconstruction-Era Alabama, may have had a stronger commitment
than Justice Bradley to honoring the true meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments.535 How would Swayne have ruled on Hurtado v. California536 or
O'Neil v. Vermont?537 We will never know. He retired in 1881 and died three
years later.538 Justice Field's views on incorporation remained a riddle during the
1870s after Slaughter-House. His silent assents to Cruikshank; Davidson, and
Lewis suggest little attention to the issue. He did dissent in Walker, but probably,
as we have seen, on other grounds.
As for Justice Miller and his majority colleagues in Slaughter-House, none
ever showed any lingering loyalty to the incorporationist implications of the
opinion they joined in 1873. Justice Miller himself, as we have seen, wrote the
opinion in Davidson and joined silently in Cruikhank, Walker, and Lewis. He
never showed any sign of wanting to resurrect a broader reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The same goes for Justices Davis, Strong, and Hunt,
who all joined Cruikshank and Walker and retired in 1877, 1880, and 1882,
respectively.539 Justice Clifford, as we have seen, dissented in Walker (but almost
certainly not on incorporationist grounds) and concurred separately in Cruikshank
(avoiding the incorporation issue), but wrote the opinion in Edwards and joined
silently in Davidson and Lewis. He died in office in 1881.540
What went wrong? Chief Justice Waite's mishandling of the incorporation
issue in both Cruikshank and Walker is perhaps explainable to a slight extent by
the fact that he alone on the 1874-76 Court had not been on the bench when
Slaughter-House was decided in 1873.541 But that was no hindrance to the
members of Congress who discussed the incorporationist meaning of Slaughter-
House in 1873-74.542 In assessing Waite's handiwork, we should perhaps also
keep in mind that, when appointed Chief Justice-he was President Grant's
seventh choice for the job!-he was "an undistinguished [real estate] lawyer"
with "no judicial experience," and was later described by Justice Field as "an
experiment which no President has a right to make with our Court."543 But where
were the other Justices who had presided in Slaughter-House? Was this sheer
535 See Aynes, Miller, supra note 41, at 674-76.
536 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.B.
537 144 U.S. 323 (1892); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4, at Part
I.A.
538 OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 850-51.
539 Id. at 967. Strong and Hunt joined silently in Davidson as well, as did Strong in Lewis.
See supra notes 523-31 and accompanying text.
540 OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 967.
541 Id.
542 See supra Part IRA.1.
543 IRONS, supra note 250, at 201-02.
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carelessness and inattention? Did the heavy backlog of cases on the Justices'
docket at the time tempt them to cut back on federal causes of action whenever
possible, even at the cost of trampling principles ofjudicial restraint and cursorily
nullifying a recently adopted constitutional amendment? 544
It is tempting to try and draw a connection between this turnabout on
incorporation and the disputed presidential election of 1876, which effectively
ended the Reconstruction Era. Professor C. Vann Woodward provided the classic
account of the crisis of 1876-77 and the Compromise of 1877 that resolved it.545
Democratic New York Governor Samuel J. Tilden defeated Republican Ohio
Governor Rutherford B. Hayes in the popular vote and received undisputed
electoral votes amounting to one short of a majority. The returns from Florida,
Louisiana, and South Carolina, and one electoral vote in Oregon, were in dispute.
Overheated partisan and sectional rhetoric, with amply justified cries of fraud and
deceit on both sides, threatened renewed civil war.546
The presidency was secured for Hayes, and the threat of violent Democratic
resistance defused, by a complex series of negotiations and compromises
between, on the one hand, Northern Republicans allied with Hayes and certain
railroad interests, and on the other, Southern Democrats anxious to promote
economic development and complete the White-supremacist "redemption" of the
South from Reconstruction. The key concessions to the Southern Democrats were
promises to (1) withdraw the remaining federal troops in the South from any
involvement in local political struggles, and in particular, allow disputed
Democratic governors to take office in Louisiana and South Carolina, (2) appoint
a Southern Democrat to the plum patronage Cabinet position of Postmaster
General, and (3) support federal subsidies for internal improvements benefiting
the South, most notably a new southern railroad route to the Pacific. 547
The Supreme Court became embroiled in the crisis when Congress
established a fifteen-member Electoral Commission in January 1877 to resolve
the disputed returns. Five members were chosen from the House and five from
the Senate, evenly divided between the parties. Four Justices, Republicans
Swayne and Strong and Democrats Clifford and Field, were named to the
Commission, and those four were authorized to appoint a fifth. It was generally
assumed that this fifteenth and tie-breaking member of the Commission would be
Justice Davis, who was regarded as an independent But then, in a bizarre turn of
544 Cf. KACZOROWSKI, POLITICs, supra note 88, at 225 (noting two-year backlog on
Court's docket around this time).
545 See generally WOODWARD, supra note 323; see also FONER, supra note 88, at 564-
87; FRANKLIN, supra note 88, at 203-10.
546 See WOODWARD, supra note 323, at 16-21; FONER, supra note 88, at 575-76.
547 See WOODWARD, supra note 323, at 22-149, 166-203; FONER, supra note 88, at 577-
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events, the Illinois state legislature elected Davis to the Senate and he declared
himself unavailable to serve on the Commission.5 48
Justice Bradley, a Republican like all the remaining members of the Court,
was appointed to the Commission in Justice Davis's stead. He proceeded to cast
the decisive vote in a series of 8-7 rulings upholding the returns favoring Hayes.
Bradley's reputation was severely tarnished in the process, not only by the party-
line nature of the Commission's votes, but also by allegations-never proven but
also never quite convincingly rebutted-that, after initially writing an opinion in
favor of Tilden, he changed his vote at the last minute under improper pressure or
influence.549 Despite the renewed uproar this triggered, the forces of compromise
prevailed. Congress accepted the Commission's verdict and declared Hayes the
winner with barely a day to spare before the new presidential term began on
March 4, 1877.550
This is all very interesting, of course, and it is certainly intriguing that
Justices Bradley and Swayne-two of the strongest incorporationists of the early
1870s-played such a prominent role, along with fellow Slaughter-House
dissenter and future incorporationist Justice Field. But does it have anything to do
with the incorporation issue? Was it the Compromise of 1877 that snuffed out the
"Lost Compromise" described in this article? There does not seem to be any
reason to think so. The timing is off, for one thing. As discussed in Parts L.B and
Ill.C, the Court had already seemingly abandoned the incorporationist consensus
of the early 1870s in Cruikshank and Walker, decided in March and April 1876,
almost a year before the Hayes-Tilden election crisis and the Justices'
involvement with the Electoral Commission.
Furthermore, incorporation was not a likely candidate to play a role in the
reaction against Reconstruction that came to a head in 1876-77. Far from it.
Southern Democrats themselves, as described in Part III.A.1, had recently and
forcefully articulated a textualist theory of total incorporation of the Bill of
Rights-repeatedly citing Slaughter-House as support-as their preferred
limiting construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal enforcement of the
freedmen's voting rights, equal access to civil rights in the public and private
548 See WOODWARD, supra note 323, at 150-54. Davis was a close friend of President
Abraham Lincoln and managed his presidential campaign in 1860. Lincoln appointed him to
the Supreme Court in 1862. Davis resigned from the Court on March 4, 1877, the same day he
took office as a senator. His successor on the Court was Justice Harlan. See OXFORD SUPREME
COURT, supra note 39, at 218-19, 362, 967; U.S. ELECTIONs, supra note 294, at 790.
Ironically, it appears that Democrats in the Illinois legislature backed Davis under the belief that
this would incline him to favor Tilden on the Commission. See WOODWARD, supra note 323, at
153-54. They outsmarted themselves, however, because the result, as noted in text, was victory
for Hayes.
54 9 See WOODWARD, supra note 323, at 154-63.
550 See generally id at 163-203.
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sectors, and the battle against the Ku Klux Klan and other state-sponsored and
private terrorism against African-Americans were all far more prominent
flashpoints during the 1870s. 51
The continuity in this regard with the debates of 1866-68, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted, is striking when viewed in
perspective. As other scholars have explored at length, the late 1860s were racked
by intense debates over such matters as whether African-Americans should be
granted voting rights and whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 should be enacted
or was constitutional.552 By contrast, as summarized in Part I.B, incorporation of
the Bill of Rights against the states, while strongly advocated by such men as
Bingham and Howard and certainly a foundation stone in Republican efforts to
extend federally guaranteed rights to the South, was simply not at the crest of
controversy. Not a single voice in Congress seems to have clearly disputed,
during the decade from 1866 to 1875, that the Fourteenth Amendment would and
did accomplish (at least) incorporation of textual constitutional guarantees as
applied to state action. The incorporation theory became, by the early 1870s, a
zone of consensus between Republicans and Democrats-a calm eye in the
constitutional and political hurricanes of the Reconstruction Era.
But returning to the puzzle of the late 1870s, exactly when, where, and why
did this compromise become lost? Professor Crosskey favored the rather
Machiavellian theory that Justice Miller and his Slaughter-House colleagues
intended and plotted all along for that opinion, and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause it construed, to be gutted as Chief Justice Waite seemed to accomplish in
Cruikshank In Crosskey's view, the Slaughter-House opinion was "most craftily
written... so as to enable the Court, with a good face, in future cases, to jump
either way: to observe the intended meaning of the ... Clause if that seemed
unavoidable, or, in the alternative, to destroy the clause utterly if this seemed
safe."553
This author tends to the view that we should not credit the Justices with too
much foresight or attention to the incorporation issue. It was probably not
uppermost in their minds. Justice Miller's language in Slaughter-House was most
likely ambiguous and sketchy simply because incorporation was an
uncontroversial side issue far removed from the dispute at bar. It should have
been a complete nonissue in Edwards, Walker, and Cruikshank To the extent it
got botched in those cases, this would seem to confirm the age-old wisdom that
courts should not reach out to address issues not pressed before them or necessary
551 See generally, eg., KACzoROwVsK, PoLmcs, supra note 88.
552 See generally, e.g., JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 88; JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra
note 88.
553 2 CROSsKEY, POLrrIcs, supra note 49, at 1130; see also id. at 1129 (descnbing
incorporationist dicta in Slaughter-House as both "ambiguous" and "evasive").
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to their decisions. 554 Carelessness and inattention, coupled with a generic and
growing inclination to limit federal judicial power and obligations whenever
possible, may be the most likely culprits, however boring and unsatisfactory such
an explanation may seem.
But does this unraveling consensus on incorporation in the decade after
Slaughter-House tend to disprove the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-
House itself?. This is perhaps the strongest ground on which to challenge the
thesis set forth in this article. One of the greatest claims to virtue of any theory is
that it has explanatory power, that it reduces the sum total of confusion and
uncertainty in the universe. The unorthodox reading of Slaughter-House urged
here resolves, to some extent, the apparent puzzle of why Miller, a Republican
Justice writing for a Republican-dominated Court,5 55 would (as depicted under
the orthodox reading) slaughter a key Clause of the Republican-backed
Fourteenth Amendment. This article argues that the majority was not guilty of
any such crime, at least in 1873-that the Slaughter-House decision did not live
up to its name.556
This reading, however, concededly generates other questions. If that was
what Justice Miller intended or understood, why did he and his colleagues seem
to abandon that reading so soon, and with so little explanation? I myself have not
been able to answer this question to my own full satisfaction. But it bears
emphasizing that there is really nothing new about the puzzle of why certain
Justices seem to have flip-flopped on the incorporation issued during the 1870s.
The apparent change of heart by Miller and his majority colleagues may forever
remain a puzzle. But it is no more a puzzle (in fact, arguably less so) than why
Justices Bradley and Swayne-whose incorporationist credentials in Slaughter-
House are not in doubt-seemed to tum tail by 1876. Orthodox and unorthodox
readers of Slaughter-House alike are in the same boat on that one.
Defenders of the orthodox reading might argue that the supposed Miller flip-
flop is more troubling than the Bradley-Swayne about-face. Perhaps Bradley and
554 See supra note 122.
555 Throughout 1873-77, six of the nine Justices were Republicans (Chief Justice Chase
and then his successor, Chief Justice Waite, and Justices Bradley, Hunt, Miller, Strong, and
Swayne). OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 39, at 81 (Bradley); id at 136 (Chase); id at
417 (Hunt); id. at 548 (Miller); id. at 846 (Strong); id. at 850 (Swayne); id at 906 (Waite); see
also id. at 967 (table of Justices and their tenures). Justice Davis was generally viewed as an
independent but he was appointed by the first Republican President, Lincoln, whose
presidential campaign he had managed. See supra note 548 and accompanying text. Justices
Clifford and Field were Democrats, but Field was a Unionist Lincoln appointee and, as we
have seen, generally favored a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. OXFORD SUPREME
COURT, supra note 39, at 161 (Clifford); id at 290 (Field).
556 Cf BRANT, supra note 22, at 347 (arguing that Slaughter-House "was truly a slaughter
of the Constitution as far as privileges and immunities were concemed').
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Swayne merely acceded to the majority view from which they dissented in
Slaughter-House. They gave up. So what? That's not unheard of for dissenters.
But Bradley had not given up by 1874, when he wrote his incorporationist circuit
court opinion in Cruikshank557 Furthermore, as discussed in the sequel to this
article, Bradley (along with Field) remained emphatically unreconciled to what
they saw as the actual point of dispute between the Slaughter-House majority and
dissenters as late as 1884, when the Court revisited Slaughter-House in a case
involving Louisiana's repeal of the very same disputed monopoly. 58
This author tends to suspect that there was some deeper current at work,
perhaps unplanned and unintended, that shifted the tide away from the
incorporationist consensus of Slaughter-House and the early 1870s. This tide was
obviously strong enough to sweep up even once-emphatic incorporationists like
Justice Bradley. It thus seems less surprising that it would carry along those, like
Justice Miller and his Slaughter-House majority colleagues, who--it should be
conceded-were probably never that strongly attached to the incorporation
theory in the first place. Justices Field and Harlan, of course, would later fight
back against that tide, but that story is best left to the sequel.
Focusing on what Miller or other Justices personally intended or believed is
ultimately somewhat beside the point in any event.559 Whether Miller or any
other Justice personally supported incorporation at any given time is not that
important. What is important is that all the Justices in Slaughter-House wrote or
joined opinions which, taken together in historical context are most reasonably
read to recognize-as minimum common ground-the incorporationist
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. What is equally important is that
they were in fact so read by many of their contemporaries, including leaders
across the political spectrum in a coequal branch of government.
The thesis of total incorporation of all, but only, rights textually guaranteed
by the Constitution has been, and will continue to be, subject to attack from
557 See supra Part III.C.
558 See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 746-54 (1884) (opinion of the
Court by Miller, J., upholding repeal while noting validity of monopoly was upheld in 1873
Slaughter-House decision); id. at 754-60 (Field, L, concurring in upholding repeal on grounds
that monopoly was inherently invalid as contended in his 1873 Slaughter-House dissent); id. at
760-66 (Bradley, J., concurring) (same); see also Wildenthal, Road to Twining, supra note 4,
at Part II.C.
559 Cf., e.g., Newsorn, supra note 22, at 687-88 (properly recognizing that his exploration
of "Miller's personal judicial philosophy" is ultimately "relevant only insofar as it sheds light
on the proper understanding of the text of the Court's opinion").
2000] 1169
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
opposite sides by scholars of the original understanding:5 60 both by those
contending that it reads too much into the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and
those contending that it reads too much out. As suggested in Part Ml.E, the thesis
is, in reality, much more vulnerable to the latter criticism than to the former. For
reasons discussed in Part Ml.E, there are strong textual arguments for so limiting
the Clause. But there is, admittedly, something a bit circular in arguing that the
text must necessarily be limited by the text. Professor Laurence Tribe has noted
"the simple but ultimately deep problem of self-referential regress whenever one
seeks to validate, from within any text's four comers, a particular method of
giving that text meaning."561
Many of us today may be textualists and positivists, but who is to say that
those of the Civil War generation were? In fact, many, perhaps most of them,
were not.56 2 They were highly enamored of vague and lofty principles of natural
law untethered to positive text Like Justice Field, they "require[d] no aid from
560 This article and its sequel, see supra note 4, having more than enough on their plates
already, do not generally attempt to address the broader theoretical issues regarding the
propriety of originalist (historical) and nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.
For an overview of those issues, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980), H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on
Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMM. 43 (1987), Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988), Antonin Scalia, Oiginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1989), Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989), and Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). For an excellent overview of the relationships and distinctions
between historical/originalist and textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation, see
PMLIP BOBBrrr, CONSTrTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF TBE CONSTrTUTION 9-38 (1982). My
present articles are written on the assumption that historical evidence relevant to the original
understanding has at least some importance to most scholars (and judges and practicing
lawyers) concerned with constitutional issues-even those who (like myself) are skeptical of
how such evidence is sometimes used. I do, obviously, argue that the historical evidence
discussed in these articles supports the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment to (at least) the degree currently recognized by the Supreme Court. I plan to
pursue in future articles more theoretical questions regarding the significance and proper use of
historical evidence in interpreting the Constitution.
561 Tribe, Comment, in A MATER OFNTERPRETA-TON, supra note 12, at 65,76.
There is certainly nothing in the text itself that proclaims the Constitution's text to be the sole or
ultimate point of reference-and even if there were, such a self-referential proclamation would
raise the problem of infinite regress and would, in addition, leave unanswered the very question
with which we began: how is the text's meaning to be ascertained?
Id. at 77-78.
562 See supra Parts II.C-E; ANTIEAU, supra note 266, at 47-63, 207-30; BOND, supra
note 82, at 255-57. See generally Olson, supra note 266; Smith, Natural Law, supra note 147.
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any bill of rights"5 63 to defend the "sacred and imprescriptible rights of man."564
Many, perhaps most, Civil War-Era legal thinkers may have found a textualist
vision of law incapable of fully protecting the rights they held dear. Can we
faithfully, or even coherently, interpret the amendments they authored and ratified
without honoring their way of thinking about the law itself?. At the same time, as
discussed in Part II.E, many of that generation, even Republicans committed to
fundamental change, adhered to a traditional, limited view of federal judicial
power.
It is a difficult problem, but not intractable. It has long been persuasively
argued that the very legitimacy of judicial review in our democratic society
demands that judges adhere to a textualist approach to the Constitution.565 Such a
view was widely, though not universally, embraced by the Constitution's
founding generation, and in any event, undergirds the logic, and more
importantly, the legitimacy, of judicial review as set forth by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.566 As Marshall reasoned:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited,
and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?567
And as Justice James Iredell argued five years earlier in Calder v. Bull.568
If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a State, violates... constitutional
provisions, it is unquestionably void.... If on the other hand, [any]
Legislature... shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional
power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their
judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are
regulated by no fixed standard. the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the
563 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (Field, J., dissenting).
564 Id. at 110 (Field, j., dissenting).
565 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 8-9. In a nutshell, textualism "supports judicial review
while answering the charge that the practice is undemocratic," because the judges are, by
definition, merely enforcing the higher law decreed by the people. See i. at 9 (quoting Thomas
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975)); see also,
e g., BLACK, supra note 173, at 18-21.
566 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
567 Ia at 176; see also BLACK, supra note 173, at 18-19 (quoting and discussing this
language in Marbury).
568 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
2000] 1171
OHIO STATE LA WJOURAL
opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural
justice.5 69
Some form of textualism was thus, at least arguably, part of the original
constitutional "deal." Later amendments to the Constitution have necessarily been
framed and adopted by later generations, in at least one case by combinations of
generations stretching across the ages.570 Certainly any honest understanding and
application of such amendments requires that we take into account the
conceptions and attitudes of the generations that framed and adopted them. But
ultimately they must be interpreted, not as freestanding documents from a given
age, but as integral parts of a single Constitution that both predates and postdates
them. They may have been their amendments, but they became part of our
Constitution. As Professor Steven Calabresi has commented, we should "read the
Fourteenth Amendment in light of the federalism and separation of powers values
that suffuse the whole of the original Constitution."571
The theory of total and textual incorporation fits that bill perfectly. It
accomplishes much of what the post-Civil War Reconstructionists wanted in the
way of limiting state authority to abuse the fundamental rights and liberties of
free citizens. But it does so squarely within the secure and traditional premises of
antebellum constitutional theory reflected in Calder and Marbury. If today's
Supreme Court is to take up the invitation of Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Saenz v. Roe572 and reassess the conventional view of Slaughter-
House and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, why should the Justices of
today not arrive at where their forebears began in 1873?573 Why should they be
5 69 Id. at 399 (separate opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Samuel Chase's lead opinion
(speaking only for himself), see id. at 386-95, has traditionally been viewed as embracing a
natural law ideology diametrically opposed to Iredell's textualism. See, e.g., GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 454-56. Dean Ely, however, has argued that a close reading of
Chase's opinion indicates that, while he spoke in terms of natural justice, Chase, like Iredell,
only supported the exercise of judicial review when a violation of constitutional text was
shown. See ELY, supra note 6, at 209-11 n.41.
570 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at app. A-15 n.* (describing ratification of
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII, which was proposed in 1789, but
not ratified until 1992).
571 Calabresi, supra note 63, at 2304.
572 526 U.S. 489, 521-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist CJ., dissenting); see
also supra Part L.A (quoting and discussing Saenz).
573 The fact that the states have relied for more than a century on the Court's
disincorporation of the rights to civil jury trial (in Edwards and Walker, see supra Part Im.B)
and grand jury indictment (in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), see Wildenthal, Road
to Twining, supra note 4, at Part II.B)-to the point of substantially restructuring their civil and
criminal justice systems-does fumish a persuasive argument for respecting stare decisis in
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unable to embrace the consensus achieved between radical progressives like
Senator Howard and obdurate conservatives like Senator Norwood? Why should
they not resurrect the compromise that once was lost but has now again been
found?
those regards. But bowing out of necessity to Walker and Hurtado does not undermine the
legitimacy or feasibility of otherwise total incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
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